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JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UC.A. § 78A-4-103(2)U)
& § 78A-3-102U). This appeal is from a summary judgment granted by the Hon. Ryan
M. Harris of the Third District Court, Summit County, State of Utah entered on October
1, 2014.
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW & PRESERVATION

Issue No. 1: The District Court erred in granting defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment on Mayflower's Public Road Claim because the District Court made
erroneous conclusions of law, made unreasonable inferences in favor of the moving
parties rather than reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving parties, and ignored
disputed issues of material fact.

Standard of review: This Court reviews a summary judgment for correctness,
giving no deference to the trial court's decision and the de novo standard ofreview
applies regardless of the nature (fact-intensive or not) of the underlying law governing
the parties' rights. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ~~ 15-16, 250 P.3d 56; see also Waddoups
v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69,

~

21, 54 P.3d 1054 (in reviewing a trial court's

grant of summary judgment, we give the trial court's legal decisions no deference,
reviewing for correctness). A trial court decides motions for summary judgment as a
matter of law as there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ~
15. Thus, the appellate court has the same paper record that was before the trial court to

•
decide whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at ,r 17.
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's October 1, 2014 Memorandum Decision and
Order. (R6009-6034.)
Issue No. 2: The District Court erred in determining that a single purpose road

cannot be deemed a highway dedicated to the public through continuous use.
Standard of review: De novo standard of review. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ,r,r

15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at ,r 21; see also Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, ,r 8, 48
P.3d 949 (the district court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review
for correctness).
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's October 1, 2014 Memorandum Decision and
Order. (R6009-6034.)
Issue No. 3: The District Court erred in concluding that prospectors under the

Mining Law of 1872 are not members of the general public and have an inchoate
property interest.
Standard of review: De novo standard of review. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at iJ,r

15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at ,r 21; Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at ,r 8.
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Preservation: Mayflower' s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's October 1, 2014 Memorandum Decision and
Order. (R6009-6034.)

Issue No. 4: The District Court did not make all inferences in Mayflower's favor
on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Standard of review: De novo standard of review. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ,i,i
15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at ,i 21.

Preservation: Mayflower' s Memorandum in Opposition to Intervenors' Motion
for Summary Judgment and United Park City Mines Company's Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment. (R3507-35 l 1.)

Issue No. 5: The District Court applied a "clear and convincing" burden of proof
to Mayflower's public road claim rather than the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard proscribed by statute.

Standard of review: De novo standard of review. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ,ii]
15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at if 21; Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at iJ 8.

Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's October 1, 2014 Memorandum Decision and
Order. (R6009-6034.)

Issue No. 6: The District Court erred in permitting defendants to argue an
alternative access theory, brought for the first time in defendants' summary judgment
briefing.

3

Standard of review: De novo standard of review. Se? Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at iliI

15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at~ 21; Jensen v. Skypark Landowners Ass 'n, 2013 UT
App 48,

~

2,299 P.3d 609.

Preservation: Mayflower's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs'

Motion for Summary Judgment (Revised). (R5546-5676.)
Issue No. 7: The District Court erred in denying Mayflower leave to amend to file

a Second Amended Complaint and to pursue the previously asserted appurtenant
easement claim.
Standard of review: This Court reviews whether a trial court properly denied a

request to amend a pleading under Rule 15 under the abuse of discretion standard. See

Daniels v. Gamma W Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ~ 57,221 P.3d 256 (citing
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1998)); see also Posner v.
Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ~ 23, 222 P.3d 775 (when reviewing
whether the district court properly enforced a scheduling order, this Court reviews the
district court's determinations under the abuse of discretion standard).
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File

a Second Amended Complaint (R2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Suppo1i of Its
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014
Hearing on Mayflower's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.
(R4324-4325.)
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Issue No. 8: The District Court erred in finding that defendants would need
discovery on Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim because Mayflower intended to
establish its appurtenant easement claim based on the existing record.
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion standard. See Daniels, 2009 UT 66 at ,i
57; see also Posner, 2009 UT App 347 at ,i 23.
Preservation: Mayflower's March 20 12 Disclosures (R1852-1874); Mayflower's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint
(R2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Support oflts Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014 Hearing on Mayflower's Motion for
Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (R4324-4325.)
Issue No. 9: The District Court erred in its reliance on the March 8, 20 12 Order
when denying Mayflower's motion for leave to amend because the March 8, 2012 Order
was an abuse of discretion.
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion standard. See Daniels, 2009 UT 66 at ,i
57; see also Posner, 2009 UT App 347 at ,i 23.
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File
a Second Amended Complaint (R2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Support of Its
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014
Hearing on Mayflower's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.
(R4324-4325.)
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Issue No. 10: Mayflower's March 2012 Disclosures complied with the March 8,

20 12 Order.
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion standard of review. Posner, 2009 UT

App 347 at ~ 23.
Preservation: Mayflower' s March 2012 Disclosures (R1852-1874); Mayflower's

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (R
2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Support oflts Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014 Hearing on Mayflower' s Motion for
Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (R4324-4325.)
Issue No. 11: Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend would not have

prejudiced defendants.
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion standard of review. See Daniels, 2009

UT 66 at ii 57; Posner, 2009 UT App 347 at~ 23.
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File

a Second Amended Complaint (R 2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Support oflts
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014
Hearing on Mayflower's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.
(R4324-4325.)
Issue No. 12: The District Court erred in granting United Park summary judgment

and dismissing Mayflower's prescriptive easement claim because there were disputed
issues of material fact.
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Standard of review: This Court reviews the trial court's determination of an

easement de novo, as it is a conclusion of law. Alvey Dev. Corp. v. Mackelprang, 2002
UT App 220, ,i 7, 51 P.3d 45. The appellate court has the same paper record that was
before the trial court to decide whether there are genuine issues of material fact and
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at

'ii 17.
Preservation: Mayflower's Opposition to United Park City Mines Company's

Motion for Summary Judgment. (R2349-2355.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STA TUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

1.

Mining Act of 1866, § 8, R.S. § 2477;

2.

Mining Law of 1872, §§ 1, 5, 6, R.S. §§ 2319, 2324, 2325
(30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 28, 29);

3.

1880 Utah Highway Act,§§ 2-3;

4.

U.C.A. § 72-5-301(1);

5.

U.C.A. § 72-5-302(3)(b);

6.

U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b);

7.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) & (b)

8.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) (pre-2011 version)

9.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) (pre-2011 version)

10.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) (pre-2011 version)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs and appellants Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting
Mayflower Recreational Fonds ( collectively "Mayflower") are the successors in the chain
of title to mining claims on Flagstaff Mountain that date as far back as 1871. Through
this action, Mayflower seeks to preserve and vindicate its rights of access, ingress, and
egress to its mining claims over a road that Mayflower's predecessor in the chain ohitle
built in 1871 and over which Mayflower had uninterrupted access until 2006 when
defendant United Park City Mines Co. obliterated part of this historic road and sought to
cut-off Mayflower's access to State Route 224 ("SR-224").
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Historical records from the General Land Office ("GLO") (now the Bureau of
Land Management) establish that in 1871 Mayflower's predecessors located the Flagstaff
Mining Claim, the first mining claim near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2894.)
Those records also establish that the Flagstaff Mine claimants built two miles of road to
the Flagstaff Mining Claim from Park City. 1 (R2894.) The Flagstaff Mining claimants
later applied for and received a mining patent for the Flagstaff Mining Claim, the first
mining patent issued near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2900-2908.) The
Flagstaff Mine patent granted the Flagstaff Mine Claimants ownership of the Flagstaff

For purposes of this action, the parts of the historic Flagstaff Road near the
Flagstaff Mine have been referred to as the Primary Access Road-(including the Lower
and Upper) and the Flagstaff Loop Road. These segments, along with parts of what is
now SR-224, were all part of the historic Flagstaff Road.
8

Mine along with the rights necessary to work the mine. See id. Chief among these rights
was the right of access to the mining claim.
Although field notes of numerous subsequent, nearby mining claims refer to an
existing wagon road to Park City, no other field notes refer to the construction of such a
road. (R2912-2919 (Uncle Charles); R2953-2961 (Home Station); R2939-2947 (Lucky
Bill); R2989-2997 (Peeler); R3007 (Boliver Plat); R3005 (Boliver 2 Plat); R3015-30 18
(Overlooked Fraction).). Nor was there any other evidence in the historical record that
someone other than the Flagstaff Mine claimants built the Flagstaff Road. Thus, the
reasonable inference from these facts is that these subsequent filed notes were referring to
the Flagstaff Road.
Pursuant to Section 8 of the 1866 Mining Act (14 Stat. 251,253 (July 26, 1866)
(R.S. § 24 77), the Flagstaff Road, including the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff
Loop Road, became a public right-of-way upon completion. The Flagstaff Road was
constructed over what at the time was the unreserved public domain. (R2900-2908.) In
addition to references in several field notes, survey notes, and survey plats between 1871
and 1901, the Primary Access Road and part of the Flagstaff Loop Road are shown in the
same location as they were when this action commenced on a topographic map surveyed
in 1901. (R3043-3044.) Thereafter, the roads appear in the same positions as they were
at the time this action commenced in aerial photography in 1950, and topographic maps
from 1955 and 1998. (R3051 -3053, R3055, R3061-3063.)
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Beginning in the years following the discovery of the Flagstaff Mine, and
continuing for more than 50 years, prospectors combed the mountains outside Park City,
including Flagstaff Mountain, and successful prospectors laid claim to virtually all of the
land near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2900-2908 (Flagstaff); R2928-293 I
(Uncle Charles); R3015-3018 (Overlooked Fraction and White); R3009-3011 (Boliver 2);
R2983-2987 (Lucky Bill); R2965-2968 (Home Station); R3001-3003 (Peeler); R30243026 (Thurman Jr.); R3030-3035 (Ray and Cooledge); R2935-2937 (Silver Hill).) The
use of the Flagstaff Road, including the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff Loop
Road, by these successful and unsuccessful prospectors resulted in the Flagstaff Road
being deemed a highway dedicated to the public through continuous public use when the
Utah Territorial Legislature passed the 1880 Utah Highway Act. Under the 1880 Utah
Highway Act, a road was deemed dedicated to the public if it was continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for at least five years. 1880 Utah Highway Act§§ 2-3. That was the
case here, as members of the general public continuously used the Flagstaff Road as a
public thoroughfare from 1871 until the 1920s. (See e.g., above.)
Access to the Flagstaff Mining claim and other mining claims that Mayflower now
owns was uninterrupted through 2005, when this action was filed. (Rl-6.) Mayflower
filed this action because United Park obtained approval to construct the Red Cloud
Subdivision near the summit ofFlagstaffMountain, and in the process of building that
subdivision, obliterated parts of the historic Primary Access Road. Although listing a
single claim for relief denominated a prescriptive easement claim, Mayflower's prior
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counsel asserted facts that would support relief under several theories, including that:
(i) the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff Loop Road were public roads under Utah
law; (ii) Mayflower was entitled to access pursuant to easements appurtenant to the
mining patents Mayflower owned; (iii) Mayflower was entitled to access pursuant to a
prescriptive easement based on its long-time use of the Primary Access Road and the
Flagstaff Loop Road; and (iv) if the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff Loop Road
were not public highways under Utah law, or for some reason ceased to be public
highways, Mayflower had a private right of access over the historic Flagstaff Road rightof-way as an owner of mining claims that abutted the historic right-of-way. (R4-5.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mayflower filed its action against United Park in 2005. Stichting Mayflower
Mountain Fonds v. United Park City Mines Co., Case No. 050500500 (Third Jud. Dist.,
Summit County). (Rl-6.) Very little occurred in the case until 2009 when the District
Court consolidated Mayflower's case with Silver Cloud, LLC v. United Park City Mines
Co., Case No. 050500430 (consolidated with Case No. 050500500) (Third Jud. Dist.,
Summit County). (R262-268.)
In December 2010, Mayflower's prior counsel moved to amend the Complaint, a
motion which the District Court granted in December 2011. (R1552-1556.) The
Amended Complaint again contained a single claim for relief denominated a prescriptive
easement claim. (R410-411.) That single claim, however, contained allegations that
would support relief under a public road theory, a private right of access theory, an
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appurtenant easement theory, and a prescriptive easement theory. (R410-411.) Relevant
here, the District Court thoroughly analyzed the Amended Complaint before granting
leave to amend. (R1565.)
In March 2012, the District Court denied defendant/appellee United Park's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings on Mayflower' s Amended Complaint. (R1695-1698.)
While denying United Park' s Motion, the District Court raised issues with the Amended
Complaint that it had analyzed and approved three months prior, and sua sponte ordered
Mayflower to make pre-trial disclosures. (Id.) The District Court ordered Mayflower to
identify all of its claims, all of the facts upon which it intended to rely, all of the
witnesses it would potentially call at trial, all of the case law and statutes upon which it
intended to rely, and re-produce hard copies of any documents Mayflower intended to
proffer as evidence at trial. (Id.) No trial date was pending in March 201 2, and the
District Court's order only applied to Mayflower, i.e. United Park was not required to
make similar disclosures. (Id.) The District Court fmiher ruled that Mayflower would be
precluded from using at trial any theories, statutes, case law, facts, witnesses, or
documents not identified or produced in response to the District Court's Order. See id.
Mayflower complied with the District Court' s Order, identifying theories, facts,
supporting statutes and case law, witnesses, and documents and re-producing documents
that Mayflower intended to rely upon at trial. (R1852-1874.)
In May 201 2, United Park moved for summary judgment. (R1995.) In August
2012, the District Court granted United Park summary judgment on Mayflower's
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prescriptive easement claim, but ruled that Mayflower was entitled to take its public road
claim to trial. (R2563.) Neither the district court nor the parties addressed the
appurtenant easement or private right of access claim in the 2012 summary judgment
briefing or order.

In October 20 12, shortly before trial was to commence, the Empire Pass Master
Owners Association and the Red Cloud Homeowners Association (the "HOA
Defendants") intervened as defendants. (R2624.) In March 2013, after former counsel
for Mayflower resigned and current counsel for Mayflower entered an appearance, the
District Court reopened discovery for all paities. (R2710.) During expert discovery, the
HOA Defendants submitted an expert report of Ernest Rowley. (R2768.) At his
December 2013 deposition, Mr. Rowley stated that all easement claims, including
appurtenant easement claims, were out of the case based on the August 2012 Order.
Following the conclusion of expert discovery, and in response to Mr. Rowley's
mischaracterization of the status of the case, Mayflower moved for leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint to make clear the different theories and claims set forth in the
Amended Complaint and the March 2012 disclosures. (R2780.) While this motion was
pending, the parties submitted competing Motions for Summary Judgment. (R2833,
3179.) Mayflower sought summary judgment on its public road claim as well as on its
appurtenant easement claim. After seeking extensions, defendants responded to
Mayflower's motion with a Motion to Strike based on the March 2012 Order. (R3749.)
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The District Court heard Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend and
Defendants' Motion to Strike in June 2014. (R4836.) Even though Mayflower's
proposed Second Amended Complaint relied solely on the existing record developed in
discovery, the District Court denied the motion based on the restrictions imposed only on
Mayflower in the March 2012 Order, because of the time since the case had been filed,
and based on defendants' unsupported claim that they would need additional discovery
on Mayflower's appmtenant easement claim. (R4837-4838, R4324.) The District Court
also struck Mayflower's Motion for Summary Judgment on its appurtenant easement
claim. (R5995.)
In September 2014, the District Court heard argument on competing motions for
summary judgment on Mayflower's public road claim. (R6098.) On October 1, 2014, the
District Court denied Mayflower's motion and granted defendants' motion. (R5963.) On
October 15, 20 14, Mayflower moved to alter or amend the October 1, 2014 Order
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R5999-6002.) The District
Court denied that motion on December 12, 2014. (R6076-6083.) Mayflower then
noticed this appeal on January 8, 2015 . (R6084-6086.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on
Mayflower's public road claim. In its October 2014 Order, the District Court determined
that an R.S. § 2477 road used for a single purpose cannot be dedicated to the public under
Utah law and that prospectors have inchoate property rights and therefore are not
members of the general public for purposes of establishing acceptance of the public road.
Both of these conclusions were contrary to law. This Court has specifically stated that
even an R.S. § 2477 road used for a single purpose could be deemed a highway dedicated
to the public. And, under the Mining Law of 1872., a prospector could be any citizen or
future citizen of the United States and had no inchoate property rights. In addition to
these errors, the District Court did not make all reasonable inferences from the record in
Mayflower' s favor, and in contrary to this Court' s precedent made inferences in favor of
the moving parties. Finally, the District Court applied too stringent a burden of proof in
ruling on the competing summary judgment motions, ignoring the burden set by statute.
As the evidence and inferences support Mayflower's public road claim and present
disputed issues of material fact, the District Court's October 2014 Order should be
reversed and this action remanded for a trial on Mayflower's public road claim.
The District Court also erred by denying Mayflower leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint and to pursue its previously asserted appurtenant easement claim.
Mayflower's Second Amended Complaint was an attempt to clarify and conform the
pleadings to the evidence. Mayflower' s appurtenant easement claim is rooted in the
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mining claims that Mayflower owns and relies on the existing pleadings and discovery
record. Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim was included in Mayflower's Amended
Complaint and in Mayflower's March 2012 Disclosures. The District Court, however,
denied Mayflower's motion based on its improper application and reliance on the District
Court's March 2012 Order - an order that itself was an abuse of discretion because it
went beyond the discretion granted to the District Court pursuant to Rule l 6(b) (pre-2011
version), violated Rules 16(d) (pre-2011 version) and 37(b) (pre-2011 version), and
unduly prejudiced Mayflower. The District Court further erred in concluding that
allowing the Second Amended Complaint would have prejudiced defendants and was
filed too late.
Finally, the district court erred in dismissing Mayflower's prescriptive easement
claim as the court erred in its application of the legal definition of "adverse" use. Had the
District Court applied the proper interpretation of adverse use, the District Court would
have found disputed issues of material fact that precluded the August 2012 summary
judgment ruling in favor United Park.
Based on the foregoing, and as established below, this Court should reverse the
District Court's October 2014, July 2014, and August 2012 rulings and remand this case
to the District Court for a trial on Mayflower's public road claim, appurtenant easement
claim, and prescriptive easement claim.
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ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court Erred in Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Mayflower's Public Road Claims

Summary judgment is an extreme remedy that should only be granted in
appropriate circumstances. Strand v. Mayne, 384 P.2d 396, 397 (Utah 1963). For the
District Court to have granted defendants' summary judgment motion on Mayflower's
public road claims, the District Court had to find, based on admissible evidence, that
there were no material facts in dispute and that defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah
1982). As demonstrated below, the District Court erred in so finding.

In concluding that Mayflower could not meet the burden of proof for establishing
a public road,2 the District Court went beyond this Court's precedent and concluded that
a road used for a single purpose, regardless of the number of users, cannot be deemed to
be dedicated to the public through continuous use. (R5985-5992.) The District Court
also erred in its belief that prospectors are not members of the general public, but instead
had some inchoate property right that made them property or rights owners equal to
locators, claimants, or patentees. (R5989-5993.) Relying upon these erroneous
conclusions, and failing to construe all reasonable inferences in favor of Mayflower, the
District Court determined that Mayflower could not demonstrate that the remnants of the

In its December 12, 20 14 Order, the District Court suggests that even if the burden
of proof is preponderance of the evidence, it would still grant summary judgment for the
defendants. (R6077-6081.) As explained in Section I.D, infra, the correct burden of
proof on Mayflower's public road claims is preponderance of the evidence.
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Flagstaff Road, i.e. the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff Loop Road, are public
roads under Utah law. (R5985-5992.) Because the District Court's summary judgment
ruling is based on these erroneous findings, along with a failure to construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of Mayflower, and a misapplication of the undisputed facts to the law,
this Court should reverse the District Court's October 1, 2014 and December 12, 2014
Orders and remand this case to the District Court for a trial on Mayflower's public road
claims.

A.

A Single Purpose Road Can Be Deemed a Highway
Dedicated to the Public Through Continuous Use

In Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1929), this Court
established the framework that has guided Utah public road jurisprudence for more than
80 years. In finding that the road at issue in Churnos was a public road, this Court
analyzed the history of the road, the different purposes for which the road was used, the
users of the road, and the length of time the road was used prior to the surrounding land
becoming privately owned. Id. at 648-49. While this Court noted the significance of the
fact that the road at issue had been used for different purposes, this Court also specifically
stated that "[i]f the claim rested alone upon the use of the road for sawmill purposes, or
for mining purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, the question would be more difficult."

Id. at 648. Thus, this Court established that a single purpose R.S. § 2477 road could be
deemed to be a public road through continuous use.
Neither this Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals have held differently in the
intervening 85 years. And Federal Courts sitting in Utah or applying Utah law have
18

similarly made rulings that left open the possibility that use of a road for a single purpose
was sufficient for finding that a R.S. § 2477 road was a public road. See So. Utah

Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 768 (10th Cir. 2005) ("SUWA").
The District Court went beyond Churnos and SUWA and believed that the question
of whether a road used for a single purpose could be deemed dedicated to the public
needed to be answered. (R5985-5992.) And in so doing, the District Court answered that
question contrary to Churnos and SUWA and ruled that a road used for a single purpose,
regardless of the amount of use by the general public, precludes a finding that the road is
a public highway. (R5985-5992.) This finding was in enor. In reaching that conclusion,
the District Court relied on other Utah Supreme Court cases and the Federal case of San

Juan County v. United States, No. 2:04-CV-0552BSJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460,
2011 WL 2144762 (D. Utah May 27, 2011. (R5985-5992.) Rather than consider all of
the factors this Court identified in Wasatch Cnty. v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, 179 P .3d
768, and the cases cited therein, one of which was the number of users of the road, the
District Court focused on the purpose of use. (R5985-5992.) And that narrow focus led
the Court to ignore the " difficult" question posed by the Churnos court and set forth a
rule that is inconsistent with Utah law.
Three of the cases that the District Court relies upon, Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127
(Utah 1916), Thompson v. Nelson, 273 P. 720 (Utah 1954), and Petersen v. Combe, 438
P.2d 545 (Utah 1968), are inapposite, as these three cases involved property owners or
invitees of a landowner. As discussed below, that situation is absent in the case of
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prospectors on Flagstaff Mountain, who were exploring the surveyed and unsurveyed
public domain. See 30 U.S.C. § 22. Thus, cases involving private property owners or
their invitees are not applicable here.
The other cases that the District Court relies upon - Cassity v. Castano, 347 P.2d
834 (Utah 1959), Harding v. Bohman, 491 P .2d 233 (Utah 1971 ), and the San Juan

County case - involve use of roads on public land. However, in each of these cases, there
was minimal use - a few cattlemen heading to Stansbury Island (Castano), two sheepmen
going to grazing land (Harding), and three cattle owners over 60 years (San Juan

County). While the users may have had a single purpose, it was the small number of
users, not the purpose of use, that led this Court or the Federal District Court to find there
had not been use by the general public. Indeed, this reading is consistent with Churnos,
which does not foreclose finding a single purpose R.S. § 2477 road is a public road. See

Churnos, 286 P. at 648. Thus, the District Court erred in "answering" the difficult
question posed by this Court in Churnos and finding that only multi-purpose R.S. § 2477
roads can be deemed a highway dedicated to the public through use.
B.

Prospectors Are the General Public

The District Court also erred in its conclusion that a "prospector" had an inchoate
property right, and therefore was not a member of the general public for purposes of use
of the Flagstaff Road. The District Court equated a prospector to a locator, claimant, or
patentee under the General Mining Law of 1872, as locators, claimants, and patentees did
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have property rights under the law. The distinction between these groups is set forth in
the statutory language of the Mining Law of 1872.
A "prospector" was or could be any citizen or future citizen of the United States.
See Mining Law of 1872, § 1, R.S. § 2319 (30 U.S.C. § 22). "Except as otherwise

provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both
surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, ... , by
citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become
such." Id. ( emphasis added). Thus, virtually anyone residing in the United States could

be a prospector, i.e. one who explores or searches for minerals.
While a prospector has no rights to the unclaimed federal lands that differ from
any member of the general public, other classifications of groups, " locators,"
"claimants," and "patentees," did have certain property rights based on their
classification. A " locator," or a "claimant," was someone who through prospecting
located a claim. To become a locator, a prospector had to stake out a claim, record the
claim in accordance with the rules and regulations of the mining district or territory, and
perform a certain amount of work each year to remain in possession. See Mining Law of
1872, § 5, R.S. § 2324 (30 U.S.C. § 28). While all claimants or locators were once
prospectors, not all prospectors became claimants or locators.
A "patentee" was a locator or claimant who applied for and received a Federal
land patent on his or her claim. To receive a patent, a locator or claimant had to submit
an application, publish notice of the application, and perform at least $500 of work on the
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claim. See Mining Law of 1872, § 6, R.S. § 2325 (30 U.S.C. § 29). All patentees were
locators or claimants, but not all locators or claimants became patentees. Thus, it is
contrary to the unambiguous language of the Mining Law of 1872 to equate prospectors
with locators, claimants, or patentees.
There is another significant difference between "prospectors" on the one hand and
"locators", "claimants", or "patentees" on the other. The latter groups are identifiable by
reference to records on file with mining districts, county recorders, and the General Land
Office. Prospectors, however, being coextensive with present or future citizens, could be
anyone.
In the October 2014 Order, the District Court used the term "prospectors" in
different ways. Sometimes the District Court used the term according to its accepted
meaning consistent with 30 U.S.C. § 22. At other times, however, the District Court used
"prospectors" to mean "locators" or "claimants." For example, on Page 25 of the
October 2014 Order, the Court states that "prospectors associated with the Flagstaff Mine
built at least two miles of roads." (R5987.) In fact, it was the Flagstaff Mine claimants
who built the Flagstaff Road. (R2894.) But in the Undisputed Facts section, the Court
refers to these same people as "claimants." (R5965-5973.) Later in the same paragraph
on Page 25 of the Order, the Court notes that "other prospectors eventually located other
mining claims on Flagstaff Mountain." (R5987.) Here, the Court appears to use the term
consistent with the Mining Law of 1872. Yet, the Court then again uses the term

22

"prospectors" to mean "claimants" or "locators" when referring to the field notes of the
nearby claims. (R5965-5973.)
The Court again equates "prospectors" with "claimants", "locators" or "patentees"
when it refers to proprietary interests on Pages 29-30 of the Order. (R5991-5992.) This
is contrary to the language of the Mining Law of 1872. While locators or patentees have
proprietary interests under the Mining Law of 1872, prospectors do not. Compare 30
U.S.C. § 22 (public lands open for exploration) with 30 U.S.C. § 26 (rights of possession
and enjoyment of locators). A right of entry onto public land, which is what the Mining
Law of 1872 effectively granted to all citizens and prospective citizens of the United
States, is not a proprietary right. In contrast, the rights of claimants or patentees are
proprietary, as they could be, and were, sold. This error in equating prospectors with
locators, claimants, and patentees contributed to the District Court' s mistaken ruling to
grant defendants summary judgment.
C.

All Inferences in Favor of Mayflower on Defendants' Motion

In ruling on a summary judgment motion, all reasonable inferences should be

made in favor of the non-moving party. See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT
31, ~ 33,235 P.3d 749; Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405,408 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
"Even if the moving party's objective statement of facts are agreed upon, reasonable
inferences made from those undisputed facts can indeed create a genuine issue of
material fact. That the objective facts are undisputed does not mean that no genuine
issues remain as to those facts." USA Power, 2010 UT 31 at~ 33. As the non-moving
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paiiy to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, all reasonable inferences should be
made in favor of Mayflower, including inferences drawn from the historical record. The
District Court, however, made a number of inferences in favor of defendants and against
Mayflower in the October 2014 Opinion, including inferences on the success of the
prospectors roaming the mountains around Park City in the late 19th century and the
number of users of the Flagstaff Road.
1.

Not All Prospectors Became Locators or Claimants

The Mining Law of 1872 allowed any citizen of the United States to become a
prospector. See 30 U.S.C. § 22. Thus, every citizen of the United States was also a
"prospective prospector," a term the District Court coined and used in Footnote 8 of the
October 2014 Order. (R5992.) Mayflower is not aware of any independent legal
meaning to the term "prospective prospector." However, by coining this term, the
District Court seems to infer that prospectors had an "inchoate proprietary interest" in the
land they were prospecting, and therefore were no longer members of the general public.
(R5965-5973, R5988-5992.) This is wrong factually and legally. While a locator has a
right of use and enjoyment, see 30 U.S .C. § 26, a prospector only had a right common to
every citizen - to explore public lands for minerals. See 30 U.S.C. § 22. Thus, for
example, a locator or a claimant could sell their rights. Conversely, a prospector,
prospective or otherwise, could only sell the tools of his or her trade, not any proprietary
interest in land. The District Court committed reversible error by inferring that
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prospectors had inchoate property rights, and therefore were no longer members of the
general public.
The Court also infers in Footnote 8 that all prospectors become locators. (R5992.)
In fact, only some prospectors became locators or claimants. Many, if not most,
prospectors failed to find any minerals and thus had no basis for staking a claim. Thus,
the District Court erred in making an inference in favor of defendants that all prospectors
became locators or claimants. And this error influenced the District Court's improper
conclusion on defendants' summary judgment motion.
2.

The Court Incorrectly Infers Few Users of the Flagstaff Road

By conflating "prospectors" and "locators", the Court concludes that the public did
not use the Flagstaff Road. However, Mayflower did not suggest that the Flagstaff Road
was only used by claimants or locators. Rather, Mayflower asserted that the Flagstaff
Road was used by "prospectors", i.e. citizens and future citizens of the United States,
some of whom later became claimants or locators. The Court tries to minimize this
distinction in Footnote 8 when it states that " [t]he fact that a few prospectors may have
wandered Flagstaff Mountain before actually officially locating a mining claim does not
change the analysis." (R5992.) This statement is incorrect. In Dean F. Wright, A
HISTORY OF PARK CITY, which the District Court ruled admissible, there are references to
more than 500 men prospecting in the hills around Park City as early as 1872. (R60296030) (identifying the Flagstaff Mine as one of the mines attracting prospectors).) Five
hundred is more than a few. And this was in 1872, when the population of Park City,
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including these prospectors, was less than 1,000 people. By 1880, the population of Park
City was more than 3,500 people - all drawn to Park City because of the mines. (R6026;
6032.) ("Such magic names as McHenry, Flagstaff, and Pinyon drew hopeful miners."))
This suggests that the number of prospectors, i.e. citizens or future citizens of the United
States and members of the general public, exploring the hills above Park City by 1880
was even greater than the 500 documented in 1872. Again, this is more than a few.
Actual or likely use of a road by dozens or even hundreds of members of the
general public is well above the amount of use that this Court and the Court of Appeal
have found sufficient to meet the use by the general public standard. See Boyer v. Clark,
326 P .2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958) ("the public, even though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninten-upted use of Middle Canyon Road ... as often as
they found it convenient or necessary"); see also Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 at~ 4 (finding
public use where several witnesses testified that they used the roads for recreational
purposes); AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, ~ 6, 112 P.3d 1228 (finding
public use where four witnesses testified that they or their family members used the road
for several years). By making these improper inferences in favor of defendants and
against Mayflower, the District Court en-ed and its summary judgment ruling should be
reversed.
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D.

The Burden of Proof on Mayflower's Claims Is Preponderance of the
Evidence Pursuant to Statute, Not Clear and Convincing Evidence as
Found by the District Court

This Court reviews de novo the District Court's burden of proof application and
analysis. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ii~ 15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at il 21.
1.

The Legislature has the Authority to Enact Certain Procedural
Guidelines and Burdens of Proof

Mayflower, as the proponent of R.S. § 24 77 status of the public roads, bears the
burden of proving an R.S. 24 77 right-of-way by a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. The Rights-of-Way Across Federal Lands Act (the "R-O-W Act") provides
that "the proponent of the R.S. 24 77 status of the highway bears the burden of proving
acceptance of the grant by a preponderance of the evidence." U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b).
The R-O-W Act represents the Utah Legislature's intent to apply the "preponderance of
the evidence" standard when adjudicating R.S. § 2477 claims in Utah courts. The
R-O-W Act provided Utah courts with clear guidelines for the proper burden of proof
when facing R.S. § 2477 claims. It is axiomatic that the Utah Legislature has the
authority and ability to enact such procedural guidelines.
The legislature of the state, which represents the people and thus the sovereign,
has all of the residuum of power of government, except only as expressly
restricted by the Constitution. In order to preserve the independence and the
integrity of the three branches of government, it is of the utmost importance that
the judicial exercise restraint and not intrude into the legislative prerogative. It
cannot strike down and nullify a legislative enactment unless it is clearly and
expressly prohibited by the Constitution or in violation of some plain mandate
thereof. The court must make every reasonable presumption which favors ·
constitutionality.
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Trade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Ctrs., 446 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah 1968). Several decisions
illustrate that the legislature has the authority to establish the burden of proof to be
applied to specific actions. See State v. Dre), 2010 UT 35, ~ 15,233 P.3d 476 (holding
that the legislature may assign the burden of proof for an affirmative defense to a
defendant so long as the defense does not negate an element of the offense); Smith v.

Cummings, 117 P. 38, 40 (Utah 1911) (stating that while the legislative power may,
within certain limits, declare what prima facie shall be deemed sufficient evidence for the
purpose of establishing a given fact, the courts, in the absence of a statute, cannot, as a
matter of law, declare what probative force or effect shall be given to any pai1icular act or
circumstance where the evidence is conflicting or where conflicting inferences may be
deduced from certain facts); Valcarce v. Valcarce (In re Estate of Valcarce), 2013 UT
App 95, ~~ 26-27, 250 P.3d 1033 (discussing the Legislature's intent to simplify and
clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents and where the legislature did not
displace the previous burden of proof explicitly, the court will not read in a different
standard).
U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b) is not substantive law. It establishes a uniform guideline
for the burden of proof to apply to R.S. § 2477 cases. Thus, the district court erred in its
application of the "clear and convincing" burden of proof standard.

2.

Subsection 6(b) of Section 310 of the R-O-W Act is Unambiguous.

The "primary goal in interpreting statues is to give effect to the legislative intent,
as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
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achieve." State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31 , ,i 16, 137 P.3d 726 (quoting Foutz v. City ofS.

Jordan, 2004 UT 75, ,i 11 , 100 P.3d 1171). The court "presume[s] that the legislature
used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning." Id. (quoting CT v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ,i 9, 977 P.2d 479). The
court will "read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Id. (quoting

Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ,i 17, 66 P.3d 592); see also Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline
Co., 2003 UT 8, ,i 28, 70 P.3d 1 ("We analyze the language of a statutory provision in
light of other provisions within the same statute or act, and we attempt to harmonize the
provisions in accordance with the legislative intent so as to give meaning to each
provision."); Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ,i 40, 116 P.3d 323 ("When
deciding questions of statutory interpretation, we do not look to language in isolation.
Rather, we look first to the statute's plain language, in relation to the statute as a whole, to
determine its meaning."). Only when a statute is ambiguous does the court look to other
interpretive tools such as legislative history. State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31 at ,i 16.
U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b) is not ambiguous. The plain language of the provision
states "[t]he proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the burden of proving
acceptance of the grant by a preponderance of the evidence for all decisions that are not
subject to Subsection (6)(a)." U.C.A. §72-5-310(6)(b). Subsection 6(a) states that,

In accordance with Section 72-5-302, a rebuttable presumption that the R.S. 2477
grant has been accepted is created when:
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(i) a highway existed on public lands no reserved for public uses as of the

cut-off date under Section 72-5-301; and
(ii) the highway currently exists in a condition suitable for public use.
U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(a). Subsection 6(a) and U.C.A. § 72-5-302(a) do not apply in this
case. See e.g. San Juan County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460 at 17-18. Thus, reading
the plain language of the provision, it is clear the Legislature's intent was to establish the
burden of proof in cases establishing the R.S. § 2477 status of highways as the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. The Court does not need to look at other
provisions of the R-O-W Act.
3.

Subsection 6(b) is Not in Conflict with Any Other Provision in the
R-O-W Act.

If there could be conflict between two statutes or statutory provisions, "the more

specific provisions will govern over the more general provisions." Grynberg, 2003 UT 8
at~ 28 (citingPerryv. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214,216 (Utah 1984)).
Subsection 6(b) is not in conflict with any other provisions in Section 72-5-310. Nor is
the provision specifically related to only circumstances whereby the "provision appears
as just another subsection of a lengthy statutory provision describing a specific and
discrete type of adjudicatory proceeding." (R6014-6015.) Subsection 6(b), on its face,
does not only apply only to the specific action described in Section 310. Subsection
310(6)(b) does not state that the "preponderance of evidence" burden of proof is
exclusively applied to the proponent of an R.S. § 24 77 status that has been determined
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through the State's process of issuing a notice of acknowledgement as described in
U.C.A. § 72-5-309.
The structure of the R-O-W Act supports Mayflower's interpretation. U.C.A.
§ 72-5-310(6)(a) specifically refers to U.C.A. § 72-5-302. U.C.A. § 72-5-302 states that
"this part applies to all R.S. 2477 rights of way." U.C.A. § 72-5-302. U.C.A. § 72-5310(6)(b) encompasses all situations that do not apply to U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(a) stating,
"The proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the burden of proving
acceptance of the grant by a preponderance of the evidence for all decisions that are not
subject to Subsection (6)(a)." Id. at § 72-5-310(6)(b ). Because the greater includes the
lesser Subsection (6)(b) "applies to all R.S. 2477 rights-of-way." See Wilson v. Union

Pac. R.R., 23 1 P.2d 715,719 (Utah 1951) (sole causation may include contributory
negligence as the greater includes the lesser regarding the statutorily imposed duty).
This comports to the legislature' s intent. The Legislative Notes accompanying
Subsection 6(b) state, " [t]his act provides that a proponent of the R.S. 24 77 status of a
road that is not presumed bears the burden of proving acceptance by a preponderance of
the evidence." 2003 Utah Laws Ch. 293, 2003 Utah HB 274. Thus, the burden of proof
articulated in Subsection (6)(b) is not in conflict with the other provisions of the statute
and clearly states the legislature's intent. See State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31 at i1 16.
Subsection 6(b) is unambiguous; the plain meaning of Subsection 6(b) should be applied.
Mayflower, therefore, as the proponent of the R.S. § 2477 status of the highways has the
burden of proof to show acceptance by the "preponderance of the evidence."
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4.

San Juan County

No court has offered guidance in applying U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b). In 2011, the
United States District Court for the District of Utah was presented with a different
provision of the R-O-W Act. San Juan County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460 at 17-18.
The provision at issue in San Juan County was U.C.A. § 72-5-302(3)(a), which sought to
presume acceptance of the R.S. § 2477 grant without following the mechanics of
"acceptance" under the R.S. § 2477 framework. Id. San Juan County does not discuss
U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b). In fact, San Juan County confirms that the two statutory
provisions, U.C.A. §§ 72-5-302(a)(2) and 72-5-310(6)(b) are not related.

It appears that in 2003 the Utah Legislature attempted to alter the burden of proof
concerning the acceptance ofR.S. 2477 rights-of-way, creating a presumption in
favor of right-of-way existence where "the state or a political subdivision of the
state makes a finding that the highway was constructed and the right-of-way was
accepted prior to October 21, 1976." Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-302(3)(a). Not
having been formulated until many years after the opportunity to accept the R.S.
24 77 grant had been terminated by Congress, this post hoc presumption cannot
serve to satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of proof in this case. Whether the R.S. 2477
grant has been accepted "is a question of compliance with the then-existing laws
of the state where the right-of-way was established."
San Juan County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460 at 17-18. San Juan County did not
involve the analysis of a consistent burden of proof to apply to R.S. § 2477
determinations. San Juan County held that the Utah Legislature could not, post hoc,
eliminate the burden of proof by presuming acceptance. Id. However, San Juan County
does not analyze U.C.A. § 72-5-31 0(b )(6) and the provision's intent to apply a uniform
burden of proof to the R.S . § 2477 framework. Thus, San Juan County is not applicable
to the analysis of the unambiguous language of subsection 6(b) of the R-O-W Act.
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E.

Defendants Were Not, and Are Not, Entitled to Judgment as a Matter
of Law on Mayflower's Public Road Claim

These errors described above in the District Court's otherwise thorough and wellreasoned opinion led the District Court to grant defendants' summary judgment motion.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District Court, and remand this action to the
District Court with instructions to enter an order denying Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and setting this case for trial.

I.

The Evidence and Inferences Support Mayflower's Public Road
Claim

Mayflower's public road is rooted in historical records. Those records show that
Mayflower's predecessors located the Flagstaff Mining claim in 1871, built two miles of
road from Park City to the mine in 1871 or 1872, and in 1876 obtained the first patent
near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2894, 2900-2908.) Over the ensuing 50 plus
years, all of the surrounding land was located, claimed, and patented. Yet, while field
notes for these other claims made reference to the wagon road to Park City (R2912-2919
(Uncle Charles); R2953-2961 (Home Station); R2939-2947 (Lucky Bill); R2989-2997
(Peeler); R3007 (Boliver Plat); R3005 (Boliver 2 Plat); R3015-3018 (Overlooked
Fraction)), not one of these other claimants alleged to have built any roads to their mines.
The most reasonable inference from this evidence, if not the only reasonable inference, is
that the Flagstaff Mine claimants built the Flagstaff Road.
The historical records also show that the location of the Flagstaff Road has not
changed in more than one hundred years. The first topographical map of Flagstaff
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Mountain in sufficient detail was surveyed in 1901. It shows the Primary Access Road
and part of the Flagstaff Loop Road in the same place as they were when this action
began. (R3043-3044.) Aerial photographs in 1950 and detailed topographical maps in
1955 and 1998 again shows the roads in the same locations as they were when the case
began. (R305 l-3053, 3055, 3061-3063.) And, GLO survey notes in 1897 describe a
road crossing certain section lines in the same place as the Primary Access Road
appeared on the 1901 and later topographic maps. (R3580-3590.) The most reasonable
inference from this evidence is that the Flagstaff Road was built in 1871 in the same
location as it appeared in 1901 and later. Indeed, it is unreasonable to infer that a road
that has been static for more than 100 years, was constructed and moved in the 30 years
prior without any evidence of such.
Moreover, pursuant to U.C.A. § 72-5-302(3)(b), the Primary Access Road and
Flagstaff Road's condition suitable for public use in 2005 "establishes a presumption that
the highway has continued in use in its present location since the land over which it is
built was public land not reserved for public use." That would be back to the
construction of the Flagstaff Road by the Flagstaff Mine claimants in 1871-1872.
Finally, the prospecting, and subsequent locating and patenting of the mining
claims around the Flagstaff Mining claim without evidence of any other road from Park
City to the summit of Flagstaff Mountain suggests these later prospectors, locators, and
patentees used the Flagstaff Road. Indeed, it would be an unreasonable inference to
suggest that later-in-time prospectors would not use the established road. And, when the
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Utah Legislature passed the Utah Highway Act in 1880, the Flagstaff Road became a
public highway as it had been used by the public for more than five years. See 1880 Utah
Highway Act§§ 2, 3.
Under the appropriate preponderance of the evidence standard, Mayflower
proffered undisputed facts and reasonable inferences that warranted, at minimum, a trial
on Mayflower's public road claim.
2.

Disputed Issues of Material Fact Preclude Summary Judgment

The foregoing record and inferences created disputed issues of material fact on
defendants' summary judgment motion that required the District Court to deny
defendants' summary judgment motion and pennit Mayflower to go forward on its public
road claim. The issues included both the type and number of users on the Flagstaff Road,
as well as the continuous use of the Flagstaff Road. Ironically, on a far less impressive
record in August 20 12, the District Court ruled to that effect, ruling that Mayflower's
public road claim should go to trial. (R2563 .)
For the District Court to grant defendants' motion, the District Court had to find
that the public did not use the Flagstaff Road between 1872 and 1880. Defendants did
not offer any evidence to that point. Instead, they claimed that Plaintiffs could not
provide any such evidence, and the District Court agreed, ignoring the record before it
showing the number of prospectors roaming the hills of Park City in the 1870s and the
number of subsequent claims made near the Flagstaff Mining claim. At minimum, these
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facts should have been submitted for trial to allow the trier of fact to hear the evidence
and make findings.
3.

The Court Erred in Permitting Defendants to Raise and Present
Evidence Supporting an Alternative Access Theory for the First
Time in their Summary Judgment Briefing.

Defendants did not assert an alternative access theory prior to their Motion for
Summary Judgment. Defendants' alternative access theory has been waived. Thus, the
district court should have refused to address issues not properly raised prior to summary
judgment. See Jensen v. Skypark, 2013 UT App 48 at ,r 4, Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007
UT App 243, ,r 33, 166 P.3d 639 (an issue not properly raised with respect to a summary
judgment motion is waived). No alternative access theory is asserted in United Park's
Answer to the Amended Complaint (Rl584-1589) and no alternative access theory is
asserted in the HOA Defendants' Answer to the Amended Complaint. (R2674-2678.)
Nothing in defendants ' answers could hint at the alternative access theory. See R. T

Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ,r 12, 40 P.3d 1119 (raising of an issue in the answer
and counterclaim without any supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not
present the issue to the trial judge for a decision and preserve the issue for appeal).
Defendants were on notice that Mayflower was asserting a claim for a private right
of access over a public road, as it was included in Mayflower's March 2012 Disclosures.
Defendants had ample opportunity to assert their claims and defenses. Because of the
untimeliness of defendants' alternative access theory, Mayflower was denied an
opportunity to discover and present evidence, question witnesses, and present legal
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arguments in opposition to that theory. The trial court should not have allowed, let alone
accepted defendants' alternative access theory raised for the first time on summary
judgment. See Jensen v. Skypark, 2013 UT App 48, ,i 4; Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243 at ,i
33. Thus, defendants' alternative access defense has been waived and allowing it to
proceed was prejudicial to Mayflower.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the District Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants on Mayflower's public road claim should be reversed
and this case remanded to the District Court for a trial on Mayflower's public road claim.

II.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mayflower Leave to Amend to File a
Second Amended Complaint and to Pursue the Previously Asserted
Appurtenant Easement Claim

Leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah
R. Civ. P. 15(a). " [R]ule 15 should be interpreted liberally as to allow parties to have
their claims fully adjudicated." Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, iJl 9, 3 P.3d 2
(quotation and citation omitted). The fundamental purpose of Utah's liberalized pleading
rules is "to afford parties the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they
have pertaining to their dispute, subject only to the requirement that their adversary have
fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the
type of litigation involved." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P .2d 966, 971 (Utah
1982) (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, parties are entitled to "notice of the
issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that
is required." Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963).
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Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) enables the court to allow amendments to the pleadings to
conform to the evidence. Amendment is mandatory if a claim is tried by consent or
without objection. See Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 UT App 270, ~ 9, 263 P.3d 440.
Where the parties did not consent to a trial of the issues, the court may still allow
amendment to conform to the evidence if two requirements are met. See Eldridge , 2007
UT App 243 at ~19 (citing Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, ~9, 974
P .2d 288). First, the trial court must find "that the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved by amendment." Id. Second, the Court must determine "that the
admission of such evidence would not prejudice the adverse party." Id. (quotations and
citations omitted). Under Rule l 5(b ), a new cause of action may be allowed if it is not a
wholly different cause of action or legal obligation. See Wells v. Wells, 272 P.2d 167,
170 (Utah 1954).
This Court reviews whether a trial court properly denied a request to amend a
pleading under Rule 15 under the abuse of discretion standard. See Daniels v. Gamma W
Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ~ 57, 221 P .3d 256 (citing Fishbaugh v. Utah Power
& Light, 969 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1998)).

A.

Mayflower's Appurtenant Easement Claim

To establish an appurtenant easement claim, a party must show: (i) unity of title
followed by severance; (ii) an apparent, obvious, and visible servitude at the time of
severance; (iii) that the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of severed
property; and (iv) the easement must be continuous and self-acting. See Adamson v.
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Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264,272 (Utah 1947) (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1132
(Utah 1916)); see also. Tschaggeny v. Union Pac. Land Res. Corp. , 555 P.2d 277,280
(Utah 1976). Here, by the granting of the Flagstaff Mining Patent and the R.S. § 24 77
right-of-way, Mayflower meets these elements.

1.

The Appurtenant Easement Claim Is Rooted in the Mining Claims
That Mayflower Owns and Alleged

The law presumes an easement to be appurtenant to and to run with the land. See

Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass 'n, 2004 UT App 149, 112, 92 P.3d 162.
Mayflower is the successor to a number of patented mining claims, including most
significantly the Flagstaff Mine claim, the first mining claim located and patented near
the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2900-2908.) Under the Mining Law of 1872, a
land patentee not only acquired title to the land described in the mining claim, but also
"the rights, privileges, immunities, and appurtenances of whatsoever nature therein."
(R2900-2908.) By necessity this includes right of ingress and egress, i.e. access, as
otherwise the patentee or its successors would not be able to exercise "the exclusive right
of possession and enjoyment" the United States granted in the patent. (R2900-2908.)
These were rights that accompany every mining patent issued during this time
period. See SUWA, 425 F .3d at 741-42 (right to use public right-of-way); Robertson v.

Smith, 1 Mont. 410, 417- 18 ( 1871) (a prior in time public right of way over a
subsequently patented mining claim subjects the patented mining claim to the easement
rights of the public); see, e.g., Ski Park City West, Inc. v. Major-Blankeney Corp. , 517
P.2d 1325 , 1326 (Utah 1974) (right of ingress and egress); Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. at
39

1132 (same). By alleging that it was the successor to these mining patents, and while
further alleging that United Park was the successor to other mining claims, Mayflower
put United Park (and later the HOA defendants) on notice that it sought to vindicate these
rights. (Rl3 76-13 78.) And, in the case of the Flagstaff Mine, i.e. the first patent granted
near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain, these rights were "prior to and superior to" the
rights of any other patent holder, including United Park. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Condas,
290 P. 954, 958 (1930) ("The right of way having been established over public lands by
public user, the predecessors of the plaintiffs when the patent was issued to them, and the
plaintiffs when they acquired their interest in and to the lands, took them subject to the
easement.")
2.

Mayflower's Appurtenant Easement Claim Relies on the Existing
Pleadings and Discovery Record

a)

Mayflower's Appurtenant Easement Claim Was Included in
the Amended Complaint.

When Mayflower moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, the
reason was not to add a new cause of action, but to clarify the causes of action that were
included in the Amended Complaint and its claim for relief. (R2780-2782, R4324-4325.)

See Wells, 272 P.2d at 170. Clarification was necessary because of defendants' efforts to
narrow and recast Mayflower's claims, such as defendants' expert Ernest Rowley
claiming in December 201 3 that the August 20 12 summary judgment ruling eliminated
all easement claims, when in fact it only addressed the prescriptive easement claim.
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As Mayflower argued below, the appurtenant easement claim was referenced in
several paragraphs of the Amended Complaint, including Paragraphs 1 (by reference to
the patented mining claims), Paragraphs 6-7 (reference to existence and use of easement
roads for access), Paragraph 8 (right to a prescriptive easement and as a beneficiary of a
public right-of-way), Paragraph 16 (right of ingress and egress over the easement roads
and "such right is superior and prior to the rights" of other owners). (R1374, Rl376,
R1377.)
The significance of alleging patented mining claims in Paragraph 1, as discussed
above, is that it includes the critical rights of ingress and egress to the property. The
allegation in Paragraph 8 demonstrates that the Amended Complaint was about more than
a prescriptive easement, as it refers to both the prescriptive easement claim and a right as
a beneficiary of a public right-of-way. Those are two separate claims. See Alvey Dev.

Corp., 2002 UT App at ,i,i 10, 13 (describing differences between prescriptive easements
and appurtenant easements).
The allegation in Paragraph 16 about a superior and prior right again refers to
something other than a prescriptive easement claim, as a prescriptive easement, by
definition, arises after another property owner's rights, not before. See Valcare v.

Fitzgerald, 961 P .2d 305, 311 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998). An appurtenant easement, in contrast,
can arise prior to another owner's claim. See, e.g., Sullivan, 290 P. at 958; Garland v.

Bear Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 34 P. 368; 370 (Utah 1893), aff'd, 164
U.S . 1 (1896) (citing Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453 (1879)) (holding that all patents
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granted by the United States are subject to pre-existing rights-of-way); Silver Bow Mining
& Milling Co. v. Clarke , 5 P. 570, 578 (Mont. 1885) ("lands conveyed by the patent are

subject to the prior rights of the locators of valid mining claims thereon").
b)

Mayflower's Appurtenant Easement Claim Relies on the
Existing Discovery Record

Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim derives from the mining patents to
which Mayflower is the successor. The United States issued these mining patents in the
latter apart of the 19th Century, beginning with the Flagstaff Mine patent in 1876.
(R2900-2908.) Thus, the record supporting Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim
consists of the historical records of the General Land Office and records on file with the
Summit and Wasatch County Recorders. This is the same record that supports
Mayflower's public road claim. Accordingly, the record that supports Mayflower's
appurtenant easement claim is the same discovery record that has already been developed
for Mayflower's public road claim. (See, e.g., R2780-2782, R6097 p. 20-32 (making this
argument to the District Court).)
In short, Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim was not a wholly different
cause of action. See Wells, 272 P .2d at 170. Rather, it was an amendment that would
subserve presentation of Mayflower's claims on the merits without prejudicing
defendants because the claim was based on the existing discovery record. See Eldridge,
2007 UT App 243 at 1 19.
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B.

The District Court's Reliance on the March 8, 2012 Order to Deny
Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend Was Error and Should be
Reversed

The July 17, 2014 Order denying Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend lists
three reasons for the denial: (i) the time since the case had been filed; (ii) a failure to
comply with requirements of the March 8, 2012 Order; and (iii) prejudice to the
defendants. (R4836-4840.) The transcript of the June 4, 2014 hearing makes clear that
the March 8, 2012 Order was the principal reason for the Court's decision, with the other
two reasons being secondary. (R6097 p. 65-68.) The District Court's reliance on the
March 2012 Order and the alleged lack of compliance therein is erroneous because the
March 2012 Order was an abuse of discretion, and the District Court's reliance on the
March 2012 Order does not comply with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Moreover, the issues of delay and prejudice were not valid grounds for
denying Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend.
1.

The March 8. 2012 Order Was an Abuse of Discretion

The District Court's March 2012 Order was an extraordinary order. The District
Court required Mayflower, and only Mayflower, to state the claims it was making,
identify the facts supporting those claims, state the statutory and case law supporting
those claims, provide a map showing the roads at issue, identify the witnesses that
Mayflower might call at trial, and re-produce the documents that Mayflower might use at
trial. (Rl695-1698.) Not only did the March 2012 Order impose an onerous burden on
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Mayflower, it created an asymmetrical process that prejudiced Mayflower and was
contrary to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 3
a)

The March 8, 2012 Order Goes Beyond the Discretion
Granted to the Court Pursuant to Rule 16 o[the Utah Rules
ofCivil Procedure

The District Court issued the March 8, 2012 Order pursuant to its case
management authority under Rule 16. The pre-2011 version of Rule 16(b) affords the
District Court discretion to issue pretrial orders on several matters, including orders
governing Rule 26 disclosures. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b) (pre-2011 version). Rule 26
disclosures include the identification of facts, the identification and production of
documents, setting forth computations of damages, and disclosing applicable insurance.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l) (pre-2011 version); see Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App
331, il 5, 170 P.3d 1138. The District Court's March 2012 Order, however, went beyond
ordering further or renewed Rule 26(a)( 1) disclosures, as it also ordered Mayflower to
state its claims and identify all case law and statutes that supported Mayflower's claims.
(R1697.) Nothing in Rule 26 authorized the District Court to order Mayflower to
disclose such information, and doing so was an abuse of discretion by the District Court.

See Rukavina, 2007 UT App 331 at~ 8. 4

Because this action was filed in 2005, the pre-2011 versions of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure control. See Order, In re Proposed Amendments to Rules, Case No.
20110725-SC (Aug. 29, 2011).
The District Court's March 2012 Order was akin to ordering the disclosure of trial
preparation materials. Such materials can only be ordered upon a showing of substantial
need. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (pre-2011 version). Even then, the District Court is
prohibited from ordering the disclosure of the legal theories of counsel. See id.
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The info1mation that the District Court ordered disclosed regarding claims, facts,
case law, and statutes was more in the form of an order compelling responses to an
interrogatory or interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Yet, the District Court did not identify any such pending interrogatory. Nor is the
District Court authorized to propound interrogatories under Rule 33. Rather, only a party
may propound interrogatories. See Utah R. Civ. P. 33(a) (pre-2011 version). By
improperly inserting itself into the discovery process, the District Court further abused its
discretion. Thus, while parts of the March 2012 Order were a valid exercise of the
District Court's authority under Rule I 6(b), ordering Mayflower to disclose its legal
theories, supporting facts, case law, and statutes, was not. Because the District Court
then relied on this abuse of discretion to deny Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend,
the District Court's denial of that motion is improper.
b)

The March 2012 Order Violates Rules J6(d) and 37(b) o[the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

In addition to exceeding the scope of its authority under Rule l 6(b), the District
Court's March 2012 Order violates Rules 16(d) and 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure by making issue and evidentiary sanctions self-executing instead of requiring a
hearing and showing of non-compliance. Although the Rules do provide for certain selfexecuting sanctions, those self-executing sanctions concern the failure to disclose a
witness or produce a document, i.e. items required to be disclosed pursuant to Rules
26(a)(l) and 26(e). See Rukavina, 2007 UT App 33 1 at ,i 8 (if a party fails to make the
disclosures mandated by Rule 26, the trial court is required to exclude the evidence). For
45

any other sanction, a hearing is necessary. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d) ("If a party or a
party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, ... , the court, upon motion or

its own initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)." (Emphasis added.));
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) (requiring finding of a failure to comply).
The District Court dispensed with the requirement of a hearing. This is another
abuse of discretion rendering the March 2012 Order invalid, at least in this regard. And
this abuse of discretion is relevant, as it was the self-executing nature of the March 2012
Order that the District Court relied upon in denying Mayflower's Motion for Leave to
Amend. This is another reason the District Court erred in denying Mayflower leave to
amend .

c)

The March 2012 Order Preiudiced Mayflower

The March 2012 Order was also improper because it created an asymmetrical
record. While Mayflower was locked into the facts, witnesses, documents, and theories
disclosed in March 2012, United Park and later the HOA Defendants were not so limited.
When first the HOA Defendants intervened, changing the complexion of the case, and
next discovery was re-opened in March 2013 for all parties (R2710), the District Court
should have terminated the punitive restrictions of the March 2012 Order. Yet, while the
District Court tempered the restrictions on witnesses or documents identified or
developed through discovery after March 20 12, the District Court remained steadfast on
the restrictions on Mayflower's theory of the case. This was a further abuse of discretion
by the District Court that warrants reversal.
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First, nothing in the rules permits the creation of an asymmetrical record. Initial
disclosures may be sequential; final pre-trial disclosures are not. Compare Utah R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(l) (pre-2011 version) with Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4) (pre-2011 version).
Second, the District Court enforced the March 2012 Order in the same way that
Utah courts used to enforce final pre-trial orders prior to 1987. Under the pre-1987
version of Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if a claim or theory was not
included in the final pre-trial order, it was not permitted to go forward at trial. See Lewis
v. Mou/tree, 627 P.2d 94, 97 (Utah 1981) (allowing amendment of pre-trial order under

pre-1987 Rule 16 only in cases of manifest injustice). This was the effect of the District
Court's interpretation of the March 2012 Order on Mayflower's Motion for Leave to
Amend. But this provision of Rule 16 was removed more than twenty-five years ago and
is no longer a valid exercise of discretion by a trial com1. Thus, it was error for the
District Court to so rigidly interpret the March 2012 Order.
2.

Even if the March 8, 2012 Order Is Valid, Mayflower's March 2012
Disclosures Complied With Its Terms

Even if the March 2012 Order was entirely valid, which it was not, the District
Court erred in enforcing its punitive, self-executing issue sanction in light of the response
that Mayflower did provide following the March 2012 Order. Mayflower provided an 11
page written response to the March 2012 Order that set forth facts, case law, statutes, and
legal theories. (Rl 863.) That response referred to Mayflower's public road claim, its
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prescriptive easement claim, its right of access along public rights-of-way theory, and
Mayflower's appurtenant easement theory. 5 (Rl852-1863.)
In denying Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend, the District Court took an
overly restrictive view of Mayflower's disclosures. The Rules of Civil Procedure only
require Mayflower to provide notice and allegations in support of that notice. See, e.g.,
Utah R. Civ. P. 8; Mackv. Utah State DOC, 2009 UT 47, ~17, 221 P.3d 194 (fair notice
of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved is all that is required) . The District Court, however, held Mayflower
to something akin to a summary judgment standard in the disclosures. (R1695-1698.)
This was error, and Mayflower should have been permitted to go forward with its
appurtenant easement claim.
3.

Mayflower's Motion For Leave to Amend Was Justified and
Granting the Motion Would Not Have Prejudiced Defendants

The District Court's July 17 Order denying Mayflower leave to amend also cited
delay and prejudice as reasons for the denial. Both were incorrect.

See Rl 853 ("Thus, they include not only a right of the public to use the roads, but
a right of access of private owners such as plaintiffs to adjoining lands."); Ri 854 ("The
latter [prescriptive] right was established by private use to reach lands now owned by
Mayflower, and is to be distinguished from the private right ofaccess to adjoining lands
over publicly dedicated roads."); Rl 858 (Section entitled Included Private Rights:
"Dedication of a public road establishes rights of two kinds: public rights and rights of
access in private owners served by the road .. .. While the public may lose the right to
use the road, private owners do not lose their right to access their property over the old
public right ofway."); Rl 862 ("The rights of ordinary members of the public and of
private owners on public roads are not mutually exclusive, but alternative."); id. ("The
correct form of claim in such a case, therefore, is for declaration of a right of access
which, depending upon the proof, may take the form ofa public/private right or a private
right.") ( emphasis added).
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On the issue of delay, the District Court focused on the fact that the case had been
pending since 2005. (R4838.) But the HOA Defendants intervened in November 2012
and Mayflower's prior counsel withdrew in November 2012. (R2624-2626, 2656-2657.)
As such, the case took on a new complexion in March 2013 when the District Court held
a status conference and re-opened discovery for all parties, not just the HOA Defendants.
(R6096.) The only discovery that the HOA Defendants provided was an expert report by
Ernest Rowley in November 2013. In December 2013, Ernest Rowley claimed in a
deposition that all easement claims had been dismissed. In response, Mayflower moved
for leave to amend to clarify its claims, as the District Court had never addressed an
appurtenant easement claim. That is not excessive delay and justifies Mayflower's
motion.
On the issue of prejudice, the District Court accepted defendants' unsupported
assertion that amendment would require additional discovery. Defendants never
identified any actual discovery they would need, merely referring to the general
discovery procedures. (R6097 pp. 41-45 .) And given that Mayflower's appurtenant
easement claim was based on the same historical evidence already in the record as a
result of Mayflower's public road claim, there was no legitimate additional discovery that
defendants could seek. Accordingly, the District Court erred in accepting defendants'
prejudice argument. Instead, the District Court should have acknowledged the lack of
prejudice and permitted Mayflower to file its Second Amended Complaint. Kelly v. Hard

Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, 131, 87 P.3d 73.4 (quoting 61A Arn. Jur.2d
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Pleadings §776 (2003)) (the court's inquiring regarding prejudice should center on
whether the nonrnoving party has a fair opportunity to litigate the new issues).
III.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing Mayflower's Prescriptive Easement
Claim.

In its August 16, 2012 Order, the District Court found that "there is no disputed
fact that Stichtings' access to the subject property was permissive. Stichtings' use of the
roads to which they claim a prescriptive easement was not adverse." (R2563.) However,
the district court erred in its application of the legal definition of"adverse use."
A prescriptive easement exists where a party proves that their use of another's
land was: (i) open, (ii) notorious, (iii) adverse, and (iv) continuous for at least 20 years.

Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, ,i 18, 186 P .3d 978 (quoting Marchant v. Park City,
788 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990)). "A prescriptive easement does not result in ownership,
but allows only use of property belonging to another for a limited purpose." Marchant v.

Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 681-682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, "a use need not be
regular or constant in order to be continuous. All that is necessary is that the use be as
often as required by the nature of the use and the needs of the claimant." Crane v. Crane,
683 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) (internal quotations omitted).
The District Court's August 16, 2012 Order focused on adverse use. Adverse use
means "the use must be against the owner as distinguished from under the owner."

Jensen v. Brown, 639 P .2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981 ). "An antagonistic or adverse use of a
way cannot spring from a permissive use.... It cannot be adverse when it rests upon a
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license or mere neighborly accommodation." Jensen v. Gerrard, 39 P.2d 1070, 1073
(Utah 193 5).
However, the fact that the parties were initially friendly or cordial with one
another does not prevent a prescriptive right from arising because of the presumption that
the use of another's land is adverse to him. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,
3 12 (Utah 1998); Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535,537 (Utah 1953). Therefore, a mere
showing of "neighborliness" does not preclude adverse use. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at
312 (citing cases where adverse use was found despite cordial neighborly relations). In
fact courts have upheld a district court's finding of adverse use where the users of the
disputed road had access to a key to a gate blocking access to the road. Crane, 683 P.2d
at 1065.
In Crane, the Grazing Association, as the "adverse user," was provided with a key
to the gate blocking the subject road in order to drive their cattle along the road. Id. The
land owners argued that the use of the key was evidence of permissive use. Id. However,
the court noted that the use of the key could also be evidence of the land owner's
recognition of the Grazing Association's continued right to use the road. Id. The court
stated, "in view of the [Grazing Association's] insistence during the 1950's that they had
a right to use the trail and would force their way through if necessary and in view of the
testimony that the association riders in fact forced their way through the fence or gate
when they did not have a key during the period from 1950 to 1980, we cannot say that the
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evidence clearly preponderates against the district court's finding that the plaintiffs use
was adverse to rather than by permission of defendants." Id.
The facts relied upon by the court in making its August 16, 20 12 Order, similarly,
do not preclude a finding of "adverse use". In its Motion for Summary Judgment, United
Park states,
11 . A cable with a combination lock denied access to the Stichting's property, but
upon request Stichtings' representative was given the combination of the lock
so that he could access the Stichtings' property. (R2 l l 9.)
12. For a time United Park and Stichtings were on "very, very good terms," had
common development interests and were discussing joint venture and
common planning for their contiguous properties. (R21 I 9-2120.)
13. Stichtings' representative understood that United Park's position with regard
to accessing the roads was that "basically you can use whatever road you
want." (R2120.)
14. United Park never denied Stichtings, their agents, or their representatives
access to the Alleged Roads. (R2121.)
United Park argued that Mayflower's access to their property following
installation of the cable across the road was permissive because Mayflower was on good
terms with United Park at times and Mayflower was provided a combination to access the
road. However, Mr. Theobald's deposition testimony contradicts these assertions and
establishes that Mayflower did begin the prescriptive period by accessing the properties
without permission. Thus, there were disputed issues of material fact.
United Park's factual statements were disputed by Mayflower. A closer
examination of Robert Theobald's testimony reveals that there was no permissive use.
Mayflower's use of the roads to access Mayflower's property mirrors the use in Crane,
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683 P.2d at 1065. Mr. Theobald testified that Mayflower acquired the properties in the
late 1970's. (R3366.) As Mayflower's representative, Mr. Theobald began accessing the
Mayflower properties during this time. When Mr. Theobald began visiting the property
there were no gates or fences or cables denying access to the Mayflower properties.
(R3368.) After the cable was installed, Mr. Theobald obtained the combination from
Deer Valley, not United Park. (R2119.) It was reasonable for Mayflower to infer that
United Park's installation of the cable was adverse to Mayflower' s use of the road in
order to access their property.
Based on the testimony from Mr. Theobald, Mr. Theobald and other Mayflower
agents never sought permission from United Park when accessing the Mayflower
properties via the road prior to the installation of the cable. (R3369.) While Mr.
Theobald was provided the combination to the cable when it was installed, he was given
access by Deer Valley, not United Park. (R2119.) Even though the relationship between
United Park and Mayflower was at times cordial, Mayflower' s use of the road to access
their property began as adverse use. Again, the presumption is that a party adversely uses
the property of another. See Lunt, 260 P .2d at 53 7. When United Park installed the cable
across the road that prevented access to Mayflower's property, Mayflower continued to
access their property. (R3368-69.) Mayflower used the road when the cable was down
and received the combination from Deer Valley when the cable was up. (Id.) The
combination was never sought from or provided by United Park. (Id.) Using the
combination provided by Deer Valley does not preclude adverse use. See Crane, 683
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P.2d at 1065; see also Vigil v. Baltzley, 448 P.2d 171, 173-74 (N.M. 1968) (finding
adverse use and an easement by prescription even though the adverse users had a key to
gates). Mayflower provided evidence regarding the "adverse use" element of a
prescriptive easement claim that created a disputed issue of material fact. This evidence,
coupled with Utah law relating to adverse use, means there are disputed issues of fact that
entitle Mayflower to a trial on this issue. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing
Mayflower's prescriptive easement claim in its August 16, 2012 Order.

I
I
I
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, May Dower respectfully submits that this Court should
reverse: (i) the District Court's October 2014 Order granting defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment on Mayflower's public road claim; (ii) the District Court's July 20 14
Order denying Mayflower leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and striking
Mayflower's appurtenant easement summary judgment claim; (iii) the District Court's
August 20 12 Order dismissing Mayflower's prescriptive easement claim; and (iv) the
District Court's March 2012 Order to the extent it went beyond the limits of Rules 16, 26,
and 37(pre-2011 version) and created self-executing issue and evidentiary sanctions and
required Mayflower to disclose legal theories protected by law.
Dated this ..,;Jd:fay of May, 2015.
Richards Brandt Miller Nelson

CRAIG C. COBURN
STEVEN H. BERG
BRAD M . LIDDELL
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and
Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds
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Addendum 1

Stephen K. Christiansen (6512)
Kelley M. Marsden (13076)
VAN Corr BAGLEY CORNWALL & McCARTHY, P.C.

36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
801.532.3333
Facsimile:
801.534.0058

20/Z li/,f?-~ 8 PM 3: 24

FILEDOif---

Attorneys for United Park City Mines Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SILVER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT
SILVER CLOUD, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company,
Plaintiff,

vs.
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation; and DOES I TO X,
person and entities whose true names are
unknown,
Defendants.
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER
RECREATIONAL FONDS,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND REQUIRING
CLARIFYING DISCLOSURES
UNDER RULES 16 AND 26
Civil No. 050500430
(Consolidated with 050500500)
Honorable Keith Kelly

Plaintiffs,

vs.
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMP ANY,
Defendant.

This case came before the Court on February 22, 2012, at 3:00 p.m. for a scheduling
conference and a hearing on defendant United Park City Mines Company's Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings. The Honorable Keith Kelly presided. United Park was represented
by Stephen K. Christiansen. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting Mayflower

Recreational Fonds were represented by E. Craig Smay. Silver Cloud, LLC was represented by
John A. Bluth.
Based on the pleadings, moving papers, opposition, exhibits, and arguments of counsel,
and for good cause appearing, the Court denies United Park's motion. However, the Court is
concerned that United Park be afforded due process with respect to the allegations in the
Stichtings' Amended Complaint, which are somewhat cryptic in nature and do not put United
Park on adequate notice regarding what is claimed. Consequently, the Court exercises its case
management authority and prerogative under Utah R. Civ. P. l 6(b) and enters the following
order sua sponte, requiring Stichtings to make the following disclosures to ameliorate the effects
of the form of the Amended Complaint:
1.

Stichtings shall make full and complete disclosures of their claims and evidence

in this case in the nature of Rule 26(a)(l) disclosures. Such disclosures shall be made
notwithstanding any prior disclosures, shall be made in writing, and shall not incorporate other
disclosures or materials by reference. Failure to make such disclosures by the date set forth
herein shall result in Stichtings being unable to use the individual, document, or evidence in
further proceedings under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(t).
2.

Stichtings shall provide a map-in reasonable detail specifying the roads claimed in

this action, including the roads' width, exact location, and a specific identification as to which
roads are claimed to be public, which are claimed to be a private easement, and which are
claimed to be both. Such disclosure shall be by affidavit, sworn and signed by a representative
of Stichtings. Failure to provide such information by the date set forth herein shall result in
Stichtings being unable to proceed with their claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 37.
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3.

For each roadway claimed, Stichtings shall provide the specific statute or case law

they allege supports their claim to a public or private road. Failure to provide such information
by the date set forth herein shall result in Stichtings being unable to proceed with their claim
under Utah R. Civ. P. 37.
4.

Stichtings are to provide a list of witnesses, including names, addresses, and

telephone numbers, along with a description of the testimony supporting the claim to the
roadways. This is in addition to and independent of the requirements for expert disclosures
under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3). This requirement does not provide Stichtings any additional time
for the disclosure of expert witnesses. The Court intends to strictly enforce the rules regarding
expert testimony, including the timeliness of disclosures. Failure to provide such information by
the date set forth herein shall result in Stichtings being unable to use such witnesses in further
proceedings under Utah R. Civ. P. 37.
5.

Stichtings are required to disclose any and all documents they intend to use at

trial. These exhibits shall be provided to United Park in 3-ring binders and shall be identified
with exhibit numbers. Failure to provide such information by the date set forth herein shall
result in Stichtings being unable to use such exhibits at trial under Utah R. Civ. P. 37.
6.

All such disclosures ordered herein shall be made by the close of business on

March 14, 2012. If any item required hereiq.to be disclosed or produced has already been
disclosed or produced, it shall nevertheless be disclosed or produced again. Nothing in this order
shall constitute a waiver of or prejudice to any party's right to challenge the propriety of prior
disclosures. Following Stichtings' disclosures as ordered herein, United Park may thereafter take
additional reasonable discovery. The parties shall meet and confer regarding what additional
reasonable discovery is necessary. Upon completion of such additional discovery, the parties
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shall further meet and confer in preparation for trial and certification thereof with reference to
Judge Kelly's procedures for complex trial in his Bench Book on the Utah State Bar's Litigation
Section website.
7.

A Rule 16 pretrial scheduling and case management conference is hereby set for

April 27, 2012, from _1:00 to 4:09 P·W·
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

a,,re.,

BY THE COURT:
-yy/_~4C, t... g-1

By:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

E. CRAIG SMAY, P.C.

I

By:
E. Craig Smay
Counsel for Stichting Mayflower
Mountain Fonds and Stichting
Mayflower Recreational Fonds

Date

-

...

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

By:

John A. Bluth
Attorneys for Silver Cloud, LLC

I
Date

482S-71S7-9406, v. I
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Addendum 2

i-,r..-tz._,
· Order Prepared and Submitted By:
Stephen K. Christiansen (6512)
Kelley M. Marsden (13076)
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801.532.3333
Facsimile: 801.534.0058

Attorneys for United Park City Mines Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY;
STATE OF UTAH, SILVER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT

SILVER CLOUD, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
VS.

UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a·
Delaware corporation; and DOES I TO X,
person and entities whose true names are
unknown,

Civil No. 050500430

(Consolidated with 050500500)

Defendants.
Honorable Keith Kelly
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAlN

FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER
RECREATIONAL FONDS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY,
Defendant.

This case came before the Court for hearing on July 9, 2012 on the Motion for Summary

August 16, 2012 12:29 PM

1 of 3

Judgment filed by Defendant Uruted Park City Mines Company ("United Park").

E. Craig Smay

appeared on behalf of Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational
Fonds (together, "Stichtings"). Stephen K. Christiansen and Kelley M. Marsden appeared on behalf
of United Park. The Court, having carefully reviewed the pleadings and memoranda subrrutted by
the parties, the relevant legal authority, and counsel's oral arguments, and for good cause appearing,
hereby FINDS, ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:

1. United Park's motion for summary judgment is supported with evidence as required by
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. In their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Stichtings did not include any
additional evidence, but instead, reference evidence submitted by United Park.
3. With respect to Sticbtings' claim that the "Lower Primary Road" and "Flagstaff Loop
Road" are public roads, there is some evidence in the record to support such a claim. Stichtings'
,,-.

public road claim may proceed to trial.
4. With respect to Stichtings' prescriptive easement claim, there is no disputed fact that
Stichtings' access to the subject property was permissive. Stichtings' use of the roads to which they
claim a prescriptive easement was not adverse. Stichtings' claim for prescriptive easement fails as a
matter of law.

5. Uruted Park's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENlED in part.
6. Stichtings' prescriptive easement claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED this_ day of _ __ _ _, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

Judge Keith Kelly
Third District Court Judge

August 16, 2012 12:29 PM .

2 of 3

Dated: August 16, 2012
12:29:52 PM
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Addendum 3

The Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: July 17, 2014
Isl RYAN HA)ill.lS
09: 15:29 AM
Di strict
Judge_.:

!=ourt

Clark K. Taylor (5354)
Nicole M. Deforge (7581)
VAN Corr, BAGLEY, CoRNWALL & McCARTHY, P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 1
Telephone: 801.532.3333
ctaylor@vancott.com
ndeforge@vancott.com
Stephen K. Christiansen (6512)
311 S. State, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801.716.7016
stever@skclawfirm.com

Attorneys.for United Park City Mines Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SILVER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT

STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN
FONDS and STICHTJNG MAYFLOWER
RECREATIONAL FONDS,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER
Civil No. 050500430

vs.
Honorable Ryan M. Harris
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation; EMPIRE PASS
MASTER OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a
Utah non-profit corporation and intervenor
Defendant; RED CLOUD HOA, a Utah nonprofit corporation and intervenor Defendant;
and JOHN DOES 3- 10
Defendants.

July 17, 2014 09:15 AM
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This case came on for hearing on June 4, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. on Mayflower's Motion for
Leave to File a Second Amended Compla int and Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment. By agreement of the parties at the hearing, the Court also
considered Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike in Part Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Honorable Ryan M. Harris presided at the hearing. Steven H. Bergman and Brad M.
Liddell appeared on behalf of the Mayflower entities ("Mayflower" or "Stichtings"). Stephen K.
Christiansen and Clark K. Taylor appeared on behalf of United Park City Mines Company.
Douglas C. Shumway appeared on behalf of Empire Pass Master Owners Association and Red
C loud HOA. The Court considered the motions, pleadings, and argument of counsel, and
engaged in colloquy with counsel. Now, for good cause appearing, the Court enters the fo llowing
Order:
I.

The Court DENIES Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Fi le a Second Amended

Compla int. Judge Kelly, who presided previously o n this case, specifically ordered on March 8,
2012:
Stichtings shall make full and complete disclosures of the ir c laims and evidence .... Such
disclosures shall be made notwithstanding any prior disclosures, shall be made in writing,
and shall not incorporate other disclosures or materials by reference ....
For each roadway c laimed, Stichtings shall provide the specific statute or case law they
allege supports their claim to a public or private road. Failure to provide such information
by the date set forth herein shall result in Stichtings being unable to proceed with their
c laim under Utah R. Civ. P. 37.
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The Court finds that the c laims Mayflower set forth in their Pre-Trial Disclosures of March 23,
20 12, filed in response to Judge Kelly's order, did not include a c la im for an appurtenant
easement nor identify any case law or statute in support of such a c laim. The Court is going to
require Mayflower to stick to w hat they have in the 20 11 Amended Complaint as clarified by the
March 23, 2012 Pre-Trial Disclosures. Furthermore, in the Court's exercise of its discretion, the
Court determines that Mayflower's motion does not m eet the case law e lements that would
support a mo tion to amend at this juncture of the case. See, e.g., Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator
Co., 854 P.2d I 025, I 028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (identifying timeliness of motion, justification
given, and prejudice to the responding party as factors in the court's analysis). This case has been
pending nine years. There wou ld be more time and expense required to address the claim. The
Court would be required to move discovery deadlines and re-open discovery to a llow the
defendants a chance to address the amended c la ims. The Court will not allow Mayflower to
recast their c laims at this point through the amendment they seek.
2.

T he Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Joint Motion to

Strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike in Part
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion fo r Summary Judgment, as fo llows:
a.

The Motions to Strike are GRANTED insofar as Mayflower's summary j udgment

briefing re lies on an appurtenant easement theory or any c laim that the roads in question were
established after 1880. The appurtenant easement theory does not appear in Mayflower's PreTrial Disclosures of March 23, 20 I 2. Moreover, those same Disclosures twice indicated the
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roads in question were establ ished by 1880. As a lready set forth in this Order, Mayflower was
required in those Disclosures to identify with specificity its claims, supporting law, and ev idence.
The failure to do so with respect to these aspects of the claims bars the ir use now.
b.

The Motions to Strike are DENIED insofar as the defendants seek to exclude

Mayflower from using documents in their summary judgment briefing that the defendants c laim
were not timely produced.
C.

•

The Motions to Strike are a lso DENIED insofar as they seek a determination that

prior court orders eliminated the "Upper Primary Access Road" as one of the roads in question in
this case. That issue was never specifically brought before the Court or conc lusively determined
on summary judgment adversely to Mayflower. It therefore remains as an open cla im in this
case.
d.

In lig ht of this Court's legal determinations herein, the Court hereby GRANTS

LEA VE to Mayflower to re-file its Motion for Summary Judgment and to Defendants to file a
Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment directed to the Upper Primary Access Road. These
shall be briefed on the following schedule:
1.

Motions and supporting memoranda filed by June 13, 201 4 .

11.

Response memoranda filed by July I 8, 20 I 4.

111.

Reply memoranda filed by August I, 20 I 4.

iv.

Optional Sur-Reply by defendants to Mayflower's re-filed Motion for

Summary Judgment filed by August 15, 2014.
3.

All other pending motions and obj ections not resolved in this hearing shall be heard
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o n September 4, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. T he Court has set as ide three hours fo r the hearing.

A PPROVED AS TO FORM (signed bye-filer with authorization):
RlCHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON
By:

Isl Steven H. Bergman
Steven H. Bergman
Brad M. Lidd ell
Attorneys for Stichting Mayflower

7/16/2014
Date

VIAL FOTHER1NGHAM LLP
By:

ls/Douglas C. Shumway
7/ 16/20 14
Douglas C . Shumway
Date
Attorneys for Interveno r Defendants

-- END OF DOCUMENT --- JUDGE'S APPROVAL OF ORDER APPEARS AT TOP OF FIRST PAGE --
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIST~RICJ
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
·r\ltO lff

STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER
RECREATIONAL FONDS,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
UNITED PARK CITY MINES
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation;
EMPIRE PASS MASTER OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah non-profit
corporation and intervenor Defendant;
RED CLOUD HOA, a Utah non-profit
corporation and intervenor Defendant;
and JOHN DOES 3-10,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Case No. 050500430
October 1, 2014
Judge Ryan M. Harris

Defendants.

Before the Court are the following motions: (1) a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
on February 28, 2014 by Empire Pass Master Owners Association, Inc. and Red Cloud HOA
("the HOA Defendants"), along with a joint Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant United Park City Mines Company ("UPCM") (UPCM and the HOA Defendants are
sometimes collectively referred to herein as "Defendants"); (2) a Joint Motion for Summary
Judgment Re: Upper Primary Access, filed on June 13, 2014 by all of the Defendants jointly; (3)
a Revised Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 13, 2014 by Plaintiffs Stichting
Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds ("Plaintiffs"); and (4) an
Objection to Certain Evidence in Defendants' Pleadings, filed on August 28, 2014 by Plaintiffs.
All of these matters came before the Court for oral argument on September 4, 2014, at which
hearing Plaintiffs were represented by Craig C. Coburn, Steven H. Bergman, and Bradford M.
Liddell; UPCM was represented by Stephen K. Christiansen, Clark K. Taylor, and Nicole M.
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Deforge; and the HOA Defendants were represented by Douglas C. Shumway. Based on the
briefing submitted by the parties, and on the arguments presented on September 4, the Court
issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order.
INTRODUCTION

In this unusual, interesting, and nine-year-old case, the Court is called upon to determine
whether a public road was created, at some point prior to October 1881, over land now owned
by UPCM, which road would link land now owned by Plaintiffs with SR-224, the main road that
leads from Park City over Empire Pass and from there to Midway or Guardsman Pass.

In

making this determination, the Court must interpret an 1866 federal statute and an 1880 state
statute, and must review and examine pri~ary and secondary source evidence dating back as
far as the 1870s. As discussed below, in order to prevail in this case, Plaintiffs are required to
demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, continuous use of the claimed roads, sometime
prior to October 1881, by the public for at least five years.
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, the passage of so many decades since the relevant events
occurred has rendered the task of proving their claims extremely difficult. They are, of course,
unable to produce any eyewitness testimony regarding whether, and how, the public used the
claimed roads before 1881 .

Rather, the only evidence available to them is documentary

evidence, which in this case for various reasons is neither voluminous nor detailed.

After

considering all of the submitted evidence, as well as applicable legal principles, the Court is
convinced that Plaintiffs' remaining claims lack sufficient evidence to proceed to trial. For all of
the reasons discussed below, the Court believes that Defendants' summary judgment motions
should be granted, and that Plaintiffs' cross-motion should be denied.
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UNDISPUTED FACTS

General and Procedural Background

1.

Plaintiffs have come to own certain parcels of land near the top of Flagstaff

Mountain south of Park City, which parcels straddle the Summit-Wasatch county line. These
parcels were formerly old mining claims that were located and patented by prospectors in the
latter decades of the 19th century.
2.

UPCM also owns similar property in the same area, and its land also consists of
th

old mining claims located and patented during the late 19 century.
3.

Plaintiffs claim that a public road, or network of public roads, exists across UPCM's

land, which public road would link Plaintiffs' land with SR-224, the main road that leads from
Park City over Empire Pass and from there to Midway or Guardsman Pass. Plaintiffs' property
is not "landlocked"; that is, there is anotber way to reach Plaintiffs' property from another
direction.

Plaintiffs are interested in establishing the purported public road from SR-224,

however, because that road, if it exists, would provide easier and more convenient access to
their property than the available alternative route.
4.

A map depicting the claimed roads is attached as Exhibit A. Some segments of

the roads have been given names during this litigation to tell them apart from one another. The
"Primary Access Road" is the road that veers off, eastward, from SR-224 in the lower-right-hand
comer of the map. The "Flagstaff Loop Road" is the road that loops off of the Primary Access
Road and around the site of the former Flagstaff Mine. The Primary Access Road is sometimes
referred to as having two parts:

the Lower Primary Access Road, and the Upper Primary

Access Road, with the upper portion being simply that portion stretching eastward beyond the
Flagstaff Loop Road. The term "Claimed Roads" is herein used to include all of the roads
claimed by Plaintiffs, including the Flagstaff Loop Road and the entire Primary Access Road.

3
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UPCM has undertaken to develop portions of its property over which Plaintiffs

claim a road exists, and takes issue with Plaintiffs' claim that any such road exists. Some of this
development already exists and, as described below, the HOA Defendants intervened in this
case in 2012 to assert their interests, which generally align with UPCM's interests.
6.

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this matter in October 2005 (in case

number 050500500), alleging rights to a road over UPCM's property. The original complaint
was quite terse, just six pages long, and gave few details into the claims pied.
7.

For its first few years the case languished, with so little action being taken to move

the case forward that it ended up on Judge Lubeck's Order to Show Cause calendar not once
but twice, in October 2007 and again in September 2009. In what can only be described as
moments of mercy, Judge Lubeck elected not to dismiss Plaintiffs' case on either occasion,
eventually granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate its case into another related case, Case No.
050500430.
8.

After consolidation, the case finally started to pick up speed, with the parties

retaining expert witnesses and conducting discovery through 201 O and 2011.

In December

2011, Plaintiffs asked for and received leave to file an Amended Complaint, which was filed on
December 9, 2011, and which was not much longer or more detailed than the original complaint.
9.

Following the filing of the Amended Complaint, UPCM moved for judgment on the

pleadings, arguing

inter alia that Plaintiffs' allegations were inscrutable and therefore

unreasonably difficult to defend against. The Court (Judge Kelly by this time) heard argument
on the motion in February 2012, and determined that Plaintiffs' claims were indeed "somewhat
cryptic in nature and do not put [UPCM) on adequate notice regarding what is claimed." See
Order dated March 8, 2012, at 2. As a consequence, Judge Kelly ordered that Plaintiffs "make
full and complete disclosures of their claims and evidence in this case" in writing, and that failure

4

STICHTING MAYFLOWER et al. v. UNITED PARK CITY MINES et al.

Case No. 050500430

to do so "shall result in [Plaintiffs] being unable to use the individual, document, or evidence in
further proceedings."

Id.

More specifically, Judge Kelly ordered Plaintiffs to "provide the

specific statute or case law they allege supports their claim to a public or private road," and that
failure to do so "shall result in [Plaintiffs] being unable to proceed with their claim." !Q.. at 3.
10.

Following entry of this order, in March 2012 Plaintiffs submitted a more detailed 12-

page recitation of their claims, for the first time specifically citing to an old post-Civil War statute
known as "RS 2477" as the basis for their claimed road. See Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Disclosures, at
3 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 932).

Plaintiffs also continued to recite their claim for prescriptive

easement under the common law. lg. at 8. Thus, as near as anyone could tell following the
pre-trial disclosures, Plaintiffs were making two claims: (1) for public road pursuant to RS 2477;
and (2) for prescriptive easement under the common law.
11.

In May 2012, after the filing of the pre-trial disclosures, UPCM moved for summary

judgment, which motion was heard on July 9, 2012. Judge Kelly determined that summary
judgment was appropriate on Plaintiffs' claim for prescriptive easement, and dismissed that
claim with prejudice. However, Judge Kelly allowed Plaintiffs' public road claim pursuant to RS
2477 to survive the motion, determining that there was at least "some evidence in the record to
support such a claim." See Order dated August 16, 2012, at 2

,r 3.

Judge Kelly, just before

being assigned away from Summit County, set the matter for trial in November 2012, to be
presided over by his successor.
12.

In late October 2012, almost on the eve of trial, the HOA Defendants appeared for

the first time and sought leave to intervene in the case, asserting that they "own0 and maintain□
at least some of the sections of road" that are the subject matter of this case, see HOA
Defendants' Memo. in Support of Motion to Intervene, at 2

11

4, and asserting that they only

became aware of the existence of the lawsuit a few days earlier, id. at 3 ,r 11. After considering
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the situation, this Court allowed the HOA Defendants to intervene, struck the pending November
2012 trial date, and allowed the HOA Defendants to conduct discovery.
13.

In November 2012, Plaintiffs' longtime attorney withdrew from representation of

Plaintiffs, and it took Plaintiffs several months, and some cajoling from the Court, to obtain new
counsel, who wasn't in place until March 2013. Throughout the remainder of 2013, the parties
(including the new parties, the HOA Defendants) completed additional discovery.
14.

In February 2014, Plaintiffs' new attorneys filed a motion seeking leave, after

nearly nine years of litigation, to file an amended complaint re-stating their claims for relief, and
stating a new claim for "appurtenant easement." After hearing in June 2014, this Court denied
that motion, and determined that Plaintiffs were stuck with their December 2011 complaint as
clarified in their April 2012 pre-trial disclosures.
15.

After finally completing all additional discovery, in early 2014 the parties began to

submit dispositive motions. In February 2014, Defendants moved for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs' sole remaining claim (the RS 2477 public road claim), asserting that this Court should
take another look at this claim on summary judgment after completion of the additional
discovery. In June 2014, Plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on the public road claim.
That same month, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding the "Upper
Primary Access" road, asserting that, at a minimum, they are entitled to summary judgment on
that portion of Plaintiffs' claims. All of these motions came before the Court for oral argument
on September 4, 2014.
The Flagstaff Mine

16.

Prior to 1871, the land on or near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain was part of the

unsurveyed public domain of the United States.
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1

Sometime around May or June 1871, a group of prospectors "located" a mining
2

claim on Flagstaff Mountain that became the site of a mine known as "the Flagstaff Mine." The
Flagstaff mining claim was the first mining claim located on Flagstaff Mountain.
18.

Secondary sources indicate t~~t the first shipment of ore from anywhere in the

entire Park City mining area came from the Flagstaff Mine, and was made in July 1871.
Another shipment of ore was made the following year, in 1872.

However, for a time after

October 1872, mining operations ceased at the Flagstaff Mine due to a change in ownership.
19.

In field notes filed in 1872 in aid of eventually obtaining a patent for their mining

claim, the Flagstaff mining claimants asserted that, among other improvements to their claim,
they had made "two miles of road." See Field Notes of the Survey of the Flagstaff Mining Claim
dated December 11, 1872 (hereinafter "Flagstaff Field Notes"), at 36. However, there is no
indication in the Flagstaff Field Notes of where this road was located, which two-mile stretch of
road they were referring to, or who used it.
20.

The Flagstaff mining claim was surveyed on December 11, 1872, and a very rough

map sketch was included with that survey.

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

Although a small

unattached stretch of "road" is shown on that map sketch, it is not connected to any other road,
and is in a completely different orientation from any of the roads now claimed by Plaintiffs.

1 The "location" of a mining claim "is the initial step taken by the locator to indicate the place and extent of
the surface which he desires to acquire. It is a means of giving notice. That which is located is called [in
statute] and elsewhere a 'claim" or a 'mining claim.' Indeed, the words 'claim' and 'location' are used
interchangeably." See Del Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. Last Chance Min. & Mill. Co., 171 U.S. 55, 74 (1898).

2

There appears to have been more than one "Flagstaff Mine" in the area at the time. A different
"Flagstaff Mine," this one located in Salt Lake County in the Little Cottonwood Mining District, was the
subject of no small amount of litigation during the 1870s and 1880s. See,~. Eilers v. Boatman, 2 P. 66
(Utah Terr. 1883); Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U.S. 463 (1878); McCormick v. Varnes, 2 Utah
355 (Utah Terr. 1877). Neither party argues that the "Flagstaff Mine" at issue in these cases is the same
Flagstaff Mine at issue here, and it appears plain from the recitations contained in the cases that it is not.
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In 1873, the Flagstaff Mine claimants published notice of their application for a

3

"patent" on the Flagstaff mining claim, and that patent was approved and issued by federal
mining officials in 1876.4
22.

At some point before 1874, several mining structures (including a log house and an

ore house) were constructed at the Flagstaff Mine site. However, by 1875, the original ore
strike at the Flagstaff Mine had apparently been depleted, and a second shaft was sunk, which
was apparently just rich enough to result in periodic ore shipments being made from the mine as
late as 1881, although not quite rich enough to keep a mill recently built in Park City in business.
23.

There is no evidence of any ore being taken out of the Flagstaff Mine after 1881, or

of any other mining work being done at the Flagstaff Mine after 1881.

Indeed, secondary

sources indicate that the Flagstaff Mine was "another mine that did not meet the expectations of
its owners." See Wright, A History of Park City, at 90 (Defendants' Exhibit J).
Other Mining Activity in the Area

24.

While the Flagstaff mining claim was the first mining claim in the area, it certainly

wasn't the last. Many other mining claims were located in the vicinity during the 1870s and
1880s, including many now owned by Plaintiffs (including the Overlooked Fraction, the Uncle
Charles, the Black Rock, and the Blue Ledge), as well as many now owned by UPCM (including
the Lucky Bill, the Home Station, and the Peeler).

3

"A mining claim always starts out as an unpatented claim. The owner of an unpatented claim must
continue mining or exploration activities on an unpatented claim, or it becomes null. Activities on
unpatented claims must be restricted to those necessary to mining. A patented claim is one for which the
federal government has issued a patent (deed). To obtain a patent, the owner of a mining claim must
prove to the federal government that the claim contains locateable minerals that can be extracted at a
profit. A patented claim can be used for any purpose desired by the owner, just like any other real
estate." See WIKIPEDIA, en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_claim (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
4

This patented mining claim, after a series of land transfers largely not relevant here, is now part of the
land owned by Plaintiffs.

8
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Although all of the mining claims listed in the preceding paragraph (as well as quite

a few others) were eventually patented and therefore had to list all of the improvements made in
aid of that patent, none of the field notes associated with any of the other surrounding mining
claims mention any work on construction of any road.

Indeed, the relevant field notes are

simply silent, in material part, with regard to exactly how the claimants on these later-filed claims
traveled to their claims. The furthest that any of the field notes go in this regard is to include
general language to the effect that prospectors traveled "southerly from Park City by wagon
road." See,~. Lucky Bill Field Notes, at 298.
26.

The Claimed Roads cross the Lucky Bill, Home Station, and Peeler mining claims,

all currently owned by UPCM. These three claims were located between 1881 and 1883. The
first of these claims to be officially located was the Home Station claim, which was located on
October 13, 1881 . The Lucky Bill claim was next, and was located on January 1, 1883. Finally,
the Peeler claim was located on December 17, 1883.
Use By People Other Than Prospectors

27.

The record contains no actual direct evidence that anyone other than prospectors,

prior to 1900, ever used any of the Claimed Roads. There were no homesteads on Flagstaff
Mountain before at least 1912, and therefore no members of the public were using any of the
Claimed Roads for homesteading purposes. There are no records to indicate that any member
of the public used the Claimed Roads prior to 1900 for timber harvesting, livestock grazing,
hunting, recreation, or any other purpose. And given the passage of time, it goes without saying
that no live witness testimony supporting any of these uses is available.
Surveys and Maps

28.

Prior to 1894, surveyors (even official government ones) were not required to show

all roads and their routes across land they were surveying. Perhaps because of this fact, or
9
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perhaps for other reasons, in this case there are no maps or surveys issued prior to 1897
describing any roads that could even possibly depict the Claimed Roads.
29.

After 1894, the rules applicable to surveyors changed, and after that point

surveyors were required to show roads that crossed land they were surveying.
30.

In 1897, the Government Land Office ("GLO") conducted a survey of the lands in

the vicinity of the Flagstaff Mine, including Township 2 South, Range 4 East. That survey noted
two roads crossing the boundary lines between Section 32 and 33 as the surveyors go from the
south to the north, and Plaintiffs posit that one of these roads was the Lower Primary Access
Road, and the other is the road (now SR-224) leading up from Park City.
31.

The GLO map that was issued as a result of that survey came out in 1899. That

map (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 56) does show a road, matching fairly well with the modern SR-224,
coming up Empire Pass from Park City, as well as a second road leading off south from SR-224
toward Bonanza Flats, but that map shows no road actually leading to the Flagstaff Mine, or any
other road that could be any of the Claimed Roads.
32.

A couple of years later, the U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") surveyed the entire

Park City district, including Flagstaff Mountain, and issued a topographical map in 1901
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 31). This map is the first map to depict a road leading east off of SR-224 near
the top of Flagstaff Mountain and headed in the general direction of the Flagstaff Mine.
However, even the road depicted on that map does not lead all the way to the Flagstaff Mine,
and does not include depictions of all of the Claimed Roads. In addition, that 1901 map also
depicts a possible alternative route, leading off of SR-224 at a much lower point, that would
have allowed prospectors to access the Lucky Bill or Flagstaff Mines without passing over most
of the Claimed Roads.
33.

In 1950, the National Agriculture Imagery Program of the U.S. Department of
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Agriculture took aerial photographs of the Park City area, including Flagstaff Mountain. These
photos taken in 1950 by the U.S. government clearly depict most of the Claimed Roads.
34.

In 1955, the USGS prepared updated topographical maps, and these also clearly

depict the Claimed Roads.
35.

Beginning in the late 1990s, additional aerial imagery became available, and this

aerial imagery clearly shows the Claimed Roads that were depicted in the 1950 aerial images
and in the 1955 topographical maps.
36.

In 1998, updated USGS maps became available, and these also clearly show the

Claimed Roads, as depicted in the 1950 aerial images and in the 1955 topographical maps.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be
granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." UTAH R. CIv. P. 56(c).
Rule 56 contains a presumption in favor of the nonmoving party, stating that "the moving party
[must meet] its initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material
fact exists" before the court should obligate the nonmoving party "to demonstrate that there is a
genuine issue for trial."

See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 1116, 177 P.3d 600 (citations

omitted). However, "[t]he non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial" to survive a summary judgment motion . See Peterson v. Coca-Cola
USA, 2002 UT 42, 1120, 48 P.3d 941. Finally, in addressing a summary judgment motion, a trial
court is required "to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." IHC Health
Serv., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, 1119, 196 P .3d 588. It is in this context that the
Court addresses the cross-motions for summary judgment at issue here.
11
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DISCUSSION
A. General RS 2477 Legal Overview
In this case, Plaintiffs' claim of right to the alleged "public roads" across Defendants'
property is grounded in a "short, sweet, and enigmatic" statute passed by Congress in 1866.
th

See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F .3d 735, 761 (10 Cir.
2005) (hereinafter "SUWA"). That year, Congress enacted an open-ended grant of "the right of
way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses." See 43
U.S.C. § 932. This statute, commonly called "RS 2477" "after its residing place in the 1866
volume of the Revised Statutes," see County of Shoshone v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 2d
912,915 (D. Idaho 2012), remained in effect for over a century. As noted by the Tenth Circuit in
its leading RS 2477 case, "most of the transportation routes of the West were established under
its authority," which comported with then-current congressional policy that "[r]oads were deemed
a good thing" and that public policy should promote "the development of the unreserved public
lands and their passage into productive hands." See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 740, 741 .
In 1976, however, Congress articulated a new policy with regard to public lands in the
West, and initiated a "statutory sea change."

Id. at 741. That year, Congress enacted the

Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA), and as part of that enactment, Congress
repealed RS 2477. After passage of FLPMA, "[t]here could be no new RS 2477 rights of way."

,IQ. However, Congress specified that "any 'valid' RS 2477 rights of way 'existing on the date of
approval" of FLPMA-October 21, 1976-would "continue in effect." ,IQ. In this way, Congress
effectively "grandfathered" in all existing RS 2477 rights-of-way as of 1976, subject (of course)
to the owners of any such claimed rights-of-way proving entitlement to those claims in court.
However, courts have struggled with adjudication of RS 2477 claims, largely because
RS 2477, perhaps unique among land-grant statutes, required absolutely no administrative
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"no entry, no application, no license, no

patent, and no deed on the federal side; no formal act of public acceptance on the part of the
states or localities in whom the right was vested." Id. In short, RS 2477 "'was a standing offer
of a free right of way over the public domain,' and the grant may be accepted 'without formal
action by public authorities."' Id. (citing Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos. 285 P. 646,
648 (Utah 1929)). Because of the licentious nature of the land grant, parties usually had little
need to make written records of their use of the land, and little "incentive to raise or resolve
potential RS 2477 issues while the statute was in effect," jg., all of which has the effect, decades
(if not centuries) later, of making RS 2477- cases particularly difficult to adjudicate. Now, in
litigating RS 2477 cases, "litigants are driven to the historical archives for documentation of
matters [that] no one had reason to document at the time." Id. at 742.
In SUWA, the Tenth Circuit finally had occasion to issue a definitive opinion in an RS

2477 case, and that opinion is the starting point for trial courts as they determine how to
navigate a case arising under RS 2477. The first question that the court tackled in SUWA was
whether state law or federal law standards governed litigation of RS 2477 claims. The court
answered that question like this:
We therefore conclude that federal law governs the interpretation of RS 2477,
that in determining what is required for acceptance of a right of way under
statute, federal law 'borrows' from long-established principles of state law, to
extent that state law provides convenient and appropriate principles
effectuating congressional intent.
_!_g_.

but
the
the
for

at 768. In that case, which arose in Utah, the court then looked to Utah law for guidance in

determining what was required under RS 2477 for "acceptance" of the road by the public.
The leading Utah case on point was Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos. 285 P.
646 (Utah 1929). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the RS 2477 grant "may be
accepted by public use without formal action by public authorities, and that continued use of the
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road by the public for such length of time and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate
an intention on the part of the public to accept the grant is sufficient." Id. at 648. The Utah
Supreme Court then looked to the state statutes in force at the time that the right of way was
claimed to have been accepted, most notably Utah's 1886 Highway Statute, which stated that:
All roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or erected by others than the Public
and dedicated or abandoned to the use of the public are highways. A highway
shall be deemed and taken as dedicated and abandoned to the use of the Public
when it has been continuously and uninterruptedly used as a Public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court then determined that a road was an RS 2477 public right-ofway if the road "was used as a public thoroughfare" for "a time in excess of that required by the

Ostatutes in force" at the time the grant was claimed. Id. Based largely on this statute, as
discussed and interpreted· in Churnos, the Tenth Circuit in SUWA determined that "[a]cceptance
of an RS 2477 right of way in Utah," at least for roads claimed after 1886, thus "requires
continuous public use for a period of ten years."5 See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 771 (citing Churnos,
285 P. at 648). It can therefore be said that there are essentially three elements of an RS 2477
claim under Utah law in any case that concerns a right of way claimed in or after 1886: the
claimed right of way must have been (1) continuously used (2) by the public as a public
thoroughfare (3) for the requisite period of time (after 1886, ten years). See San Juan County v.
United States, 754 F.3d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 2014) (hereinafter "Salt Creek Appellate Case").
B. Standards Applicable Here, Where a Significant Part of the Land in Question
Was Withdrawn From the Public Domain in 1881
However, this case tosses its first curveball at the batter in the form of the date of
withdrawal of the property from the public,.domain. The courts in SUWA and Churnos both
relied heavily on Utah's 1886 Highway Statute in coming up with the relevant common-law

5
Whether the relevant time period at issue In this case is ten years, or some other span of time, Is
discussed below.
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standard to which both federal and state courts should look in determining whether an RS 2477
right-of-way had been accepted by the public. For SUWA and Churnos, the 1886 statute more
or less defined the relevant standard, including the three elements listed above. The obvious
problem here is that the 1886 statute was not yet in effect on October 13, 1881 , when the Home
Station mining claim was officially located, thus withdrawing it from the public domain. Plaintiffs'
RS 2477 right-of-way therefore needed to be completely established as of that date, because
once the mining claims were located, the land subject to those mining claims was removed from
the public domain and was no longer subject to being saddled with a public right-of-way
1h

pursuant to RS 2477. See United States v. Pruden, 172 F.2d 503, 505 (10 Cir. 1949) (stating
that "where one acquires from the United States legal or equitable title prior to an effective
,

.

acceptance of the grant or dedication, he and his successors in interest do not hold subject to
an easement for the subsequent establishment of [an RS 2477] highway"); see also Swanson v.
Sears, 224 U.S. 180, 181 (1912) (stating that "[a] location and discovery on land withdrawn
quoad hoc from the public domain by a valid and subsisting mining claim is absolutely void for

the purpose of founding a contradictory right"); Galli v. Idaho County, 191 P.3d 233, 237 (Idaho
2008) (stating that "[n]o RS 2477 road may be established once the land has been removed
from the public domain"); Our Lady of the Rockies, Inc. v. Peterson, 181 P.3d 631, 635 (Mont.
2008) (holding that, once a mining claim is located, "[t]he area becomes the property of the
locator and, thus, segregated from the public domain - i.e., the grounds within the boundaries of
the location cease to be public lands when the location is made").
In this case, Plaintiffs' Claimed Roads cross directly and significantly over the former
Home Station mining claim. After leaving SR-224 on the former Peeler claim, the claimed road
travels only a few feet of the Peeler claim before moving into the Home Station claim, and from
there it travels next right through the middle of the Home Station claim, and proceeds from there
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past the former Flagstaff Mine site and on to the rest of the claimed roads. The Home Station
property is effectively the gateway to all of Plaintiffs' claimed road s. Without that section of
property, the remainder of Plaintiffs' claimed roads-even if established-would be marooned,
effectively unable to reach SR-224 (which, after all, is the entire point of this exercise). Because
the Home Station claim was withdrawn from the public domain on October 13, 1881, that date
becomes a central date in this case, and the date by which Plaintiffs need to have completely
established public acceptance of any RS 2477 roads. 6
Both parties agree that "when determining whether an RS 2477 highway has been
accepted in Utah, courts must look to Utah law in effect at the time of the alleged dedication."
See Defendants' Br., at 25. This is surely accurate. See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 771 (stating that
courts are to look "to the Utah statutes in force at the time the right of way was claimed to have
been accepted"); see also San Juan County" v. United States, Civ. No. 2:04-CV-0552BSJ, 2011
WL 2144762, at *5 & n.9 (D. Utah May 27, 2011) (hereinafter "Salt Creek District Court Case")
(stating that "[w]hether the RS 2477 grant has been accepted is a question of compliance with
the then-existing laws of the state where the right-of-way was established" (citations omitted)),
affd, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014 ). If the Court does so in this case, however, the Court cannot
rely upon the 1886 statute for any purpose, because it was not yet passed in 1881. All parties
appear to assume that the Court should not rely upon the 1886 statute in establishing the
relevant time period (Plaintiffs argue for a five-year time period based on the 1880 statute, and
Defendants argue for a 20-year time period based on the common law of prescription). But

6

The Court, in its ruling rendered after hearing on June 4, 2014 (and memorialized in an order dated July
17, 2014), stated that Plaintiffs needed to prove complete acceptance of the RS 2477 road by 1880, given
the representations made by Plaintiffs in their April 2012 pre-trial disclosures required by Judge Kelly.
However, moving that date forward some ten m6nths to October 1881 (or even forward until December
1883, when the last of UPCM's three relevant claims were located) ultimately makes no difference to the
outcome of the case, and the Court will proceed analytically as though the effective date is October 1881
rather than the end of December 1880.
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neither side takes the next logical step, an'! neither asks the Court to ignore the 1886 statute's
role in formulating the substantive RS 2477 standard articulated by SUWA and Churnos.
However, in the Court's view, this is exactly what is required. See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 771; Salt
Creek District Court Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *5 & n.9. In the end, the Court is convinced
that the applicable substantive standard for all purposes (and not just for time period) must be
gleaned from the 1880 statute, at least to the extent that the 1880 statute "provides convenient
and appropriate principles for effectuating congressional intent." SUWA, 425 F.3d at 768.
Utah's 1880 Highway Act was passed in February 1880, and contains 25 separate
sections, only two of which are materially relevant here. These two sections were helpfully
quoted in their entirety in Churnos:
Sec. 2. Highways are roads, streets or alleys and bridges, laid out or erected by
the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or abandoned to the use
of the public.
Sec. 3. Roads laid out and recorded· as highways by order of the County Court,
and all roads used as such for a period of five years, are highways ....
See Churnos, 285 P. at 648 (quoting Chapter 29, Laws of Utah 1880).
In the Court's view, the elements required for establishment of an RS 2477 claim
between 1880 and 1886 are, under the 1880 statute viewed in conjunction with the Salt Creek
Appellate Case, more or less the same (with the exception of the duration of the relevant time
period) as post-1886 elements set forth above: (1) continuous use (2) by the public (3) for the
requisite period of time. The second element-use by the public-is plainly included in Section
2 of the 1880 statute, which requires roads to have been "abandoned to the use of the public."
The Court sees no reason to interpret this element any differently under the 1880 statute than it
is interpreted under similar language ("abandoned to the use of the Public . . . as a Public
thoroughfare") in the 1886 statute. The third element is discussed more fully below, but in any
event a time period must be applied.

And the first element-continuous use-is not at all
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present in the 1880 statute, but the Tenth Circuit recently stated in no uncertain terms that any
common-law standard that does not inclo·de the continuous use requirement contravenes
congressional intent. See Salt Creek Appellate Case, 754 F.3d at 798-99.
Thus, in the end, although one additional analytical step was required here due to the
1881 (as opposed to the post-1886) withdrawal of a material portion of the relevant property
from the public domain, the end result is no different. Plaintiffs, in order to succeed on their
claims, must demonstrate that the Claimed Roads were (1) continuously used (2) by the public
(3) for the requisite period of time.
C. The Applicable Time Period in This Case is Five Years

Some additional extended discussion is required here with regard to the applicable
length of time required under pre-1886 law to establish an RS 2477 right-of-way. With regard to
the applicable time period, the parties advance conflicting arguments. Plaintiffs ask this Court
for a straightforward interpretation of the 1880 statute, which mentions "a period of five years"
#. ~·
as the applicable time frame. Defendants, by contrast, argue that the 1880 statute's reference
to "five years" applies only to roads that are both (a) "laid out and recorded as highways by
order of the County Court," and (b) "used as such for a period of five years."

Defendants

maintain that, unless the road in question was actually laid out and recorded as a highway by an
order of the applicable county court, the five-year time period listed in the statute does not even
apply, and that one must then default to common-law prescriptive time periods which, at the
time, were twenty years. See Harkness v. Woodmansee, 26 P. 291, 292 (Utah 1891) (stating
that the period required for dedication, "unless other provision was made in local statutes, . ..
has been assumed to be the term of twenty years" (emphasis added)).
Defendants' arguments seem, on their face, to be overly complicated and contrary to a
plain and simple reading of the applicable statute, and seem to advance an interpretation that

~·--·
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requires this Court to read words out of the statute (e.g., "Roads laid out and recorded as
highways by order of the County Court, and ati--roaG6 used as such for a period of five years, are
highways"). The better reading of the plain language of the statute, in the Court's view, is that
there are two ways to establish a "highway." The first is if the county court laid out and recorded
the road. Under this factual scenario, the road becomes a "highway" immediately, and no actual
use is required. The second is if the road is "used as such," "by the public," "for a period of five
years." While the phrase "used as such" is perhaps not as clear as it could be, in the Court's
view it is plain enough: any road that is actually used as a highway by the public for five years
qualifies as a "highway" under the statute, regardless of whether that road was laid out and
recorded by the county court. Defendants' proposed interpretation is therefore not consonant
with the language of the statute, and requires ignoring several critical words that appear there.
However, Defendants have the Idaho Supreme Court on their side. In Galli v. Idaho
County, 191 P.3d 233 (Idaho 2008), the court interpreted Idaho's highway statute in effect at the
time, which was materially identical to Utah's 1880 Highway Act. In a two-sentence analysis,
the court concluded that, under the applicable statutory language, "[a] highway may not be
created unless it is a road, street, alley or bridge that is erected or laid out by the public, and it is
used for a period of five years," and that the two sections of the statute "are not mutually
exclusive, and must be read in conjunction with one another." Id. at 238. The analysis of the
Idaho Supreme Court is, in this Court's view, less than persuasive. The court there did not act
as though the issue was strongly contested in that case, and did not offer a detailed explanation
of its reasoning. This Court is, of course, not bound to follow the Idaho Supreme Court, and in
this instance this Court elects not to do so.
In addition, however, and perhaps more to the point, the Court considers this issue at
least implicitly answered by Churnos, a case handed down by the Utah Supreme Court, which is
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a court that this Court is bound to follow. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court implicitly
weighed In on this very issue, citing both the 1880 and 1886 statutes as potentially supplying
the relevant time period in an RS 2477 case spanning the years 1876 to 1894. See Churnos,
285 P. at 648. In the end, the Utah Supreme Court held that the evidence in that case was
sufficient, under "the territorial statute2 in force" during the relevant time period, to demonstrate
public use for "a time in excess of that required." Id. (emphasis added to point out that the court
used the plural). There was no indication in Churnos that the road in question had ever been
laid out and recorded by the applicable county court. It is therefore at least very strongly implied
by the Churnos Court that the 1880 statute does supply the relevant time period to be applied to
RS 2477 claims arising between 1880 and 1886, and that this Court's statutory interpretation set
forth above was shared by the Court in Churnos.
Accordingly, with regard to the time period element of Plaintiffs' RS 2477 claim, this
Court determines as a matter of law that the 1880 Highway Act applies here to supply the
relevant time period, and that, under the applicable imported state-law standard that federal law
"borrows" for interpretation of RS 2477 claims, Plaintiffs in this case must demonstrate that the
claimed roads were ( 1) continuously used (2) by the public (3) for at least five years.
D. Burden of Proof
Before proceeding to an analysis of the evidence presented to the Court on summary
judgment, it is important to next discuss the burden of proof. In many cases, the burden of proof
is sort of an afterthought, something that only matters at the margins. But in RS 2477 cases,
especially cases involving evidence that is 130 to 140 years old, the burden of proof matters a
great deal, even in the summary judgment context.

"[l]n ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the judge must view the evidence through the prism of the substantive evidentiary
burden." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).
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In all "public road" cases, including RS 2477 cases, "the burden of proof lies on those
parties seeking to enforce rights-of-way" against the landowner. See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 768
(citations omitted). Under long-established Utah law in "public road" cases, "the presumption is
in favor of the property owner; and the burden of establishing public use for the required period
of time is on those claiming it." !Q. (citations omitted). And this comports with the federal
interests at stake: "[T]he established rule is that land grants are construed favorably to the
Government, that nothing passes except what is conveyed in clear language, and that if there
are doubts they are resolved for the Government, and not against it." Id. at 769 (citations
omitted). Here, then, Plaintiffs-as the parties seeking to establish public rights-of-way on land
owned at the time by the federal government-bear the burden of proof.
And this burden of proof is a heavy one. Courts, both state and federal, in public road
cases (including RS 2477 cases) have consistently applied a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard. See Salt Creek District Court Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *5. Although the Tenth
Circuit, in affirming the district court in the Salt Creek District Court Case, declined to definitively
reach the issue as to whether the "clear and convincing evidence" standard should be applied in
RS 2477 cases arising in Utah, see Salt Creek Appellate Case, 754 F.3d at 801, in this Court's
considered judgment that question is rather easily answered by reference to a long line of Utah
appellate court cases that clearly mandate the use of the heightened burden of proof in public
road cases. See, M.:., Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995)
(reasoning that "[t]he public's taking of property [for use as a public road] requires proof of
dedication by clear and convincing evidence"); Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639, 639 (Utah
1972) (reasoning that a "clear and convincing quantum and quality of proof [is] universally
demanded for the establishment of a public thoroughfare"); Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545,
548 (Utah 1968) (reasoning that "taking of Dproperty [for the establishment of a public highway]

21

STICHTING MAYFLOWER et al. v. UNITED PARK CITY MINES et al.

Case No. 050500430

must be proved by clear and convincing evidence"); Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc.,
2009 UT App 119, ,I11, 208 P.3d 1077 (reasoning that "[t]he public's taking of property [to
establish a public highway] requires proof ... by clear and convincing evidence"); AWINC Corp.
v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, W, 112 P.3d 1228 (reasoning that "[t]o establish the dedication
of a public road, we require clear and convincing evidence"). Thus, not only do Plaintiffs bear
the burden of proof, but they bear the relatively heavy burden of proving their case not just by a
preponderance of the evidence but by clear and convincing evidence. It follows therefrom that
the Court must view the present summary judgment motions through the prism of the clear and
convincing evidence standard by which dedication of property to use as a public road must be
proven. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254; Jennings Inv., 2009 UT App 119, ,I11.
It is also noteworthy that, due to the passage of time, this case looks and feels different
than most of the RS 2477 cases currently being prosecuted by the State of Utah and some of its
counties. See,~. Salt Creek District Court Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *24-*29 (citing actual
testimony from live witnesses regarding use of the claimed road in the 1950s and 1960s);
Maffiy, Ruling Sticks: Salt Creek Not a County Highway, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Sept. 9, 2014
(stating that "[a] stable of lawyers, most on the taxpayers' dime, have been touring the state in
~·
recent months, taking 'preservation' depositions of elderly and infirm witnesses whose testimony
is needed to establish road use decades ago"). In most of those cases, the state and county
plaintiffs are trying to establish the existence of a public road before 1976, and the evidence
they are trying to muster consists to a large degree of eyewitness testimony from the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s. In this case, by contrast, Plaintiffs are trying to establish the existence of a
public road between 1871 and 1881, a time period more than 130 years in the past. When the
evidence in question is this old, it is of course impossible to come up with live witness testimony
to establish any of the necessary facts. And this makes Plaintiffs' task much harder.
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The year 1871 was a very long time ago, so long that perhaps some perspective is in
order. At the time that the first group of prospectors located the Flagstaff mining claim, the Civil
War had only been over for six years. Ulysses S. Grant was President of the United States.
General George Armstrong Custer was still five years away from meeting his demise at Little
Big Horn, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt had not yet been born. The light bulb was then still,
so to speak, just a filament of Thomas Edison's imagination. The United States flag had only 37
stars on it.

Utah was still a territory, and was closer in years (24) to Brigham Young's

declaration that "This is the right place" than it was (25) to statehood. In cases like this one,
where no live testimony is available due to the passage of an extremely long period of time, the
parties' arguments can only rest on whatever documents might exist from the 1870s, and the
parties are by necessity "driven to the historical archives for documentation of matters [that] no
one had reason to document at the time." See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 742. That historical record
is necessarily limited and, although the parties in this case have done a remarkable job of
unearthing and marshaling the evidence that does exist, the task faced by Plaintiffs in trying to
gather enough evidence to meet a heightened "clear and convincing evidence" standard in this
context is terribly daunting. Because of this, the Tenth Circuit in SUWA warned that, because
all RS 2477 cases by definition require courts to look back further than 1976, the "evidence in
these cases is over a quarter of a century old," and that in some cases "the burden of proof
could be decisive." SUWA, 425 F.3d at 769. As discussed more fully below, in the Court's view
this case is one of those cases.

E. Plaintiffs Cannot Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Use, By the General
Public, of the Claimed Roads for Five Years
Now, after all of that prelude, the Court now turns to the substance of the matter:
whether either side is entitled to summary judgment in this case under the evidence presented
and under applicable law as set forth above. After careful analysis of the evidence and the law,
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the Court is convinced that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, because-even
drawing certain reasonable inferences from the evidence in Plaintiffs' favor-Plaintiffs cannot as
a matter of law carry their heavy burden of proof on this factual record. Specifically, Plaintiffs'
case founders on the second element that they must prove: use by the public.
This issue was first flagged in Churnos. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court examined
all of the available evidence regarding the road in question, and determined that the road had
indeed been used by a wide cross-section of the public, including sheepherders who "trailed
[their sheep] over the route in question," Churnos, 285 P. at 647; people visiting a sawmill in the
vicinity who "traveled the road for the purpose of hauling lumber from the sawmill," id; members
of the "general public" who traveled the road "extensively ... in going to and from [a nearby]
mining camp," i.Q..; as well as "hunters, fishermen, and others who had occasion to travel over it,"
id. After examining all of this evidence, the Court stated as follows:
We think the evidence established a general public use of the road. If the claim
rested alone upon the use of the road for sawmill purposes, or for mining
purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, the question would be more difficult.
But here the road connected two points between which there was occasion for
considerable public travel. The road was a public convenience. When sawmills
were established on or near the road, it was used, not only by those conducting
the sawmills, but by many others who went to the sawmills to get lumber, etc.
During the period when the mining camp existed in the vicinity, the road was
unquestionably used very extensively by the general public for general purposes.
And all the time it was used as a general way for the driving or trailing of sheep.
This latter use was not by a few persons, but by many persons, and it involved
more than the mere driving of animals on the road. Camp outfits and supplies
accompanied the herds and were moved over the road in camp wagons and on
pack horses. While it is difficult to fix a standard by which to measure what is a
public use or a public thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by
many and different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all who
desired to use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as the
situation and surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid out as a
public highway by public authority. We therefore conclude that the court was
justified in finding that the road had been continuously and uninterruptedly used
as a public thoroughfare for more than ten years.

.!Q. at 648-49 (emphasis added).
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The question left open in Churnos-whether "public use" could be established by
evidence of use by only one specific group of users-was flagged again in SUWA.

After

quoting the above-quoted language from Churnos, the Tenth Circuit stated that "[w)e think it
significant that the Utah Supreme Court stated that if the claim rested 'alone upon the use of the
road for sawmill purposes, or for mining purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, the question
would be more difficult."' See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 773. A few pages later, the court stated that
"[l]arge parts of southern Utah are crisscrossed by old mining and logging roads constructed for
a particular purpose and used for a limited period of time, but not by the general public." Id. at
781-82 (emphasis added). The court then noted that the standard it had adopted-public use,
rather than a standard grounded in mechanical construction-was "better calculated to
distinguish between rights of way genuinely accepted through continual public use over a
lengthy period of time, and routes which, though mechanically constructed (at least in part),

served limited purposes for limited periods of time, and never formed part of the public
transportation system." Id. at 782 (emphasis added). However, because the SUWA court was,
at that point in its opinion, simply giving guidance for the trial court to follow upon remand, it did
not issue a definitive holding on the issue either, although its commentary is certainly instructive.
In this Court's view, the issue left open by Churnos and SUWA is squarely presented
here. The undisputed factual record, set forth above, indicates definitively that prospectors
associated with the Flagstaff Mine built at least two miles of roads 7 in the vicinity of the Flagstaff
Mine, and used those roads to reach the mine. The factual record also indicates that other
prospectors eventually located other mining claims on Flagstaff Mountain in the late 1870s and
7

In addition to the arguments discussed in the body of this Memorandum Decision, Defendants also
argue that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the two miles of roads built by the Flagstaff Mine
prospectors are the same roads that they claim as their own today, and in addition argue that there is
insufficient evidence that any of these roads were used with sufficient frequency. While these arguments
may have some force, it is not necessary for the Court to reach their merits, given the Court's disposition
of the "public use" requirement discussed herein.
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early 1880s, and at no point in the available field notes from those other claims do any of the
other prospectors discuss building a road. Plaintiffs ask this Court to infer from this evidence
that at least some of these other prospectors used the roads built by the Flagstaff Mine
claimants to reach the other mining claims in the area. At least at the summary judgment stage,
where all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, the Court (at
least in connection with adjudicating Defendants' summary judgment motions) will assume that
the factfinder would draw this inference in favor of Plaintiffs.
But even with this particular inference comfortably in their column on summary
judgment, Plaintiffs have located no evidence at all that anyone other than prospectors ever
used the roads in question during the relevant time period. There is no direct evidence that
anyone else ever used these roads, prior to 1881, for homesteading purposes, for timbergathering purposes, for livestock grazing, for hunting or fishing, or for recreational pursuits. This
is the sort of evidence that, in most RS 2477 cases, is usually supplied by "old-timer''
eyewitness testimony, but as noted this sort of evidence is unavailable to Plaintiffs as a practical
matter. In response to this dilemma, Plaintiffs make two arguments.
First, Plaintiffs argue that it would be reasonable for a factfinder to infer that, given Park
City's small but burgeoning population in the 1870s and 1880s, at least some members of the
general public were using the roads in question for timber gathering, hunting, fishing, and the
like. The Court simply disagrees. There is not a shred of evidence of any kind that any such
use occurred on these roads during the •1870s and 1880s. While it might be theoretically
possible to infer that a random hunter or axeman wandered some stretch of these roads during
that period of time, such an unsupported inference is, in the Court's view, as a matter of law
insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence of public use. The heightened pleading
standard has to mean something, and if it could be satisfied with this sort of unsupported
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In the Court's view, no reasonable

factfinder could consider that particular inference to be clear and convincing evidence.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the prospectors who may have used the roads in question
were, at least prior to their locating a mining claim, simply members of the general public
themselves.

But this is precisely the question that was left open in Churnos and SUWA,

namely, whether one specific type of user can be considered "the public" for purposes of the
"public use" element of an RS 2477 claim. And in the Court's view, this question has been
definitively answered in the negative by the Utah Supreme Court, in the cases following
Churnos, and by the Utah federal district cou[t in the Salt Creek District Court Case.
Even before Churnos, the Utah Supreme Court had hinted at its ultimate resolution of
the issue, stating in 1916 that "such use must be by the public" and that "[u]se under a private
right is not sufficient." See Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916). After Churnos, the
Court became even clearer in its intentions. In Thompson v. Nelson, 273 P.2d 720 (Utah 1954),
the road in question was a 44-foot-long alleyway behind a row of buildings in Brigham City, and
the Court determined that the only users of this "road" were customers of one of the "few
business[es]" housed in the row of buildings. The Court stated that
[t]he road led to no place of public interest and ended in a cul-de-sac. The use
made of the road was for delivering merchandise and supplies and for parking to
the rear of buildings on Main Street in connection with the few business houses
on Main Street in the half block over which the road extends.
Id. at 345-46. The Court found this evidence "insufficient to establish use sufficient to meet the
requirements" of the public highway statute. _Id. at 345.
A few years later, in Cassity v. Castagna, 347 P.2d 834 (Utah 1959), the Court held that
a trail leading out to Stansbury Island in Tooele County that had only been used by cattlemen
for grazing purposes was not a public right-of-way under RS 2477, and that "the evidence does
not support" the plaintiffs case. Id. at 835.
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Next, in Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah 1968), at issue was a claimed road in
Weber County. The Petersen Court noted that the plaintiffs in that case did not even allege that
"any member or members of the general public used the road, save the property owners in the
area," and held that "[s]uch property owners cannot be considered members of the public
generally, as that term generally is used in dedication-by-user statutes." Id. at 546. Under the
circumstances, the Court determined that the record was insufficient "to show clear and
convincing evidence

D that

the public generally-not just a few having their own special and

private interests in the road-had used the road continuously for 10 years." Id. at 546-47.
In Harding v. Bohman, 491 P.2d 233 (Utah 1971 ), the Court determined in a short
opinion that a "road" that had been used only by "two sheepmen in trailing their sheep to and
from grazing lands," as well as by an "occasional" deer hunter, was not a public road. The
Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the "evidence failed to show a public
dedication of the strip of land in question as a public road." Id. at 234.
Most recently, the federal district court canvassed this line of cases in the context of
examining whether San Juan County had carried its burden of demonstrating, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a claimed road up Salt Creek Canyon in Canyonlands National Park
had been used by members of the general public before 1950. See Salt Creek District Court
Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *33-*34 & nn. 86-96. In that case, there was evidence that the
claimed road had been used by a solitary cattleman (Mr. Kirk) in the 1890s, who had built a
cabin in upper Salt Creek and had left various relics there (e.g., a hay rake and a wagon)
indicating that farming and ranching had occurred there before Mr. Kirk abandoned the site for
good a few years later. There was evidence that a second individual, Mr. Peachman, had been
in the cabin area in 1911, but there was no evidence regarding how long he was there. In the
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the canyon was used by the Scorup-Somerville Cattle Company,
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which pastured a herd of bulls near the Kirk Cabin site. With regard to the cattle company's
presence in the canyon, the court stated as follows:
Though the company's presence in upper Salt Creek at times during the 1920s,
1930s and 1940s was more consistent than that of Kirk or Peachman, it would
strain the language to characterize its presence as a "public" use, or that Salt
Creek Canyon was then being used as a "public thoroughfare." The company
had its own proprietary interests in upper Salt Creek-federal grazing permits
issued after 1936, and a 1942 deed to 80 acres of land near Kirk's Cabin. As the
Tenth Circuit explains in SUWA, "The decisions make clear that occasional or
desultory use is not sufficient." 425 F.3d at 771. The SUWA panel noted that
"[l]arge parts of southern Utah are crisscrossed by old mining and logging roads
constructed for a particular purpose and used for a limited period of time, but not
by the general public." lg. at 781-82.
lg_. at *34. After examining this evidence in light of the applicable RS 2477 case law, the federal

district court ultimately determined that one cattle company's use of the canyon, even for more
than two decades, was not the sort of use th13t qualified as a "public use" under the statute, and
that all of the evidence, even taken together, did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of
public use prior to 1950. Id.; see also SUWA, 425 F.3d at 782 (stating that roads that merely
serve "limited purposes for limited periods of time, and never [become] part of the public
transportation system," do not qualify as RS 2477 rights-of-way).
In the Court's view, the result in this case is compelled by the Salt Creek District Court
Case as well as by SUWA and by the several Utah Supreme Court cases cited above. The
factual record unearthed by the parties in this case indicates that the roads claimed here by
Plaintiffs were used-even drawing certain reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor-only by
prospectors for a relatively limited period of time. There is no competent evidence-or even
reasonable inferences that can be drawn here given the heightened standard of proofindicating that anyone else ever used these particular roads before 1881 . The prospectors in
question here, like the cattlemen referenced in the Salt Creek District Court Case, had their own
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"proprietary interests" in the area in the form of located and/or patented mining claims.8 This
situation is materially indistinguishable from the Salt Creek District Court Case, in which the
court found that evidence that cattlemen used Salt Creek Canyon for more than two decades
was insufficient to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of public use. There is nothing in
the factual record unearthed by the parties in this case-or in any reasonable inferences that
can be draw n from that evidence given the high burden of proof here-indicating that the roads
created and used by the Flagstaff mining claimants during the 1870s were anything more than
roads that "served limited purposes for limited periods of time, and never formed part of the
public transportation system." See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 782.
As explained above, the Court is cognizant of the fact that these motions are brought on
summary judgment. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot weigh the evidence or
make factual findings.

Rather, the Court must examine the undisputed facts and consider

whether any reasonable factfinder, upon hearing these facts, could possibly determine that
there is clear and convincing evidence of at least five years' worth of public use during the
relevant time period. After careful consideration of the factual record and applicable law, the
Court is comfortably convinced that, on this record, no reasonable factfinder could so conclude.

9

8

The fact that a few prospectors may have wandered Flagstaff Mountain before actually officially locating
a mining claim does not change the analysis. Such men were at least prospective prospectors, and had
at least an inchoate proprietary interest in the area, as contrasted with a member of the public who is
using the road simply for getting from one place to another, or a family out for a picnic, or any other
unattached member of the general public.
9

The Court believes that Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Upper Primary Access is
resolved by the Court's resolution of the "public use" element discussed above. However, the Court also
notes that it finds many of Defendants' other arguments contained In the papers supporting that motion to
be highly persuasive. See Defendants' Reply Br. Re: Upper Primary Access, at 3-4 (arguing persuasively
that there is no evidence regarding when or how. the Upper Primary Access road was ever constructed,
and that there is not even an inference to be drawn that it could have been constructed prior to 1878, and
that even if that inference is drawn by the factfinder that would not constitute five years' worth of use prior
to 1881 ). This would be an alternative ground for the granting of the Upper Primary Access Road motion.
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F. Evidentiary Issues
Finally, Plaintiffs have lodged certain objections to the use of some of the evidence
proffered by Defendants in support of their summary judgment motions. Specifically, Plaintiffs
objected to Defendants' use of the following pieces of evidence:
Dean Franklin Wright's secondary-source University of Utah master's thesis
entitled "A History of Park City," in which Mr. Wright describes some of the
mining claims at issue here, including the Flagstaff Mine;
expert reports issued for and on behalf of Defendants by J. Scott Buchanan
and Ernest D. Rowley;
USGS topographical maps from 1900 and 1925; and
a 1918 USGS instructional manual for USGS topographers.
The astute reader of this Memorandum Decision will have noticed that the Court has not
once cited to, or even mentioned , the dueling expert reports obtained by the parties here (in
addition to Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Rowley, who are Defendants' experts, Plaintiffs have a
competing expert report of their own, from a Mr. John Stahl). Courts in general do not need
help from experts in reviewing the historical record or the applicable case law and, while experts
in reading maps or aerial imagery could conceivably be helpful in certain contexts, such
expertise was not essential here, especially in the summary judgment context and especially
given the Court's disposition of the pending motions on the "public use" element. While these
experts might have been more helpful had this case proceeded to a jury trial, this Court did not
find them particularly helpful one way or the other under the circumstances and, in part because
there had been an objection raised to the Court considering their views, this Court elected not to
consider their opinions.
This Court has also not relied upon either the 1900 or the 1925 USGS topographical
maps referenced in Plaintiffs' objection, or upon the 1918 USGS instructional manual. These
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items are not listed in the Court's factual recitation set forth above, and the Court did not
consider them or rely upon them in reaching its decision herein.
The Court did, by contrast, cite and rely upon Mr. Wright's master's thesis.

This

document, created in 1971, qualifies as an ancient document under Utah R. Evid. 803(16),
which means that the hearsay rule is no bar to its consideration by the Court.

Plaintiffs

complain that Mr. Wright's thesis was not properly authenticated and therefore lacks foundation,
but the Court is unpersuaded.

In their objection, Plaintiffs do not specify what kind of

authentication or foundation they are expecting Defendants to provide, and their arguments ring
quite hollow given Plaintiffs' own reliance on a host of ancient unauthenticated documents,
including field notes from various mining claims as well as secondary source documents that
look a lot like Mr. Wright's master's thesis. See, ~ . Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1-29 (old mining
documents that are presented without additional authentication or foundation); see also
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 30 (a USGS narrative history of "Geology and Ore Deposits of the Park City
Mining District, Utah"). In a case like this one, where the only evidence available consists of old
historical documents and secondary sources compiling those documents, this Court does not
believe it improper to examine and consider those documents and secondary sources.
Plaintiffs' evidentiary objections are largely MOOTED by the Court's lack of reliance
upon most of the items to which objection is lodged.

With regard to Mr. Wright's thesis,

however, Plaintiffs' evidentiary objection is OVERRULED.
CONCLUSION

After nine years of litigation, it is time for this case to finally come to an end. Given the
passage of more than 130 years since the events in question transpired, Plaintiffs from the
outset faced a very difficult task: proving by clear and convincing evidence that there was at
least five years of continuous public use of the Claimed Roads between 1871 and 1881.
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Despite valiant efforts, Plaintiffs have simply not gathered enough evidence to meet that
standard, even drawing certain reasonable inferences in their favor on summary judgment.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants' summary judgment motions
are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion is DENIED.

Specifically, the HOA

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; UPCM's Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED; Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Upper
Primary Access is GRANTED; and Plaintiffs' Revised Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and all remaining claims asserted therein, is

DISMISSED, with prejudice and on the merits.
Finally, Plaintiffs' Objection to Certain Evidence in Defendants' Pleadings is largely
MOOTED, but to the extent not mooted is OVERRULED.
This Memorandum Decision and Order is the order of the court with regard to all of the
Motions and Objections listed on the first page hereof, and no further writing is necessary to
effectuate this decision.
DATED this1~ day of October, 2014.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF Ultft_~ 9 ''--- _ _ _ STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER
RECREATIONAL FONDS,

-·

RULING AND ORDER
Case No. 050500430

Plalntlffs,

December12,2014
vs.
Judge

Ryan M. Harris

UNITED PARK CITY MINES
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation;
EMPIRE PASS MASTER OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah non-profit
corporation and Intervenor Defendant;
RED CLOUD HOA, a Utah non-profit
corporation and Intervenor Defendant;
and JOHN DOES 3-10,
Defendants.

Before the Court is a Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's October 1, 2014
Memorandum Decision and Order (ihe Motion"), flied by Plaintiffs Stichting Mayflower Mountain
· Fonds and Stlchtlng Mayflower Recreational Fonds ePlaintJffs•). The Motion was filed on or
about October 15, 2014, and has been fully briefed by the parties and submitted for decision.
Plaintiffs have requested a hearing, but the Court does not believe that oral argument will
substantially assist the Court In resolving the Motion, and therefore respectfully denies Plaintiffs'
request for oral argument.

By the Motion, Plaintiffs essentially ask this Court to reconsider Its decision,
memorialized in a Memorandum Decision and Order dated October 1, 2014, to resolve this case
on summary Judgment in favor of Defendants. In support of their contention, Plaintiffs make two
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main arguments.1 First, Plaintiffs assert that the Court employed an incorrect burden of proof,
contending that the Court should have used a .. preponderance of the evidence• standard rather
than a ..clear and convincing evidence" standard, and further assert that the Court misapplied
that standard. Second, Plaintiffs assert that the Court erred by concluding that Plaintiffs could
not establish public use of the Claimed Roads. The Court will discuss these two arguments in

tum.
A. Burden of·Proof

Plaintiffs base their arguments regarding burden of proof on a part of the Utah Rights•ofWay Across Federal Lands Act c•the Act11) that states, on its face, that "(t]he proponent of the
R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the burden of proving acceptance of the grant by a

preponderance of the evidence for all decisions that are not subject to Subsection 6(a).• See
Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-310(6)(b). There are two problems with Plaintiffs' arguments regarding

burden of proof.
First, the Court remains unconvinced, even after reconsideration, that the burden of
proof to be appUed to this case Is anything other than ..clear and convincing evidence: The

federal district court, in the Salt Creek Distri~..court Case, declined to apply provisions of the
Act-at least not provisions that Impacted the burden of proof-to modem RS 2477
adjudications. That court stated as follows:
It appears that in 2003 the Utah Legislature attempted to alter the burden of proof
concerning the acceptance of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, creating a presumption in
favor of right.at-way existence where '1he state or political subdivision of the
state makes a finding that the highway was constructed and the right.of-way was
accepted prior to October 21, 1976.• Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-302(3)(a). Not
having been formulated untll many years after the opportunity to accept the R.S.
2477 grant had been terminated by Congress, this post hoc presumption cannot
1

Plaintiffs make some additional seconda,y arguments, but the Court declines to provide additional

response or analysis with regard to these secondary arguments. The Court believes that its October 1
Memorandum Oecfslon speaks for Itself on these Issues, and that ft does not need to be altered,
amended, or reconsidered with regard to these secondary arguments.
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serve to satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of proof In this case. Whether the R.S. 2477
grant has been accepted ..is a question of compliance with the then-existing laws
of the state where the right-of-way was established."

See Salt Creek District Court Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *5 & n.9. Although Plaintiffs correctly
point out that the federal court was discussing a different provision of the Act, this Court finds

the analysis of the federal court Instructive here, certainty as to provisions of the Act that might
.. attempt(] to alter the burden of proor that would have applied to establlshment of RS 24n
claims on or before October 21, 1976. Id.
Moreover, the Court after analysis of the relevant statutory provision is also unconvinced

that the provision was ever intended to apply to RS 2477 claims generally, as opposed merely
to specific proceedings challenging ..the correctness of [any] acknowledgment of acceptance"
that may be created or recorded by the State of Utah notifying Interested parties that the State
of Utah considers "title of the right-of-way" as having •vest(edr in the State of Utah. ,Sn Utah
Code Ann.§ 72-5-309(1), and 72-5-310(2)(a). Indeed, in Sections 309 and 310 the Act sets up
a mechanism for the State of Utah and other interested parties to follow In the event that the

State of Utah claims title to any particular rights-of-way pursuant to RS 2477. Under those
provisions, if the State of Utah believes It has title to such a right-of-way, it "shall issue a notice
of acknowledgment of the acceptance of the R.S. 2477 grant as to that right-of-way: Id. at§
, ,.

72-5-309(2).

That notice of acknowledgement "may" be recorded with the relevant county

recorder's office, jg. at§ 72-5-309(4), but In all events "shall" be provided by certified mall to llt_he
last known owner of the servfent estate in land over which the right-of-way" runs as well as to
•any person known to have a competing dominant estate ownership claim," id. at§ 72-5-310(1).
Those persons •may petition for a decision of the district court as to the correctness of the
acknowledgement of acceptance• issued by the State of Utah. whfch petition must be filed in
"the district court for Salt Lake Countf and is to be filed In the fonn of a •complaint governed by
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."2 Id. at § 72-5-310(2) and (3). It is In this context that
Subsection (6) appears, declaring that the "burden of proving acceptance• falls upon the
"proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway," and that this burden is "preponderance of
the evidence.• Id. at § 72-5-310(6)(b). If this statutory subsection were a stand-alone provision,
its context may look different But when this provision appears as just another subsection of a
lengthy statutory provision describing a specific_and discrete type of adjudicatory proceeding, In
the Court's view this subsection applies not to RS 2477 lawsuits generally but, rather, only to
the specific actions described in Section 310 of the Act (e.g., petitions filed to challenge the
correctness of one of the State of Utah's notices of acknowledgment).3
The Court's conclusion, then, based not only on the federal court's analysis but also on
this Court's own analysis of the statutory provision at issue, is that this particular statutory
provision does not operate to supply the burden of proof to RS 2477 actions generally, and that
the Court's discussion of the burden of proof in the October 1 Memorandum Decision does not
require amendment or alteration, even after reconsideration.
However, the Court also notes, upon further review of its Memorandum Decision, that
the Issue of whether the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence or clear and
convincing evidence would not by itself be dispositive In this case.

Despite Plaintiffs'

characterization, In their briefing supporting their Motion, that this case Is a "close case,• the
Court did not ever describe this case as such In its October 1 Memorandum Decision. Even if
the burden of proof to be applied in this case were preponderance of the evidence, the result
would not be any different. Plaintiffs would still bear this burden of proof-something that can,
z In addition,

the statute sets forth very specific requirements not only for where the petition must be filed,
but also with regard to when II must be filed, what it must contain, and upon whom it must be served.
~ Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-310(2) and (3).
>This result Is hardly without justifiable policy basis. It is not hard to Imagine the Utah legislature wanting
to make it easier for the State of Utah to establish entitlement to an RS 2477 right-of-way than It would be
for a private entity or Individual to do so.
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425 F.3d at 769-and, on the

evidence presented, Plaintiffs would not be able to surmount even this lessened burden. As
noted in the Memorandum Decision, Plaintiffs have no actual evidence that anyone other than
miners and prospectors ever used the Claimed Roads during the relevant time period. In the
Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court determined that an inference that a "random hunter or
axeman wandered some stretch of these roads during the (relevant] period of time• would not
constitute clear and convincing evidence of use by non-miners. ~ Memorandum Decision, at
26-27. For the record, the Court does not believe that such an Inference could push Plaintiffs
across the goal line in this case, even if the burden were lessened. Plaintiffs must not only
prove that the Claimed Roads were used by the public, but must also prove that they were used
with sufficient frequency to satisfy the ·continuous use• element of the RS 2477 standard. See
Salt Creek Appellate Case, 754 F.3d 787, 797-98 (10111 Cir. 2014). "Intermittent or occasional
use by hunters, fisherman, and shephers, farmers, and miners is not sufficient• to meet that
standard. .!.Q. at 798 (citing Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639, 641 (Utah 1972)). Thus, even if
the standard were preponderance of the evidence, a bare inference that an occasional hunter or
axeman wandered some stretch of the Claimed Roads during the relevant time period would, in
the Court's view, be insufficient even under the lighter burden of proof.
Finally, the Court finds Plaintiffs' citation to Haynes Land
Family Chalk Creek,

LLC.

& Livestock Co, v, Jacob

2001 UT App 112, 233 P.3d 529, unavailing. In its Memorandum

Decision, the Court noted that Plaintiffs' burden of proof, under the clear and convincing
evidence standard, was indeed "daunting• and "heavy,• but the Court did not state-and
certainly did not mean to imply-that the task was Impossible or that it could never be
surmounted in any case involving historical evidence. Certainly, Haynes presents an example
of a case where a court determined that the heavy burden had been surmounted on the
5
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strength of evidence that was largely historical. However, as Defendants rightly point out in
their brief opposing the Motion, In Haynes "the claimants presented evidence of contemporary
maps dating from fifteen years prior to the date of dedication and additional later maps showing
that the clalmed roads had existed 'on all maps thereafter,'" as well as •other evidence of vast
usage.'" See Defendants' Br., at 5, 6 (citing Haynes, at ,r12). The historical evidence unearthed

by Plaintiffs In this case was nowhere near as conclusive.

B. Public Use

•

Next, Plaintiffs assert that the Court misapplied the "public use• element of the RS 2477
analysis by focusing on "purpose of use rather than the number of users,• and by too-casually
using the term "prospector." See Plaintiffs' Br., at 6-9. The Court is unpersuaded by Plalntlffs'
arguments on both points.
As explained In detail in the Memorandum Decision, In the Court's view both Chumos
and SUWA raise the question of whether single-purpose use can constiMe "public use• for
purposes of an RS 2477 claim. While Chumos does not answer the question, in the Court's
view the Tenth Circuit in SUWA at least Impliedly did answer the question by focusing on
"purpose" of use and noting that "[l]arge parts of southern Utah are crisscrossed by old mining
and logging roads constructed for a particular purpose and used for a limited period of time, but
not by the general public."

Id. at 781-82 (emphasis added). The court then noted that the

standard it had adopted-public use, rather than a standard grounded In mechanical
construction-was "better calculated to distinguish between rights of way genuinely accepted
through continual public use over a lengthy period of time, and routes which, though
mechanically constructed (at least in part), served 1/mited purposes for limited periods of time,
and never formed part of the public transportation system." .l.d.- at 782 (emphasis added). Part
of this Court's express holding In the Memorandum Decision was to definitively answer the

6
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question only impliedly answered in SUWA, which question the Court views as having been
squarely presented In this case. The Court views its analysis in the Memorandum Decision as
sound on this point, and declines the invitation to alter or amend it.
Under this analysis, whether the individuals using the Claimed Roads were prospectors,
locators, claimants, or patentees makes no difference. No matter what stage of the mining
process they were involved in, they are all engaged in the same behavior and activity: mining.
In order to prevail on the "public use• element of an RS 2477 claim, Plaintiffs must show that the
Claimed Roads were used during the relevant time period by more than just one segment of the
population. In the Court's view, even a showing that a lot of miners were using the roads Is
insufficient; Plaintiffs have to demonstrate that people other than miners used the roads.
Because there Is no competent evidence in this case that anyone other than Individuals
engaged in the mining industry ever used the Claimed Roads during the relevant time period,
under the Court's interpretation of Churnos and fil!11h there is no public use as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion is respectfully DENIED. This Ruling and
Order Is the order of the court with regard to the Motion, and no further writing is necessary to

......

.~

effectuate this decision.
DATED this

Yl~day of December, 2014.
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Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so
amend it at any time within 21 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 14 days after service of
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not withi n
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be.subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable
the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading
sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the
adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
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Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences.

(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its discretion or upon motion of a pa1ty, may direct
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or
conferences before trial for such purposes as:
(a)(l) expediting the disposition of the action;
(a)(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted for lack of
management;
(a)(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(a)( 4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation;
(a)(S) facilitating the settlement of the case; and
(a)(6) considering all matters as may aid in the disposition of the case.
(b) Scheduling and management conference and orders. In any action, in addition to any other pretrial
conferences that may be scheduled, the comt, upon its own motion or upon the motion of a party,
may conduct a scheduling and management conference. The attorneys and unrepresented parties shall
appear at the scheduling and management conference in person or by remote electronic means.
Regardless whether a scheduling and management conference is held, on motion of a party the court
shall enter a scheduling order that governs the time:
(b)( 1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings;
(b)(2) to file motions; and
(b)(3) to complete discovery.
The scheduling order may also include:
(b)(4) modifications of the times for disclosures under Rules 26(a) and 26(e)(l) and of the extent of
discovery to be pem1itted;
(b)(S) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference, and trial; and
(b)(6) provisions for preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information;
(b)(7) any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trialpreparation material after production; and
(b)(8) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
Unless the order sets the date of trial, any party _may and the plaintiff shall, at the close of all
discovery, certify to the court that the case is ready for trial. The court shall schedule the trial as soon
as mutually convenient to the court and parties. The court shall notify parties of the date of trial and
of any pretrial conference.
(c) Final pretrial or settlement conferences. In any action where a final pretrial conference has been
ordered, it shall be held as close to the time of trial as reasonable under the circumstances. The
conference shall be attended by at least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the
parties, and the attorneys attending the pretrial, unless waived by the court, shall have available,
either in person or by telephone, the appropriate parties who have authority to make binding
decisions regarding settlement.
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(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party or a party's
attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney
fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon_ motion or its own initiative, may take any action
authorized by Rule 37(b)(2).
Advisory Committee Notes
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Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.

(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods.
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as
otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a _party shall, without awaiting a discovery request,
provide to other parties:
(a)(1 )(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information;
(a)(1 )(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable documents,
data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the possession,
custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment;
(a)(1 )(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making
available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other
evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(a)(1 )(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under
which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to
satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required
by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under
subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined
after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being served.
A party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available and is
not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the
investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's
disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures.
(a)(2) Exemptions.
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions:
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or
less;
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an
administrative agency;
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award;
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/Superseded/urcp()26.html
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(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not represented by
counsel.
(a)(2)(8) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are
subject to discovery under subpart (b ).
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used
at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(a)(3)(8) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving
expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the
study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures
required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery
as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut
evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(8), within
60 days after the disclosure made by the other party.
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information
regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment:
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of
each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the
party may call if the need arises;
(a)(4)(8) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by
means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of
the deposition testimony ; and
(a)(4 )(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including
summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and
those which the party may offer if the need arises.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required
by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter,
unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i)
any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made
to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed,
other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed
waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown.
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/Superseded/urcp026.html
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(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless othecwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1 ), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing , signed and
served.
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other
property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests
for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources
that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The
party shall expressly make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, describing
the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and
any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is
made, the court may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good
cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court may specify conditions for the
discovery.
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that:
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action
to obtain the information sought; or
.,·
(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable
notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule,
a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
Subdivision (b )(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney,
http:/lwww.lrtcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/Superseded/urcp026.htm1
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consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the party
is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
•

A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its
subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain
without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously
made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed
or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical,
electrical, or other recording , or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital
of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded .
{b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts.
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose
opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3 )(8 ), any
deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after the report is provided.
(b)(5)(8) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial
and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule;
and
·
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) of this rule the
court may require , and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this
rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of
the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions
from the expert.
(b)(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials.
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable
under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation
material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the
applicability of the privilege or protection.
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a
claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may
http1/www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/Supersededlurcp026.html
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notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being
notified, a party must promptly return , sequester, or destroy the specified information and any
copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving
party may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the
claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, it must take
reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information until the
claim is resolved.
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted
to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and
for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters
relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had;
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a
designation of the time or place;
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected
by the party seeking discovery;
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited
to certain matters;
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the
court;
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such
terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery.
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion.
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2),
except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered
by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met and
conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered
by the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed.
Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests
of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact
that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to
delay any other party's discovery.
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(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision (a)
or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the
disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in
the following circumstances:
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under
subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty
extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a
deposition of the expert.
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory,
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some
material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not
otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference.
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise
stipulated or directed by order.
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in
person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss
the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by
subdivision (a)(1 ), to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable information and to
develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiff's counsel shall schedule the meeting. The
attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good faith to agree
upon the discovery plan .
(f)(2) The plan shall include:
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form , or requirement for disclosures
under subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1)
were made or will be made;
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be
completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should be
limited to particular issues;
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced;
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation
material, including - if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order;
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these
rules, and what other limitations should be imposed;
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating fault
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to a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court.
(f)(3) Plaintiff's counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any
event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity
with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also include each
of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(1 )-(8), except that the date or dates for pretrial conferences,
final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled w ith th e court or may be deferred until the
close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a discovery plan or any part
thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry of a discovery order on
any topic on which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the
presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject not included within the
parties' stipulated discovery plan.
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under Rule
16(b).
(f)(S) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery plan
and discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the
discovery plan and order. The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after
joinder.
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for discovery or
response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of record
or by the party if the party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The signature of
the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the request, response,
or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge , information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the
needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the party making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall not be
obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person whc( made the certification, the party on whose behalf
the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
violation , including a reasonable attorney fee.
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding
in another state may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner
and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending
in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such
deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person whose
deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising
during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court
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shall be submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken.
(i) Filing.
(i)(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
disclosures or requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the date of
service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that th!;!
response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in
Rule 30(f)(1 ), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed
with the court.
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach
to the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue.
Advisory Committee Notes
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.

(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, 1,,1.pon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons
affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
(a)(l) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made to the court in which the action
is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken . An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district
where the deposition is being taken.
(a)(2) Motion .
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel
disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good
fa ith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making th e disclosure in an effort to secure the
disclosure w ithout court action.
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Ru le 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to
answer an interrogatory submitted under Ru le 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection
submitted under Ru le 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit
inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer, or a
designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance w ith the request. The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good fa ith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party
failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material without court action , When
taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the
examination before applying for an order.
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or
incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a fai lure to disclose, answer, or respond.
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions.
(a)(4 )(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was
filed, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated
the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the cou rt finds that th e
motion was fi led without the movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery
without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially
justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust .
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may ent er any protective order authorized under Ru le 26(c) and
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney or both of them to pay to the
party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion,
including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter any protective order
authorized l,mder Ru le 26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses
incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a j ust manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(b)(l) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a
question after being directed to do so by th e court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, t he
failure may be considered a contempt of that court.
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered under Ru le
16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Ru le
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including
an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, , unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified, the court in which th e action is pending may take such action in regard to the fa ilure
as are just, including the following:
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(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other desigr:iated facts to be established for the purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or from
introducing designated matters in evidence;
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts t hereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by
the failure;
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical or mental
examination, as contempt of court; and
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference.
(c) Expenses on failu re to admit . If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of
any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the
genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the party requesting th e adm issions may apply to
the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that
proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the request
was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial
im portance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable gro\,Jnd to believe that he might prevail on the
matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request for
inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Ru le
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the
deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories
submitted under Ru le 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a
request for inspection submitted under Ru le 34, after proper service of the request, the court . on motion
may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is
objectionable unless the party fa iling to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or attorney fails to participate in good
faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court on motion may
take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, c;locument or other material as required by Rule
26(a) or Ru le 26(e){l), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Ru le 26(e)(2), that party
shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this
sanction, the court on motion may take any action auth orized by Subdivision (b)(2).
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the court to take any action
authorized by Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a
document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional
circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these ru les on a party for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system .
Advisory Committee Notes
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.

(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 21 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim , or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as
to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motior.i, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy ,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the acti.on as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts
so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party
failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential
to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.·'·
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
presenting them to pay to th e other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp056.html
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filing of the affidavits ca used, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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AMENDMENT
Reported by Mr. fhE\V:\RT: from the Committee on Public Lands,
to the act (H. R. 365) granting tho right of way to ditch and
canal owners o,·er the public lnntls in the States of Oalifornia,
Oregon, an<l N evadu., viz: Rtl'ike out all aJter the enacting
clause, and. insert as follows:
3 That the mineral lands of the public domain, both surveyed

and unsnrveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to
!i

exploration and occupation by all citizens of the United

6 States, and those who have declared their intention to become
7 citizens, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by
8 law, and subject also to the local custom or rules of miners
9 in the several mining districts, so far as the same may not be
10 in conflict with the laws of the United States.
1

SEc. 2. And be it further enacted, That whenever any

2 person or association of persons claim a vein or lode of quartz,
3 or other rock in place, bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, or cop4 per, having previously occupied and improved the same

2

5

:wcordincr
c, to the locn.1 crni.torn or rules of. miners in the dist.ri ct

G where the same is situated, nnd hn,ving expended in actual
7

labor and improvements thereon nn amount of not less than

8

one thousand dollars, and in regard to whose possession there

is no controvcr~.v or opposing claim, it shall and may be lawIO fnl for said claimant or associn.tion of claimants to file in the
11

local hnd ollicc a diagram of the sn.mc, so ext.ended lafora.lly

1~

or otherwise as to conform t.o the locn.1 luw8, customs, nml

13

rules of miners, and t,o enter such tract u,rnl receive

14

therefor, granting such mine, together wHh the right, to fol-

lf>

low such vein or lode with its dips, rmgles, and variations, to

n,

pnfont

16 any depth, although it may enter the land rt<,Uoining, which
17
1

land adjoining shall he sold snb,jcct to this condition.

SEc. 3. And be £t furthe1· enacted, That upon the filing

2 of the diagram us provided in the sccoml section of this n.ct,
3

and posting the same in a conspicuous place on the claim,

4

together· with a notice of intention to apply for a patent, the

5 register of

t}ie

land office shall publish

n,

notice of the same

6 in a ne:wspaper published neurest to the location of said clnim,
7

and shall also post such notice in his office for the period of'

8

ninety days ; and after the expiration of said period,

9

adverse claim shall have been filed, it shall be the duty of

IO

the surveyor general, upon application of the party, to survey

11

the premises and make a plat thereof, indorsed with his ap-

12

proval, designating the 1_wmber and description of the loca-

jf

no

3
J3

tion, the valne of t.hc lahor an<l improvements, and the

14 chnrncter of the Ycin exposed; and upon the payment to the
l:°>

proper ofliccr of Ii vc dollars per acre, together with the cost

lG

of snch suryey, plat, and notice, and giving- satisfactory evi-

17

deuce that said diagram nud notice have been posted on the

18 claim dnring said period ,-of 11inety days, the register of the
lU

land office sLmll trn11smit to the Gcnci·aJ Lund Ollice said plat,

20

snrvcy, and description; and a pa.tent shall issue for the same

~I

thereupon.

But said plat., survey, or description shall in no

~2 case cover more tha.11 one vein or lode, nrnl no patent shall
23 i:;sue for more tha11 011c vein or lode, which shal I be expressed
~4

1

in the patent issued.
81'.:c. 4. And be it fm·tlter enacted, 'rhat. when such

2 location and eut.ry of a miue shall he upon unsurvcye<l lands,
3 it shall and may be ln,wful, a.fter Lhe extension thereto of t.heJ'

4 public slll'vcys, to adjnRt the surveys to t~e limits of the
5 premises according to the location and possession and plat
6 aforesnid, a.nd the surveyor general may, in extending the
7 surveys, vary the same from a rectangular form to suit the
8 circumstances of the country and the local rules, laws, and
D customs of miners: Provided, 'l1 hat no location hernafter
l O made shall exceed two hundred feet iu length along the vein

11 fol' each locator, with a.n additional claim for di~covery to the
12

discoverer of the lode, with the right to follow such vein to

13

any depth, with nH its dip_s, variations, and angles, together

4

14 with
15

R.

reasonable quantity of snrface for the convenient

working of the :::atnc ns fixed by local rules:· And provided

16 further, That no pcn;on may make more than one location
17

on the same lode, and not more than three thousand feet shall

18 . he taken in .any one claim by any association of persons.

I

Si-;c. 5. And be it fu,rt!wr enacted, ~I.1hat u.s a further

2

condition of sale, in. the absence of necessary legislation by

3

Congress, t.he local legislature of any State or Territory may

4

provide rules for ,vorking mines involviug casements, drai11-

5

a.ge, and other necessary means to their complete develop-

6

rnent; nnd those conditions shall be folly expressed in t.be

7

patent.

1
2

St~c.

o.

And be i"t further enacted, rl'ha.t ,vhcuever any

a.dverse claimants to a.ny mine located and cluimcd us afore-

3 said, shall appear before the ap1n·oval of' tho survey, us pro4

vided in the third section of this net, aJI proceedings shall be

5

stuyed uutil a final settlement and ac\jndicatio11 in the courts

6

of competent jurisdiction of the rjgbts of possession to snch

7

c~aim, when a patent may issue ns in other cases.

1

SEC.

7. And be ,:e further enacted, rrha.t the President

2

of the United States he, nnd is hereby, nnthorized to establish

3

additional land districts and to appoint the necessary officer$

4

under existing laws, wherever he may deem the same neces-

5 sary for the public convenieuce in executing the provisions

6 of this act.

5

Sr:c. 8. And be it fw·thCJ' enacted, 'l'hat tho right of

1

2 wa.y for the construction of hig-hwnys over public lands, not
3 reserved for pnl)lic uses, is hereby granted.
1

SEc. 9. And be it further enacted, That wheneYer, by

2

priority of possession, rights to the. use of water for mining,

3 agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, havo vested

n.nd accrued, and the same are rcc~gnized and acknov.,}edged

4

5 by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the
6 possessors and owners of such vested rights, shall be main7 taine<l and protected in the same; and the right of way for
8 the construction of ditches and· canals for the purpose::; afore-

9 snid is hereby acknovde<lged and c·onfirmed: Provided, howl O ever, That whenever, after the passage of this :tct, any person

i 1 or persoHs shall, in the constrnction of any ditch or canal,
l'.2

injure or damage the possession of any settler on tlie public

13 domain, the party comrnit,ting f-uch injury or damage shall be
14 liable to the party injured for snch injury or damage.

1

8Ec. 10.

And be it furthe1· enacted, That wherever, prior

2 to the passage of this act, upon tho lands heretofore designated
3 as mineral lands, which have been excluded from survey and

.-

4

sale, there have been homesteads made by citizens of the

;:>

United States, or persons who have declared their intention

6 to become citizens, which homesteads have been made, im7 proved, and used for agricultural purposes, and upon which
8 there have been no valuable mines of gold, silver, cin:\}abar

6

D

or copper discovered, and which arc properly agricultural

IO

lands, the said settlers or owners of such homesteads shall

11 _, hiwe n. right of pre-emption thereto, and shall be entitled to
12

pnrchase the same at the price of one dollar and twenty-fi\'e

1:-3

cents per acre, a.nd in quantity not to exceed one hundred trnd

14

sixty-acre8; or said parties may avail themselves of the pro-

15 visions of the act of Congress approved May twenty, eigh1(j

teen hundrnd and sixty-two, entitled "An act to secnre

17

homesteads to actual settlers on tLc public domain," and acts

18

amendatory t.hereof.

1

SEc. 11. And be z·t fin·ther enacted, 'I1lrn,t upon the sur-

2

vey of the lands aforesaid, the Decrctary of !'he Interior may

3

designate and set apart such portions of the sai<l lands as are

4

clearly agricultural lands, which lauds shall thereafter be sub-

5 ject to pre-emption and sale as other public lands of the United
G States, and subject to all t.he lnsvs and regulations applicable
7

to the same.
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GENERAL LAt[D OFFICE
SECRETARY OF TD- INTERIOR,
"½.
)ONINO STATUTES OF J"ULY ll6, 1866,- JULY ~ 1870, AND MAY
10, l87ll.
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"·

Mining Statute of July 26, 1866.
CHAP. CCLX.TI. -AN Arrr granting the right of way to

ditch and cane.I owners over the public lands, and for
other purpoa~s.
Be it enacted by' tk Senate and Bott8e of RepreJJenlativeJJ of
e United Stata of America, in Congr/WJ CLB8t:mbkd, That the
insral lands of the publio domain, both surveyed and unnrveyed, are hereby declared to be free end open to e;iplor.· ation end occupation by all citizens of the United States,
i,.
and those who ha-ve deolared their intention to become "\
citizens, subject to such regulations as msy be prescribed
by law, and BUbject aleo to the local ouatoms or rules of
miners in the several mining districts, so fer ss the 11nme
~ o 1 be in conflict with the laws of the United States .
.---pealed
Sro. 2. .And be ii f urlher enacted, That w h ene-ver any person, or association of pernons, claims a vein or lode of
quartz, w other rock in pla.oe, bearing ~old, silver, oinna.ba.r, or copper, having previously occupied · and improved
~he same _acc~rding to the local' cna~m~ or rules of min!'rs
m the dietnct where the same 18 S1tuated, and havmg "e-xpended, in actual labor and improvements thereon~ an
amount of not less than one thou.so.nd dollara, and in regard
to whose possesaion there is no controvera7 or opposing
claim, it shall and may be lawful for said cla.imant, or association of claimants, to file in the local land office a
diagram of the same, so extended, late~ly or otherwise,

/2

.r --·· ·-
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as to conform to·the local laws, coelome, a.nd roles of mwers, and to ent.er such tract and pceive a patent therefor,
grllllt-ing such mine, together wi* I.he right to follow such
vein or lode, with its dips, SDf4eB, and variations, to any
depth, although it may ent.ef't.lie land adjoining, which la.nd
adJoining shall be sold subjec~~ this condition. rRepealed.l
BEo. 3. ..d.1ul be it furtk:r ~ackd, That upon the filing o1
the diagram ae provided i;t the second section of t-his act,
and poetins the same in a ·l )nepicuoua plaoe on the claim,
together with a notice o(int.ention to apply !or a patent,
the Register of the Lru:i,d Office shall publish a notice of
the same in a newspaper published nenrest to the location
of said claim, and sha['t also poet such notice in hie office
for the period of n ~ days; a.nd alter the expiration of
such period, if no ,.; verse claim eruill have been filed, it
shall be the duty ~• •.he Surveyor-genera.I upon application
of the party, I,,,. au. vey the premises and make a plat
thereof, indors_ed with bis appro-val, designating the number
and descriptio., of the location, the value of the labor and
improve~ents, and the character of the vein exposed; and
upon the payment to the proper officer of five dollars per
acre, together with the cost of snob survey, plat, and notice,
. and giving satisfactory evidence that said diagram and
notice have been posted on the claim during said period of
ninety days, the Register of t~e Land Office shall trans1:1i't
· to the General Land Offic.e saJcl plat, suney, a.nd deecnption, and a pat.ent shall issue for the same thereupon. ButJ
said plat, survey, or description shall in no case co·ler more
than one vein or lode, and no pi.tent shall issue for more
than one vein or lode, which shall be expressed in the pat,.
ant issued. (Repealed.]
·
SEO. 4. And be il furfherp11.1.detl, That when such loce.,..
tion a.nd entry of a mine eh'iill be upon unenrveyed lauds, it
ehall and may be lawful, aft.er the extension thereto of the
publio surveys, to adjust the enrveye to the limits of the
. premises aooording to the location and possession of lbe
plat aforesaid; an<l the Surveyor-general may, in extending
the surveys, vary the same from a rectangoJur form, to suit
the oironmstanoea of the country and the local rules, laws,
and custom.a of miners; Provuled, th.at no location hereafter
.f-' ma.de shall exceed two hundred feet in length along the -vein
for each locator, with an additional claim for discovery to
the discoverer of the lode, with the right to follow such vein
to any depth, with all its dips, variations, and angles,
to~ether with a reasonable quantity of surface, for the convenient working of the same, as fixed by local rules; .And,
provided. fu.rllu:r, that no person may make more than one
location on the same lode, and not more than three tboneand feet shall b~ taken in any one olaim by any association
of persona. [Repealed.]
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SEC. 5. .Aud be it further cnaclw, That, a.a a further condition of sale, in the absence of necessary legielutioo by
Congress, the local Legialature of any State or Territory
may provide rules for working mines, in·rnlving eaaeroents,
drainage, or other oecesaary m eans to their complt!le development; nod . those oonclitions shall be fnlly expressed in
the patent.
SEO. 6. And be it further enacted, That whenev er any no.ver&e claimants to any mine, located o.nd claimed as aforesaid, shall appear before the approval of the enrvey, as
provided i.n the third section of this act, all prqceedinf>B
shall be etayed until final s etUemont and aqjudicatioo, m
the court.a of competent jurisdiction, of the rights of possess.ion to ench claim, when n patent may issue as in other
cases. rRepea.led.J
Bro. 1". And be u furtkr cnacud, That the President of
the United States be, and is hereby, authoru.ed to esuiblish
additional land districts, and to appoint the necessary ofli- •
cers under existing laws, whene-ver be may deem I.b e same
nece881U)' for the public conve11ieoce in executing I.be provisions of this a.ct.
.•··
SEO. 8. A11d be itf-u.rtkr t:nacl,w, That the right of way
for the construction of highways over public la.od e, not
reserved for public uses, is here by granted.
SEO. 9. .A11d be it {llrther cnaded, That whenever, b,r priorit;Y of poBBeBBion, rights to the use of vwter for m1n 111g,
agr1cnltoral, msnofaoturing, or other purposes, have vested
and seemed, and the same are reoogni.zed and acknowledged
by the local customs, laws, and th!! deoisions of courts, the
poaseSBora and owners of 81lch vested rjgbts shall be mofotained and protected in the same; and the right of way for
the construction of ditches and canals for the purpose!!
aforesaid is hereby acknowledged and con.fi,rmed; Provuled,
houxwer, that whenever, alter the p ~ e of _this a.ct., any
person or peroons shall, in ilia construction of any ditch or
cansJ, injure or dam.age the possession of any settler on the
public domain, the pa.rty committing snob injury or damage
shall be linble to the party injured for such injury or
damage.
SEO. 10. .And be it furtkr r:naded, That whenever, prior
to the po.ss~e of this net, upon the lands heretofore deuignsted sa :onneral li.nda, which have been excluded from
survey and sale, there have been homeatea.ds made by citizens of the United States, or persons who have decliu-ed
their intention to beoome citizens, which homesteads have
been made, improved, and used for sgrionltural purposes,
and upon which there have boon no -va.lne.ble minee of gold,
silver, cinnabar, or copper discovered, and which are properly agricultural lands, lhe said ~tt.Jers or owners of such
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homesteads shall haTe a right of pre-emption thereto, and
sha.lJ be entitled to purchase tbe same nt the price of one
dollar and twenty-five cent.a per u.cre, a.nd in qunutity not to
exceed one hUDdrod and sixt_;y acres; OT said parties may·
avail themselves of tho :provisJoos of the Act of Congress,
approved ~y twenty, mghteen hundxed end sixty-two, entitled "An ad to aeon.re homesteads to actual sett)era on the
public domain,'' and acts amendatory thereof.
8.w. J 1. .Lind Ix it furl her t.nacled, Th lit upon the survey
of the lands aforesaid, the _S ecretary of the Interior may
designate and BOt 11parl e'uc·h portions of the said lands as
BTO clenr_ly e.gricnltnral ln.nds, which lands shall thereafter
be subject to pro-emption 11nd ea.le as other public lands of
tho United States, and subject to all the laws and regulations applicable to tho so.mo.
Approvad, July 26, 1866.
Mining Statute of July 9, 1870.

CRAP. CCXXX"V.-AN Acr to amend "An Act granting the

I

right of way to ditch and canal. owners over tho publi~
land.a, and for other purposes."
Be it enacted by the Sena!,e, a.n d HO'lf~e oj Represt:nf.oliv~ of
the United Stales of .America in Congreu auemhled, Thut the
act grantmg the right of way to ditch and can.al owners over
tho publjc la_nds, and !cir other· pnryoees_, approved July
twenty-all:, e1ghteen hundred and s11ty-slX, be, and the
same ia hereby amended, by addmg thereto the following
additional sections, num bared twelve, thirteen, fourteen,
fifleen, sixteen, and seventeen, re11pootively, which shall
hereafter constitute and form a part of the aforesaid act.
SEO. 12. .And be it /urtl1tr eooct,ed, That claims usually
called "placers," mcluding all forms of deposit, excepting
veins of qUl\rtz, or other rock in place, shall be subject to
'entry and J.'atent under this act, under like circumstances
and conditions, ~nd upon lrimilar proceedings, as are provided for vem. or lode cl~ime; Provitid, that where the
lands have been previousl7 surveyed by the United States,
the entry, in it.a exterior limit.a, shall conform to tho legal
subdivisions of the publio Jahde, no further survey or plat
in such case b eing r equired, and the lands may be paid for
at the rnie of two dollara and fifty conte per aero ; Pn:wided,
ftLrlher, that legal subdivisions of forty acres may bo subdivided into ten-acre tracts ; and that two or more psrsons,
or associations of persons, having contignoue claims of any
size, althou~h such claims may be l ees than ten aores each,
may make Joint entry thereof; .tlnd, provided further, thnt
no location bf a placer claim, hereafter me.do, shall exceed
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HnIDIO STATUTES.

one bnndred and sixty licres for any one person or assooia-~
· tion of persons, which location shall conform to the United
States surveys : and nothing in this section contained sh11ll
. defeat or impair any lxma fide pre-emption or homestead
claim upon agricultural laudH, or authorize the sale of the
improvements of any borw. fide settler to any purchaser. .
SEO. 13. And be itfu.rtkr waded, That where said _person or association, they o.nd tht1ir grantora, shall have held
and worked their said claims for s period equal to the time
prescribed by the statute of limitations for mining claims
of the State or Territory where the Imme may be situated,
evidence of such possession n.nd workin15 of tho claims for
snob period shall be sufficient to establish a. right to a pa.tent thereto nnder this act, in the absence of any ·adverse
claim ; Provided, however, that nothing in iliis act aha.ll be
deemed to impair any lien which may have attached in any
way whatever to.any mining claim or property tberetq attached· prior to the 1asuance of a patent.
Bro. 14.. .d11Ci .be ii. further mcded, That al] ez..parle affidavits reqnired to be made under this act, or the act of
which it is amendatory, may be verified before any offictJr
Blltborized to administer onlbs within the land district where
the claims may be situated.
SEO. 15. And be it further enacted, That Registers and
Receivers shall receive the same fees for services under this
act BB are provided by law for like senices under other acts
of Congreaa; and that effect shal1 be given to the foregoing
·.act according to such regnlati9na as may be prescribed by
the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
Bxo. 16. And be it further enacted, That so mnch of the
act of March third, eighteen hundred and fifty-three, entit1ed "An Act to provide for the snrvey of the public londs
of California, the granting of pre-emption rights, and -for
other purposes," 11.8 provide~ that, none other than township
lines aha.JI be surveyed · where the lands are mineral, ts
hereby repealed. And the public surveys are hereb;r extended over iill such la.nds; Provided, tbat all subdinding
of the surveyed lands into lots of leBS than one hundred
and snty a.ores may be done by county and local surveyors
at the expense of the claimants; A11d, provided further, that
nothing herein contained shall require the survey of waste
or nseleBS land.
Bro. 17. .And be iJ.furtha enacwl, Tbatnone of the rights
conferred byBBctions five, eight, and nine of the act of which
this is amendstory shall be abrorted by this act; and the
same are .hereby extended t-0 ~ d s affected by
this a.ct ; and all paten ta gran~ or~prii:emption or homesteads allowed, sh..:11 be sub~ct to a.ny vested and a.corned
water rights, or rights to1tches and reservoirs used' in

- -------

Stahl Exper1 Report

Attachment .4a • Federal Mining Laws,.,..

.

l;,1,d.1£:Ct~

G UUc,l
.Paoj\»..of 13
t..::

8

umTED

STATES

[lli:r 10, 187'.l.

connection ?lith such water righta as may have been acquired under or recognized by the nint.h section of tho act
of which thie sot ie amendato:ry. But not.bing in this act
shall be construed to repeal, 1II1pair, or in any way affect
tho provisions of tho "Aot granting to A. Sntro tbe right
of wa7 and other privileges to aid in t.he conetrucLion of a
draining and exploring tunnel to the Comstock lode, w t.he
State of Nevada," approved J nly twenty-fifth, eighteen hundred and sixty-six.
Approved Joly 9, 1870.
Mining Statute of May 10, 181.2.
AN Aor to promote tho development of tho mining re-

sources of the United States.
Be it enaded by tk Senak a11d Hoiue of RepraenJ.atives of

the Uniud Staua of America,. in Congrru a88embkd, Thal all
valuable mineral deposit.a in land belonging to the United
States, both snrveyed and unsorveyed, are hereby declared
to bi;, free and open to exploration and pnrohMe, and the
lands in which they are foond to occupation and purchase,
by citizens of the United States. and t.boee who have declared their intention. to become such, Ullder regulations
prtiecribed by law, and aocording to the local customs or
rules of minera, in the several mining districts, so fa.r as
the same are applicable and not inconi;istent with the laws
of the United Btntee.
SEO. 2. That mining cluims upon .-eins or lodes of
quartz or other rock in place, bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable deposits heretofore
located, shall be ·governed, as to length along the vein or
lode, by the customs, regulations, and lawe in force at the
dale of their location. A minixig claim locateil a.ft.er the
passage of this act, whether located by one or more peraons,
may equal, but shall not e-xceed, one thousand five hundred
feet in Jen~ along the vein or lode; but no location of a
mining cl111m shall be made until the discov·ery of the vein
or lode within the limits of the claim located. No claim
shall extend more than three hundred feat on each side of
the middle of the Tein nt the surface, nor shall BllJ claim
be limited, by llllJ mining regulation, to leas that twentyfive feei on each side of the middle of the vein at the surface, except where ad-verse rights existing at the paaBD.ge of
this act shall render snob limitation neoeBSOry. The end
lines of each claim shall be •parallel to each other.
SEO. 3. That the locators of all mining local-i ons heretofore made, or which shall hereafter be made, on any mineral
vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the public cloma.in, their
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hemr and aasigns, where no n.dverae claim e:x.ists at
the paasage of t.liia ad, so long as they comply with
the laws of the United States and the State, Territorial,
and local ragwstions, not ·in conflict with said laws
of the Unitect States, governing their possessory title,
ehaJJ have the e:xclneh-e right of ~sseeeion and enjoyment of all the snrfaoe included w1t.b.i.n the Jines of their
loentions, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges, thron~hont
their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of
such surface lines extended downward vertically, although
such veins, lodes, or lodges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to e:xtend ootsirle
the vertical side-lines of said surface locations: Provided,
that their right of posaession to such outside part.a of such
veins or ledges shall be oonfuiod to such portions thereof as
lie bet-veen vertical planes drawn downward as aforesaid,
throogh the end-lines of their looolions, so conlinoed in
their own direction that soch planes will intersect soch exterior parts of said veins or ledges. .A11d, pr()l)ide,d further,
That nothing in this section shaJJ authorize the locator or
posaessor of a vein or lode which extends, in its downward
course, beyond the vertical lines of his claim, to enter upon
the snrfaoe of a claim owned or possessed by another.
SEO. 4. That where a tunnel is run for the de-velopmen tof a vein or lode, dr for the disc()very of mines, the owners
of such tunnel shall have the right of possession of all veins
or lodes within three thousand feet from the face of ench
tunnel, on the line thereof, not previously known to exist,
discovered in such tunnel, to the same e:xtent aa ii diecovered from the surface; and locations on the lines of such
tunnel of veins or lodes not appearing on the st!liace, made
by other parties after the commencement of the tunnel, anu
while the same is being proaecoted with reasonable diligence, shall be invalid; but failure to proaecute the work
on the tunnel for six months-·ehall be con.siderod as an
abandonment of the right to all undiscovered veins on the
liDe of said tunnel. ·
Bro. 5. That the miners of each minin6 district may
make rules and regulations, not in conflict with the laws of
the United States, or with the la"Wl! of the State or Territory
in which the district is sitoated, governing the location,
manner of recording, amount of work necessary to bold
posaeBSion of a mining elaim, subject to the following re- ......,_
quirements: The location must be distinctly marked on
the ground 8-0 that its boonde.riea can be readily tracecl.
All records of mining claims hereafter made shall con.tain
the name or names of the locators, the date of the location, ,
and such a i!eecription of the claim or claims, looated by
?'1\ference to so·me natural object or permanent monument,
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as will identify the claim. On each claim located after the
passage of this act, and tnltil a patent shall have been issocd
lherefor, not leas than one hundred dollB.Js worth of labor
shall be performed, or improvements made during each
year. On nll claims localed prior to the passage of this
act,. ten dollars worth of labor shall be performed or iml_p1
provementa made each year for each one hundred feet in·
length along the vein, until n patent uhall have been iasued
therefor; bot whore such claims are hold in common, each
expenditure may be made upon an;r one claim; and upon a
failure to comply with these conditions, the claim or mine
upon which euch failure oconrrerl shall be opened to relocation in the same manner as if no location of tho enme bad
ever beeu made: Provuud, 'that the original locators, their
heirs, assigns, or legal representatives, hnve not resumed
work upon the claim after such failure nnd before such
location. Upon t.he failore of any one oI several co-ownera
to contribute bis proportion of the .expenditures required
by this aot, the co-<>wners who have performed the labor or
made the improvementa may, at the expiTBlion of f.be year,
give such delinquent co-owner personal notice in writing,
or notice by publication in the newspaper published nearest
the claim, for at least once a week for ninety days, and ii,
at the expiration of ninety days aHer such notice in writing
or by publication, such delinquent should fail or refuoe to
contribute his proportion to comply with this act, bis interest in the claim shall become the property of his co-ownera
who have made the required expenditures.
SEC. 6. That a patent for any land claimed and l=ted
for valuable deposita may be obtained. in the following
manner: A:ny person, association, or cor:eoration, authorized to locate a claim under this act, haTIDg claimed and
located a piece ofland for such purposes, who has, or have,
com_plied with the terms of this act, may file i~ lhe proper
land office an application'11or a patent, under ois\h, ahowmg
§Ucb compliance, together with a plat nnd field;notes of the
claim or claims in common, made· by or under the direction
of · the United States Surveyor-general, ab.owing accurately
the boundaries of the claim or claims, wliich shall be distinctly marked by monuments on the grounds, and ·shall
povt a copy of each plat, together with a notice of such application for a patent, in a conspicuous place on the lnnd
e!Dbraced in such plat, previous to the fihng of the application for a patent, and shall file an affidavit of at least two
persons, that such not.ice ha.s been duly posted as aforesaid ;
and shall file a copy of said notice in B'UCb land office, and
shall thereupon be entiUed t-0 a patent for said land in the
manner following : .The Register of the land oflh·e, upon
the filing of snob application, P.lat, and field-notes, noticeo,
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and affidavits, shall publish a notice that such application
baa been mado, for the/eriod of sixty days, in a newspaper
to be by him deaignnt.e as po blished nesre1Jt to said claun ;
and be shall also post snch notice in bis office for the·same
period. The claimant, 11t the time of filing his application,
or at any time thereafter, within the sixty days of publication, shall file with the R-egister a certificate of the United
States Surveyor-general that five hnndrea dollars worth of
labor baa been expended, or improvements made upon the
claim by himself or grantors; that the plat ia con-eel, with
'Such further description by such reference to natural objects or permaneut mounments as shall ide_ntify the claim,
and furn1sb a.n accurate d;siri~ion to
torporated iq
t b ~ p i r a 1 n o the~ y ;7iiof pubhC!I~ e claimant shall file his affidavit, s:li9wing that the
plat aud notice have been posted in a coosp~cuons place on
tbe claim during said period of publication: If no adverse
claim shall have been filed with the Register and the Receiver of the proper land office at the expiration of the
sixty da:ys of )?Ubhcalion, it shall be assumed that the applicant 1s entitled to a patent, upon the payment to the
prayer officer· of five dollars per sere, and that no adverse
claUIJ exists, and thereafter no objection .from third parties
to the issuance of a patent shall be heitrd, except jt be
s hown that the. !!,pplicant has failed to com ply with this
act-.
SEO. 7. That where an adverse claim shall be filed during the period of publication, it shall be upon oath of the
person or persona making the·sa10e, and shall show the nature, boundaries, o.nd extent of .such adverse claim : and all
proceedings, exeept the public,stion of notice, anct making
and filing of the affidavit thereof, shall be stayed until the
controversy shall hav!l been settled or deoided by a Court
of competent jurisdiction, or the adve113e claim waived. It
shall be the dut;)'. of the adverse claim,mt, within thirty days
e.Iter filing hi11 claim, to commence proceedings in a court
of competent jurisdiction, to determme the question of the
ri_g!:it ol pa68esaio?, and prosecute th~ same with reasonable
dihgeiice to final Judgment; and a failp.re to do so shall be
a waiver ol hie adverse claim.. After such judgment shall
have been rendered, the party entiUed to the poSBession · of
the cl.&im, or any portion thereof, may, without giving further notice, file a certified copy of the judgment-roll with
the Register of the ]and office, together with the certificate
of the Surveyor-general that the requisite amount of labor
bas been expended, or improvements made' thereon, and
the description required in other cases, and shall pay .to the
Receiver five dollars per acre for his claim, together with
the proper fees, wher~npon the whole proceedings and the
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Jndgmeot-roll shall be certified by iho Register to ihe Commissioner of tho General Land Office, and a patent ehall
isane thereon for tho claim, or euoh port.ion thereof as
tho applicant shall appeM, from ihe decision of the
court, to rightly possess. ··· 'If it shall appear, from the
doc\eion of the court, thot several parlies ar~ entiLled to
soparate and different portions of the claim, each pllrty
m11y pay for hi.a portion of the claim, with tho proper foes,
and file the certificale ond description b.1, the Sunoyor~oneral, whereupon the :Register shall cert.Hy the proceedings and judgment-roll to tbe CommillllioneE of tho Oenero.l
Land Office, as iu the preceding case, and patents shall is1100 to the several parties according to tbuir rellpoctiTe rights.
:Proofs of citizenship under. this act, or tho acts of July
twonty-6ixth, eightee11 bnodred nod .~ixt-y-si:x, and July
niuth, llighteen hundred and seventy, in toe CBll6 of an individual, may consist of his own affidavit thereof; a.nd, in
cnse of en association of persona unincorpo:rnted, of the
affidavit of their authorized agent, made on hie own know Judge, or upon information ond belief, ll!ld in case of a corporation organized under the ]awe of tho United Stotee, or
of o.ny State or 'l'orritory of tho United Stotes, by the filing
of a certified copy of their cb&.rtor or certificl\te of incorporation ; 1'nd nothin& heroin contain!ld shall be construed
to prevent the alienation of the title conveyed hy a patent
for s mining cl.rum to any person whntevor.
B:w. 8. That the doecription of vein or lode cloime, upon
surveyed lands, shall do8lgnate the location of the clium
with reference to tho linee of the public surveys, but need
not conform therewith; but where a patent sboll be i88u.ed
as aforesaid for claims upon unsurveyed lnnds, the Survoyorgeneral, in extendmg the s~r,veys, shall adjust tho some to
tho boundaries of such patented cloim, according to the plat
or deecription thereof, bul so as in no case to interfere with
or change the location of any such patented claim.
SEO. 9. That eoctione one, two, three, four and six of an
act entitled ".A.n .Act grantiJJg the right of way to ditch
a.nd canal owners over the public lands, and for other purposes," approved July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and
sixty-six, are hereby re~led, but such repeal shall not affect
existing rights. .Applications for patents for mining claiml!
nowpending maJ be prosecuted to a final decision in tho General Land Office; bnt in Rncq cases, whore Adverse rights are
not affected thereby, patents may iaano in pursuance of the
provisions of this act; a.nd all patent£ for mining claims
heretofore issued under Lbo act of Julytwenty-eixtb, eighteen
hundreil and sixty-six, eball convey all ihe rights and privilegoe conferred by this act, where no adverse rights exi.et at
the time of the paaaa:ge of this act.
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SEc. 10. That the act entitled •'An Act to amend an net
granting the right of way to ditch and canal owners over
the public lands, and for other purposes," approved July
ninth, eighteen hundred and seventy, shall be and remain
in full force, except 88 to the proceedings to obtain a pat,..
ent., which shall be similar to t.he proceedin~s proscribed
by sections six. and seven oi this act for obtamin~ pa~ots
to vein or lode claims; bot whtiro said placer claims shall
be upon surveyed lands, and conform to legal subdivision,
no further survey or plat shall be r equired, and all placer
mining claims hereafter located shall conform as near as
practicable with the United States system of public laud·
surveys and t.he :rectangular snbdivis1ons of such suTTeys,
and no such Jocation shall include more t.han twenty acres
for each individual claimant; but where placer claims cl\.O
not be conformed to legal subdivisions, survey and plttt
shall be made as on unanrveyed lunds; Provided, That proceedings now pending may be prosecuted to their final determination under existing laws; bot tho provisions of
this act, when not in conflict with existing laws, shall apply
to such cases ; And, provided also, That where, by the segregation of miner.al land in any legal subdivision, a quaotitJ
oi agricultum.l land leas than forty acres remains, said fractional portion of agricultural land may be entered by any
party qualified by law, for homest.oad or pre-emption purposes.
SEC. 11. That where t.he same p erson, association, or
corporation, is in poBBeasion of a placer claim, and also a
vein or lode included within the boundaries foereof, application shall be made for a _p.t1tent for the placer claim, wit.h
the statement that it includes such vein or lode, and in such
case (subject to the provisions of this act anrl the act entitled "An Act to amend an act granting the right of way to
ditch and canal owners over ~e pub~c Janda, and for other
purposes," approved · Jnly n10th, eighteen hlllldred and
seventy) a patent shall issue for the pla.cer claim, including
such vern or lode, upon the payment of five dollars per acre
for such vein or lode claim, and twenty-five feet of surface
on each side theTIJof. The :remainder oi the placer claim,
or any placer claim not embracing any vein or lode clai!ll,
shall be paid for at the rate of two dollars and fifty cents
per acre, together with all cost.a of proceedings; and where a
vein or lode, such as is described in t.he second sectivn of
tbis act, is known to e:ri11t within the boundaries of a placer
claim, an application for a patent for such placer claim,
which does not include an application for the vein or lode
claim, shall be construed as a conclusive declaration that
the claimant oi the placer claim has no right .of possession
of the -vein or lode claim; bt\.t -where the existence of a vein
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or a lode in a placer claim ia not known, a patent for tho
placer claim shall convoy all vu.lnnble mineral and other
deposits within t.he boundaries thereof.
8:w. 12. That the 8nrvllyor-6ontsml of the United Biol.es
'mny appoint, in each land dfatr_icl containing mineral lands,
as many competent surveyors aa shall apply for appointment
to survey mwin$ claims. The expenses of the survey or
vein or lode cla.1ms, and the euney and subdivision or
placer olllims into smaller quantities than one hundred and
si:xty aores, together with the oosto! publication of notices,
shall be paid by tho applicants, Md they shall be at liberty
to obtain the same at the- ·m ost reaaooeble rates, and they
shall also be at liberty to employ nny United States Deputy
Surveyor to make the SUTTey. The Commiaaionor of the
Genero.l Lnnd Office shall also have power to establish the
maximum charges for surveys and publication of notices
under this a.ot; 11nd, in case of excessive charges for publication, he may dcsignalo any newspaper published in a land
district where mines are situaLed, for the pnblicatiol! of
mining not.ices in such diatl-ict, and fix the ·rates to be
charged by such paper; and, to tho end that the Commissioner may be fully mformed on the subject, each applicant
shall ·file with the Re~ster n awom statement of all charges
and the fees paid by a.aid applicant for publication anu survey,
togethtlr with all fees and mone7 paid the Register end tho
Receiver of the Land Office, which statement eh11ll be transmitted, with the other papers in the oase, to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The fees of the Register
and the Receiver shill! be five dollars each for filing and
acting upon each application for patent or adverse claim
filed, and they shall be allowed the runount fixed by law for
rnducing testimony to writing- when done in tho Land
Office, such fees and allowances to be paid by the respective parties-and no other fees shall be charged by them in
auoh cases. Nothing in this act sho.ll be construed to enlarge or affect the rights of either party in regard to any
property in controversy et the time of the passage of tbis
act, or of tho act entitled "All Aot granting tho right of
way to ditch nnd ca.no! o.iv.ners over the public lands, and
for other purposes," approved July twcnty-ei:dh, eighteen
hundred and si:xty-aix; nor shall this act affect any right
acquired under said act; and nothing in this act shall be
construed to. repeal, impair, or in any way affeot tho provisions of the act entitled '' An Act granting to A. Sntro the
right of way and other privileges to aid in the construction
of a draining and exploring tunnel to the Comstock lode, in
the Stole of Nevada," approved July·twenty-fifth, oightoen
hundred and sixty-six.
Bro. 13. That all affidavits required to be made under
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this act, or I.he act of which it is 11.Drendatory, may be verified before an;y officer aut.borized 'to adminis~r oat.ha within
the land district where the claims may be situated, and all
testimony and proofs may be. la.ken before any suoh officer,
and, when duJy certified by I.he officer taking the srune, •
shall ha.-ve the same force and effect as if la.ken before the
&gi.ster and Tuiceiver of I.he Land Office. In cases of contest as to the mineral or agricnJtnral character of land, the
testimony SDd proofs may be taken as herein provided, on
per11onal notice of at least ten days, to the opposing party;
or if saitl party cSDnot be found, then by publication of at
le~t once a week ·for thirty days in a newBpaper, to be
designated by tho Register of the Land Office as pnblished
nearest to the location of such land; and the Register shall
require proof that suoh notice bas been given.
l:3EO. 14. That where two or more veins intersect or cross ·
each other, friority of title sho.ll govern, and such prior
location sbal be entitled to all ·ore or mineral contained
within the space of intersection; Provided, howcva, That
the subliequent location sho.ll have the right of way through
said space of intersection for the purpose of the convenieni ·
working of the said mine: And prrwukd, also, That where
two or more veins uriite, the oldest or prior location shall
take the vein below the point of union, inolndwg all thll
space of intersection.
S:iw.·16. That where non-mineral 18.lld, tot oontignona
to the vein or lode, is need or occupied by the proprietor
of such vein or lode for mining or milling purposes, such
non-adjacent snrfaco-ground m~;y be•embraced and included
in an application for I\ patent !or such vein or lodo, SDd the
same may be .Patented therewith, subject to the same preliminary requirements as to survey and notice as are applicable under this act to veins or lodes; Provided, That no
location hereafter made of such non-adjacent land abs.II exceed fivo acres, and payment for the same must be made at
llie same rate as fixed by this act for the superfices of the
lode. The ownet oI a quartz mill or rednct:ion works, not
oWDing a mine in connection therewith, may a.lso rect1ive a
patent for his mill-site as provided in this aootion.
·
8:E0. 16. That all sots and parts of sots inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed; Prnwied, that nothing contained in this act shall be constroed to imJ;>air, in any way,
rights or intereef.s in mining property acquired under existing laws.
Approved May 10, 1872.
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Conrt on the fil'::it Monday of Jnne, mrnnally, the mdc1 Court
shall call for ancl recoivo the County 'J'rl'asuror's r eport, as
provided in section 218 of the Compiled Ln.ws ot' Utn.h, of
the conclition of tho. trc:isnt·.v on the 31::JL cfay of Mny next
prcccc1ing, nnc1 shn.11 snttle with s:tid 'l're:umrer. 'l'hc County
-rosuum lL
Ulcrk shall tlwnmpon submit to the sn.it1 conrt a statement
c~~\~~~.onito h1 detail, shmving tho receipts during the Jiscn.1 year enc1ing
Conri, Mny 31, 011 the sn.ic1 81st dn.y ot' :Mn.y; the baliince, it' any, in the
treasury at the clor-;c ot' the previous fiscal ycn,r; the expenditures during the llscnl yenr just closct1, specitYing sep:trntely in said e:xpem1itnrcs the amount p:iicl to each ofttcel',
nnd for crnry other disbursement; nml the ba.lnncc on h1mtl,
Tltc CourL
together· with :t statcmc11t of all the debts paynbJa to nn<l by
1
~\ ~ 1~t,;.:~~[~
said counties. 'J'he sn..icl courts shnll tlwrenpon anc1it saicl
trif~~;l stl1tl ll1Cllt, :mc1 the County Clerks slmlJ, within ten chyi; from
11u1i11ah snmo, the dose of s:iid auclitntion, pnlilish n. true copy of s:Lid
,•~ r.Y:~oh1~~'_>Y st:1tement, as appro,·ccl by the C01mty Court-, in sonu~ newspn.pc1· published in the connty, nm1 ha,ving general eircubtion therein, if there be one; if there be no such paper,
then by posting up the saicl copy in their otlices, and sbl411
keep sn.icl co1)ie:i posted up during the year. A neg led of
this l1nty by any Clerk or tho County Conrts shall 1·ende1·
Ponnlly,
him liable ton. line in nny snrn not exceeding fin lrnndrcd
c1ollnrs .
.Approrccl F cbrunry 20, J880.
1

CHAPTER XXIX.
111(;11 W .A YS,

.AN AC'f 11ortnl11l11g to Ulghwnys.

Public llli;h•
wny~.

SEr. J. Belt c:nael,ecl uy tl1e Govm1or rtn<l LeoislatioJ
.1lss 1111ul·11 nf tlu: 'l'.Jrrilor!f nf Ulalt.: 'J'lmt all roads shall
Le considcrC'l1 :,s puhlic highways which arc now used ns
such antl hare Leen cleclnred such by orller of tho County
Courts or which m:1.y be Iwrcnfter 8 0 cleclarecl by the County
Comts witbiu their respective colmtiee, or by mnnici1xll corporr.tion'3.
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2. Highwo,ys n.re ro:ids, stt·eets or nllP-ys n.nd ppn
niuon
1 6 11

briclges, ln,id out or m:ectecl by the pnhlic, or if lnid out or
erected by others, decliciited or n.bnncloned to tile nse of the
public.
S1-:0. 3. Rands laid out nncl recorded ns highwn.ys by

or

wnya.

cer1n111 ro111ta

otxlcr of tho County Court, nml nll roacls used ns such for a ~?~~n;~~-A.
poriod of five yca.ni, nro highways. ,Vhencver nny corporation owning a toll l>riclgo or n. turnpike, plnnk or•common
wngon roall is dissolved or discontinued, or has expired by
limitntion, the hriclge or road l.Jecomcs n highwn.y.
SEc. ,1, A road not work eel or usccl for tho J)eriocl of Wh~n n ,o,ul
iivo yenni, ccn.scs to be n. highwity for nny purpose whn.tm·er. cc 1160• to Ile"
11
' t mm;t 1{Cep n. Co11n1i•
hlgbwny.
SEC. fil. 'I')
. le Cl Cl'lC Of' t] le vOllll t,Y COlll'
Cleric
lJook, in which mnst lie recorded n.11 l1l'ocee<lings of tho ~~~~~~to~
conrt relntiYe to ench roail c1istl'ict, inclui ing on1erti for la.y - prococ,11n1:
. Oll t , :\.}tl'l'lllg
.
. l'Oa(l 8 fill(1 [t (1eSCl'l})
. t·1011 0 f rolntln
to
rng
:me1 opcmng
ro11tlH, utc.
1
en.eh ronc1 distrlet, its supcn·isorR, its roads, highwayH, contrnets ancl n.Il otlll'r matters _pe1-t:l-ining thereto.
S1-:0. O. By t.iking or nccnpting lnncl for n, highway, IU,:;htoCtho
. Oil1J t•·
. J1 t 0 f' wn,y nnc1 lllCJ(
• '1 L'll t S nee- r.11bllul11
tl lO }Hl11I •IC nC(llllIC
-ue l'lg
llghwnys ,lcessary to enjoying and nmintaining it. A tmm;fot· of Janel, anct1.
boundccl by n. highway, p:tsscs the title of the person whose
estate is transft rrcd to the soil in front to the ccntl'c of thtl
highwn.y.
S1-:c. 7. Any owner or occnpn11t of land may constrnct s1u(lwn11c"
~ side-walk on the highwrty :Llong tho line of his '1aml, 1:mb- ~l;:Ic~~~ouJect, howorer, to tho :mthority conferred by law on the
County C01ll't and the snpervisors of highwnys, nnd :my
})Orson using snclt sidewalk with horse or team without per- Dnmngos 10.
mission of t)lc owner 1 is linlJle to such owner or occupn11t
for all clnmnge sntt'ered tlwreliy.
S1w. 8. Any owner or occupant of lnncl ncljoining n. ~f~~!c'-:tr:0~ .
highwn,y not less than fonr rocls wide may plant trees on tho
'
sides of suclt highwn.y, co11ti;1gons to his lnnd. '!'hey
must be set :i, c1istnnce of at lea.st 1ifteen feet from each
other, in regular rows, nncl not more tlrn.n ten feet from tho
bouut!ary of the highway. If the highwn.y is six rocls wide or
more, the row must not be less thnn ten nor more thnn PorHons
11 Jnrtng _troos
feet from, the
.twelve
.
. bonnc1nry
. of the higltwn.y. ,Vhoevl'r
l lll1Lblo
/01
lllJnres any of sn.1c1 trees 1s liahlc to the owner for t 1e unmnso.
clnmn.ge which is thereby susta.ined.
,
.
.
ltl~htor WRY
Sim. n. Evcr,v gas , water, telegra.vh or 1':t1lrom1 corpo- forccrlnln
ration has tho right of wn.y th ronglt the l)nhlic wn.ys ,\ml corporuLlonn.
sqnnrcs jn any city, villngc, or town, wit 1 the consent of
the authorities thereof, nml nmlnr s uch ren.sona,hle regulations as saitl authorities nncl the ln.w prescribe. 'l'he County
Courts of the severn.l counties h~ve power to grant ii right
of w:iy over the public highways for rn.ilro:itls, cnnnls,
1
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wn.ter pipes nnd telegrn.ph lines, uncler BUCh reasonn.lJlc regulations :is snch court rnriy establish. Such portions of n.11
county roads :is lie within tho limits of nny incorporntcd
town or city, or in :rny town or city JicrcaJtr.r incorporntc<l,
shnll conform to the clircction nnd gl':1l1c nnc1 be subject to
:iJl the regulations of other Hlrcets in such town or city.
SEC. 10. '!'ho County Conrt of each oJ lh0 cmmtics of
Pnw~r nncl
this Tcrritor,r, by propcr'rcgul:ttions, haYe power: First.(luty o! Ille
County
•ro t1iYiclc, wheru not nlrnac1y tlonc, !Jw county iuto n, suitaCourts.
n-blo :mcl convenient m1rnber of roncl districts nnd nppoint
su11errisors tht)refor bienninJl,r, or wheneY<!l' Yncnncies oc•
ell!', and to remorn them n.t l1lc'.1::iun'. Se<'urnl-'.l'o cnnsc
to be survercd, vicwcll, ]:de ont, reco1·dcd, opened, and
workec1, such highwa.ys as nro neces:-:1ry for 1ml>lic convenience. 'l'hin1.-'l'o cnnse to he reconkc1 ns ltighwa._rs such
ro:1t1H ns ]1:irn become such liy nsngn m· a.h:1Jl(1011ment to the
public. Fourth.-'l'o abolish or nham1nn :meh a~ nro nnneccssnry. li'ifth.-11'0 contr:wt, ngrt•c for, pmchaso, ot·
otherwise acquire the right of' wn.y m·er prh·atc prnpcrty fm·
the use of public higllwn,rs; :rnc1 for that pmpose i111;Litt1te
or require tlw Connly Prosecuting Allonwy lo inslitull.! proceL'<ling,; for the ac<ptircmc11t of :--;:ti11 righ t or w:i._y as prnvic1l'c1 in 'l'itlc~ :XI, Clt:iptci· If, of' tho Cornpilcil fo.w:ci ol'
Uta h. Sixth.-To c:nrne lo Ju ~ 1•n•c:kcl :m<l nmint:dnPcl on
such hig:hwn.ys as tlw.r ma.y ck-dgn11 ll.', milestones or JlOsh-;
nml guicw pm,ts, p1·01wrlJ' insr.rilir.c1:
Si-:c. JJ. 'J'lwCounty Courts t;hn]l tlPsign:1lli thcconnty
co11n1, ron<la, romls necessrn·.r within or exl<!mli11g throng-Ji c:1ch incorpo•
number or.
rntril town 01· city; which in no cnS<! shall lJl' morn thn u three
in the s:rnw clircction.
Sr-:o. 12. Snp1!rYisor:3 of ro:1tl c1h-;frict:-3 rccciYe notice of
s11por11sors their n.ppointment from the Cl<!rk of the County Conrt,
fr1~t'.:.~'mt11::~ ancl within twenty clnfs thereafter mnstgi\'C tho officinJ bond
~1~g~~~\\.~ 0d required by the County Conrt, nm1 ta.Im the us11:1l onU1 of
oflicc. 'J'hc notice :rncl certilicate thnt the honcl hns lieen
filed~ nnd the oath hken nnd imlorsed thereon, or n. certified
copy thereof, constitutes n, commission, a1H1 a.u thoriics the
11erson namecl h1 nncl holding lhe sn,me, to discharge the
duties of su1x•1Tisor until superseded.
SEo. 18. Roacl supervisors under the clirection nnd
Powcrunt1
snvervision and pursuant to 01drrs of the County Conrt n.p~~~~~vY!ora. pomting thmn, must: li'irst.-'l'alrn charge of the 1mblic
]1ighwn.ys within their respective districts. Secoml.-Kcep
them dear from obstrnctions nnd h1 gooc1 repiiit-. 'l'hird.Cn.uso b:mks to be gra.dcd, bridges and cansewn.ys to be mntle
where necessary, and keep the same in good l'C}Jnir, nnd
renew them when necessary. Fonrth.-Shall giYe not less
than two c1nys' notice to the inlmbitants of his road c1i::itrict
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lin.blc to do work on ro:1.cls, when, wlw~·e, with whn.t imµlemcnts, and under whoso direction to work. Pifth.-Collcct
from each inhabitant notilic<l. to WOJ.'k, iuid who fails to
wo1·k or prnfors to p:1._y it. · Sixth,-To receive snoh com- compousnpensation iis ml.}' be nUowcd by the County COll\'t for ser- tiou,
vices pcrformetl.
.
S1w. 14. 'l'Jmt two <lays' work of eight hours each, or Poll Tnx, how
in lien thereof, three dollars ($H) b.wful money, is :111 f.:~t~~'.1011 cotannuul road poll hx upon every .nl>le-l>oc1ietl man over
twenty-one mHl under sixty yen.rs oltl. "\Vithin incoq)oratt~tl
cities, siticl poll t:1.x nmy \Jc collcctLxl nntler such regnhtions
n.s m:iy be by onlinancc provillet1, and one-fourth of the now eJ"sa.id t.1.x so collectl'd l..>y eitics sha.11, on or l>clorL! the first poollo ·
Monc1a.y in ,Jn.nnnry, April, .July nntl October of e:wh yerir
he p:Lic1 into the county treasury, to lw expend eel under tile
direction of thn County Conrt, in nmki11g and improving
highw,iys, nrnl the olhcr t.hnie-fourths slln 11 be nsetl by s:iid
citie::; for improving, lit::it, territorial and county roads rnnning through such citil's; am1, second, on a1ty other streets
or alleys in suclt cities.
.
S1-:c. rn. All uienus otlH~l' than liLhor colketec1 as 1)011 'fnx to bo pnhl
f;;1x b,r tho rcspectil'c road supervi::ior;-; slml] bo }l'.iit1 L',)' them ~!~~~~r~~ty
into the connty lrea:m1·y, to l>n a.ppropria.tetl aml expL'1Hled
on the principal roatls antl bridges under the direction or
the County CottrL.
Si-:e. Hi. '.l'lw Count.y Court shall fnrnisll oach road fiuporvlaor to
.
. t 1)00 )c, \\'l"t] ls tll l >S, Oil \\')lit:
. }l or
lcocp
SU]Wl'YlSOl'
Wl't] l :t 1.1
I.Janl C l'CCCll)
t,,x,roconl
1111!.l
shall lie stated l,_r tlw sn1wrvisor whether snitl poJl t:ix wa::; glvorcceipu.
p:1.-i1l i11 ca:,;h or Jnbor, nnd the receipt be given to the party
as odtknco that he h:u:i piiid hii-i l)Oll t:ix, n.ml s:ticl l>ook antl
stnhs sh:tll he rl!tlll'lH.'<1 to tlte Count.v Uourt, witlt his annual report, togetlwr with the 'rreasmL•r's receipt::;.
S1-:c. 17. Every Hupervisor mnst make to tlw C.:01111t,v supcrvlaor
Comt :mnunlly, on or before the 1irst },fomhy in Decemlwr ~:11~8~~1 ~!<_0
of each year 1~ writt1m report cont:tinin•r:
· Pirst.-Tho names port.
0
•
' a.ssos;;ecl to wor1c m
· j us
• c·1·1s lr1c
· t. S'ecom1.- c11nrnotcr or.
of nl 1 persons
Tho names of all who ha.vo actun.lly worked, anc1 the mnn~
hor of (lays. 'l'lt'nl. -Tltc nn.r ncs of all who lmvo commutetl, am1 the a.mount receivctl from them. l 1'omth.-Tlto
names of a.11 ddinquent::i a.JH1 the mnount tluc. Pifth.•'l'hc a.mount of liLho1· cxpPnt1et1 a,t en.eh lloint n.ntl the kind
of 1.thor pcrformcc1. Sixth.-.An accnrnte account of en~ry
l11ty he lmnsclt' was einployccl, ancl tho natnrc aml items of
Uw servico 1·e11c1ercc1. 'l'lto County Courts may r oquiru
special reports from ro:1d supervisors when clccmetl proper.
SJ,'C
18 • A failure to nnke n.
''P.l)Ol't as l'Cqnirc(l ' 01' to Pennlty
for
' •
' ~
ru.11nro to
p:ty over, on the ordet· of tlte County Court, nny moneys in mnko roport;
his hnnds, suhjects the su11ervisor t'o :t pena.lty of twenty-live

or

•
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dollarn ($2G), to bo recovered in nn nction on his boncl to~ethcr with any balnnco due from him; suit therefor mn,y be
nrntitutcc1 by tho County Attorney, under order of tho County Court.
S1-:0. 10. ·whoever wilfully or carelessly obstructs or
I'OT80D8
injures any highwriy by How of wntcr or otherwise, is lin.blo
llnblo for
to n. penn,lty of Jive dolln.rs for cnch day such obstruction or
dnmngo
caused by
injury remn,ins. .Any persoll or wa termnstc•r 11crm itting wnter
wntcr or
'olhonvlsc.
undm· their conh'ol to 11oocl nny higltwn.y to the injury thereof, shall be lia.hle to the city or county, ns the cnsc m:iy be,
for the cfamage, nncl to n 1lne b1 any sum not exceeding
twenty-live doll:11·:3 ($211).
S1-:c. 20. Whoever rem ores or injnres any milehonrc1,
In/"rl
to
or milt!stone, or gnicle post, or nny inscription on snch,
~!~ 0 0 " rd8• erected on :my higllwa.y , is lhible to ,i 11cnnlty of ten t1ollars
1'c11111ty,
($10) l'or every such ofl'e11cc.
SE<?. 21. .An,v llerson or per;:;ons who dri\'c loose herds
Pcrsoosltnblo of l10rses, c:1ttfo, s 1ccp, goat:-i or sw ine orc1· t.ho higltwn.ys
~~~.~gf'i~;°s where they pnss on dugwn.ys, Hhall be liable fo1· nll dnmnge
hol'scs, cau1c, c1onc to such highw:i,y:-i IJJ' cari1w or the banks or rolling
etc
•
'='
·
loo:;e rocks into the same.
SEO. 22. 'l'hc ro:1<1 snpcr\'isorii nny 1rnt up on hric1ges
Fost url~lns mu1er their charge notices that there iH "lire cloll;i L'S(%) lint~
oo brJtt~cs.
for r :ding or dri\'illg on lhb br;:~ge fostL•r t.ltan :i walk."
,Yhoerer tlwr<'nftl~r r:cles or drives f:i,-;tL•t· tlun ti \\'a.lk on
snch l1ritlge is li:tlllu to it penalty of lire doll:ns (>.iii) for
c.•ach offence.
·
.··
S1•:l!. 2H. '.Vhocn~r clig::; up, cut::; down, or otherwise
i11j11rr.s or wilfnll,r clestro,rs any sltacle 01· Ol'll:tllll'llt:d tree
InJ11ry to
trees.
phm
tccl a ncl sbntling on :my highway, is Jia.blc to a line of
I'onnltr,
twenty-Jive dollar:; ($2/i) i'ot· each 1meh trr.e.
S1•:c. 2-!. .All penaltb; or forfoitnrcs nm1m· th;:! Act,
I'cnnltlcR nnd ancl not otherwhm prol'iclcc1 for, mnst-be rcco,·L\t'Ctl by the
forfcltnrrs,
roacl s11pm·\'iso1·:-1 of the respective ro:1d distl'iets am1 be nphow rccoycrctl,
plicd on the liiglnmys 1n whiclt they nre collected.
Si-:o. 2o. All Acts or 11rnt:.'I of Acts in conllict with the
coofllctlng
provisions of this Act are hereby repe.1It-<1.
Acta rcpcnlApproYed I<'cbrunry 20, 1880.
oil,

Addendum 10

Utah Code

72-5-301 Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Acceptance," "acceptance of a right-of-way for the construction of a highway over public lands,
not reserved for public uses," or "accepted" so as to vest the R.S. 2477 dominant estate in the
right-of-way in the state and any applicable political subdivision of the state, means one or more
of the following acts prior to October 21, 1976:
(a) by the state or any political subdivision of the state:
(i) construction or maintenance of a highway;
(ii) inclusion of the highway in a state, county, or municipal road system;
(iii) expenditure of any public funds on the highway;
(iv) execution of a memorandum of understanding or other agreement with any other public or
private entity or an agency of the federal government that recognizes the right or obligation
of the state or a political subdivision of the state to construct or maintain the highway or a
portion of the highway; or
(v)
(A) the acceptance at statehood of the school or institutional trust lands accessed or
traversed by the right-of-way; or
(B) the selection and receipt by the state of a clear list, indemnity list, or other document
conveying title to the state of school, institutional trust lands, or other state lands accessed
or traversed by the highway;
(b) use by the public for a period in excess of 10 years in accordance with Section 72-5-104; or
(c) any other act consistent with state or federal law indicating acceptance of a right-of-way.
(2)
(a) "Construction" means any physical act of readying a highway for use by the public according
to the available or intended mode of transportation, including, foot, horse, vehicle, pipeline, or
other mode.
(b) "Construction" includes:
(i) removing vegetation;
(ii) moving obstructions, including rocks, boulders, and outcroppings;
(iii) filling low spots;
(iv) maintenance over several years;
(v) creation of an identifiable route by use over time; and
(vi) other similar activities.
(3) "Cut-off date" means the earlier of the date the underlying land was reserved for public use or
October 21, 1976.
(4)
(a) "Highway" means:
.
(i) any road, street, trail, or other access or way that is open to the public to come and go
or transport water at will, without regard to how or by whom the way was constructed or
maintained; and
(ii) appurtenant land and structures including road drainage ditches, back and front slopes,
turnouts, rest areas, and other areas that facilitate use of the highway by the public.
(b) "Highway" includes:
(i) pedestrian trails, horse paths, livestock trails, wagon roads, jeep trails, logging roads,
homestead roads, mine-to-market roads, alleys, tunnels, bridges, and all other ways and
their attendant access for maintenance; and
(ii) irrigation canals, waterways,"viaducts, ditches, pipelines, or other means of water
transmission and their attendant access for maintenance.
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(c) To be a "highway" a right-of-way need not have destinations or termini that are some kind of
landmarks distinguishable from other points along the right-of-way, as long as the right-of-way
accommodates travelers from one point along the right-of-way to another point as often as
convenient or necessary.
(5) "Maintenance" means any physical act of upkeep of a highway or repair of wear or damage
whether from natural or other causes, including the following:
(a) vertical and horizontal alignment alterations to meet applicable safety standards;
(b) widening an existing road or flattening of shoulders or side slopes to meet applicable safety
standards;
(c) grooming and grading of the previously cpnstructed road surface;
(d) establishing and maintaining the road crown with materials gathered along the road;
(e) filling ruts;
(f) spot filling with the same materials of the road, or improved materials;
(g) leveling or smoothing washboards;
(h) clearing the roadway of obstructing debris;
(i) cleaning culverts, including head basins and outlets;
U) resurfacing with the same or improved materials;
(k) installing, maintaining, repairing and replacing rip rap;
(I) maintaining drainage;
(m) maintaining and repairing washes and gullies;
(n) installing, maintaining, repairing, and replacing culverts as necessary to protect the existing
surface from erosion;
(o) repairing washouts;
(p) installing, maintaining, repairing and replacing marker posts;
(q) installing, maintaining, and repairing water crossings;
(r) installing, maintaining, and repairing and replacing cattle guards;
(s) installing, maintaining, and repairing and replacing road signs;
(t) installing, maintaining, and repairing and replacing road striping;
(u) repair, stabilization and improvement of cut and fill slopes;
(v) application of seal coats; or
··
(w) snow removal.
(6) "Public lands not reserved for public uses" means the surface of federal lands open to entry
and location and includes the surface of lands that are subject to subsurface coal withdrawals
or mining claims.
(7) "R.S. 2477 right-of-way" means a right-of-way for a highway constructed in this state on public
lands not reserved for public uses in accordance with Revised Statute 2477, codified as 43
U.S.C. Section 932, and accepted by the state or a political subdivision of the state prior to
October 21, 1976.
Amended by Chapter 293, 2003 General Session
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72-5-302 Rights-of-way across federal lands -- Title -- Presumption -- Scope.
(1) This part applies to all RS. 2477 rights-of-way .
(2) The state and its political subdivisions have title to the RS. 24 77 rights-of-ways in accordance
with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-103, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103.
(3)
(a) Acceptance of a right-of-way for the construction of a highway over public lands, not reserved
for public uses, is presumed if the state or a political subdivision of the state makes a finding
that the highway was constructed and the right-of-way was accepted prior to October 21,
1976.
(b) The existence of a highway in a condition suitable for public use establishes a presumption
that the highway has continued in use in i~s present location since the land over which it is
built was public land not reserved for public use.
(4)
(a) Unless specifically determined prior to the cut-off date provided in Section 72-5-301 by the
state or a political subdivision of the state with authority over the RS. 2477 right-of-way, the
scope of the R.S. 24 77 right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary for all highway
uses as of the cut-off date determined according to the facts and circumstances, including:
(i) highway drainage facilities;
(ii) shoulders adjacent to the right-of-way; and
(iii) maintenance activities defined in Section 72-5-301 that are reasonable and necessary.
(b) Unless specifically determined by the state or political subdivision of the state with the
authority over the R.S . 2477 right-of-way, an RS. 2477 right-of-way is presumed to be at
least 66 feet wide if that is the usual width of highway rights-of-way in the area.
(c) The scope of the RS. 2477 right-of-way includes the right to widen the highway as necessary
to accommodate the increased travel associated with those uses, up to, where applicable,
improving a highway to two lanes so travelers can safely pass each other.
(5) The safety standards established by the Department of Transportation in accordance with
Section 72-6-102 apply to all determinations of safety on R.S. 2477 righ ts-of-way used for
vehicular travel.

Amended by Chapter 293, 2003 General Session
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72-5-309 Acceptance of rights-of-way -- Notice of acknowledgment required.
(1) The governor or the governor's designee may assess whether the grant of the R.S. 2477 has
been accepted with regard to any right-of-way so as to vest title of the right-of-way in the state
and the applicable political subdivision as provided for in Section 72-5-103.
(2) If the governor or governor's designee concludes that the grant has been accepted as to
any right-of-way, the governor or a designee shall issue a notice of acknowledgment of the
acceptance of the R.S. 2477 grant as to that right-of-way.
(3) A notice of acknowledgment of the R.S. 2477 grant shall include:
(a) a statement of reasons for the acknowledgment;
(b) a general description of the right-of-way or rights-of-way subject to the notice of
acknowledgment, including the county in which it is located, and notice of where a center-line
description derived from Global Positioning System data may be viewed or obtained;
(c) a statement that the owner of the servientestate in the land over which the right-of-way or
rights-of-way subject to the notice runs or any person with a competing dominant estate
ownership claim may file a petition with the district cou rt for a decision regarding the
correctness or incorrectness of the acknowledgment; and
(d) a statement of the time limit provided in Section 72-5-310 for filing a petition.
(4)
(a)
(i) The governor or the governor's designee may record a notice of acknowledgment, and any
supporting affidavit, map, or other document purporting to establish or affect the state's
property interest in the right-of-way or rights-of-way, in the office of the county recorder in
the county where the right-of-way or rights-of-way exist.
(ii)
(A) A notice of acknowledgment recorded in the county recorder's office is not required to be
accompanied by a paper copy of the center-line description.
(B) A paper copy of each center-line description together with the notice of acknowledgment
shall be placed in the state archives created in Section 63A-12-101 and made available
to the public upon request in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records
Access and Management Act.
(C) An electronic copy of the center-line description identified in a notice of acknowledgment
shall be available upon request at:
(1) the county recorder's office; or
(II) the Automated Geographic Reference Center created in Section 63F-1 -506.
(b) A notice of acknowledgment recorded in the county recorder's office is conclusive evidence of
acceptance of the R.S. 2477 grant upon:
(i) expiration of the 60-day period for filing a petition under Section 72-5-310 without the filing of
a petition; or
(ii) a final court decision that the notice of acknowledgment was not incorrect.

Amended by Chapter 97, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code

72-5-310 Notice of acknowledgment -- Court determination -- Presumption of acceptance.
(1) The governor or the governor's designee shall provide a copy of the notice of
acknowledgement by certified mail and return receipt requested to:
(a) the last known owner of the servient estate in land over which the right-of-way or rights-ofway subject to the notice runs; and
(b) any person known to have a competing dominant estate ownership claim .
(2)
(a) A person with a servient estate or competing dominant estate ownership claim to the
right-of-way may petition for a decision of the district court as to the correctness of the
acknowledgment of acceptance of the R.S. 2477 grant issued under Section 72-5-309.
(b) Venue for the court action shall be the district court for Salt Lake County.
(c) The petition shall be fil ed no later than 60 days after the date on which the petitioner received
a copy of the notice of acknowledgment.
(d) The state, through the governor or the governor's designee, shall be named as a respondent
and served with a copy of the petition in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(e) No one other than a person with a servient estate ownership claim in land over which the
right-of-way or rights-of-way subject to the notice runs or a competing dominant estate claim
may challenge the correctness of a notice of acknowledgment.
(3) The petition for a court decision of the correctness of the notice of acknowledgment shall be a
complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall contain:
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address;
(b) a copy of the notice of acknowledgment the petitioner asserts is incorrect;
(c) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and
(d) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief.
(4) Except as provided under this Part 3, Rights-Of-Way Across Federal Lands Act, all pleadings
and proceedings to determine the correctness of a notice of acknowledgment in the district
court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(5) The court sha ll make its decision without deference to the notice of acknowledgment.
(6)
(a) In accordance with Section 72-5-302, a rebuttable presumption that the R.S. 2477 grant has
been accepted is created when:
(i) a highway existed on public lands not reserved for public uses as of the cut-off date under
Section 72-5-301; and
(ii) the highway currently exists in a condition suitable for public use.
(b) The proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the burden of proving
acceptance of the grant by a preponderance of the evidence for all decisions that are not
subject to Subsection (6)(a).
Amended by Chapter 9, 2006 General Session
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General Land Office No. 2089
No. 2089

Mineral Certificate No. 5-5
No. 5-5

The United States of America.
To all.whom these Presents shall come greeting: Whereas, in issuance of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, Chapter Six, Title Thirty-two, there have been deposited in the
General Land Office of the United States the Plat and Field Notes of Survey of the Park Silver
Mining Company assignees of Edward P. Vollum, Julien F. Carter and William H. Howland
upon the Flagstaff Mine accompanied by the Certificate of the Register of the Land Office as
Salt Lake City, in the Territory of Utah whereby it appears that, in furtherance of the said
Revised Statutes of the United States, Edward P. Voll um, Julian F. Carter and WilliamH.
Howland did, on the fifth day of April, A.D. 1873 enter and pay for said mining claim or
premises, being Mineral Entry No. 5-5, in the series of said Office, designated by the Survey or
General as Lot No. 38, embracing a portion of the unsurveyed Public Domain in the Uintah
Mining District in the County of Summit and Territory of Utah in the District of Lands subject to
sale at Salt Lake City, containing five (5) acres and fifty-one hundredths (51/100) of an acre of
land more or less and according to the returns on file in the GenerarLand Office bounded
described, and platted as follows, with magnetic variation at sixteen (16) degrees thirty (30)
minutes East to such.
Beginning at Corner No. I. a Post. marked "No. l ." and "No. 38". Thence north fortyseven (47) degrees thirty (30) minutes East, two hundred and fifty (250) feet to top ofRidge,
twelve hundred (1200) feet to Corner No. 2. a Post marked "No. 2," and "No. 38" from which a
Fir Tree eighteen (18) inches in diameter bears West at the distance of two (2) feet. Thence from
said Corner No. 2, South forty-two ( 42) degrees thirty (30) minutes East one hundred (100) feet
to a point from which Discovery Shaft on the claim bears South forty-seven (47) degrees thirty
(30) minutes West at the distance often hundred (1000) feet, two hundred (200) feet to Corner
No. 3 a Post. marked "No. 3" and "No. 38" from which a Fir Tree fifteen (15) inches in diameter,
bears South eight (80) degrees West, as the distance of five (5) feet and an Aspen Tree fourteen
(14) inches in diameter, bears north five (5) degrees East, at the distance of nine (9) links:
Thence from said Comer No. 3 South forty-seven (47) degrees thirty (30) minutes West, eight
hundred and fifty (850) feet to top of Divide, twelve hundred (1200) feet to Corner No. 4, a Post
in mound of stone marked "No. 4" and "No. 38". Thence north forty-two (42) degrees thirty (30)
minutes West, one hundred (I 00) feet to a point from which Discovery Shaft on the claim bears
North forty-seven (47) degrees thirty (30) minutes East, at tbe distan.ce of two hundred (200)
feet, two hundred (200) feet to the place of beginning, containing five (5) acres and fifty-one
hundredth (S 1/100) of an acre of land more or less and embracing tweJve hundred (1200) linear
feet of said Flagstaff Mine, to wit: one thousand (1000) linear feet north-easterly and two
hundred (200) linear feet South-westerly from Discovery Shaft on said mine, as represented by
yellow shading in the follow plat.
From said Discovery Shaft, U .S. Mineral Monument No. 2, bears South sixty-five (65)
degrees East, at the distance of eight hundred and eighteen (818) feet, a Shaft bears north thirty
(30) degrees East, at the distance of thirteen (13) feet, and a Shaft bears South sixty-four (64)
degrees West, at the distance of sixteen (16) feet.
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Now know ye, that the United States of America, in consideration of the premises and in
conformity w ith the said Rev ised States of the U nited States, have given and granted, and by
these presents do give and grant unto the said Park Silver Mining Company and to their
successors and assigns the said mining premises herein before described as Lot No. 38 embracing
a portion of the unsurveyed Public Doma in with the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment
of all the land included with the exterior lines of said survey, nor here in expressly excepted from
these presents and of twelve hundred (1200) linear feet of the said F lagstaff Mine vein, lode,
ledge, or deposit for the length hereinbefore described throughout its e ntire depth, although it
may e nter the land adjoining, arid also all of the ·o ther veins, lodes, ledges, or deposits throughout
their entire depth, the tops or apexes of which lie inside the exterior lines of said survey of the
surface extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, ledges, or deposits in their
downward course may so far deposit from a perpendicular as to extend outside the vertical side
lines of said survey;
Provided that the right of possession hereby granted to such outside parts of said veins,
lodes, ledges, or deposits shall be confined to such portions thereof as lie between the vertical
planes drawn downward through the end lines of said survey at the'surface, so continued in their
own direction that such vertical planes w ill intersect such exterior parts of said veins, lodes,
ledges, or deposits;
·
And Provided further that nothing in this conveyance sha ll authorize the grantees herein,
their successors or assigns to enter upon the surface of a mining claim owned or possessed by
another.
To have and to ho ld said mining premises together w ith all the rights, privileges,
immunities, and appurtenances of whatsoever nature thereunto belonging unto the said Park
Silver Min ing Company and to their successors and assignees forever, subj ect none theless to the
fo llowing conditions and stipulations:
First. That the grant hereby made is restricted to the land hereinbefore described as Lot
No. 38 with twelve hundred (1200) linear feet of the Flagstaff Mine vein lodes, ledges, or despite
for the length of the aforesaid throughout its entire depth as aforesaid, together with all other
veins, lodes, ledges, or deposits throughout the ir entire depths as aforesaid, the tops or apexes of
which lie inside the exterior lines o f said survey.
Second. That the premises hereby conveyed, with the exception of the surface, may be
entered by the proprietors of any other vein, lode, ledge, or deposit, the top or apex of which lies
outside the exterior limits of said survey, should the same in its downward course be found to
penetrate, intersect, extend into or underlie the prem ises hereby granted, fo r the purpose of
extracting and removing the ore fro m such other vein, lodge, ledge, or deposit.
T hird. That the premises hereby conveyed shall be he ld subject to any'vested and
accrued water ri ghts for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes and rights to
ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water rights as may be recognized and
acknowledged by the local laws, customs, and decisions of courts.
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Fourth. That in the absence of necessary legislation by Congress, the legislature of Utah
may provide rules for working the mining claim or premises hereby granted, involving
easements, drainage, and other necessary means to its complete development.
In testimony whereat: I Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America, have
caused these Letters to be made Patent and the Seal of the General Land Office to be herewith
affixed.
Given under my hand at the City of Washington the twenty-eighth day of December in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six and of the Independence of the United
States the one hundred and first.
By the President U.S. Grant
By D.D. _ , Secretary
S. W. Clark-Recorder of the General Larid Office
Recorded Vol. 24 Pages 413 to 420 inclusive
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